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Series foreword
ix
Before the Labour Party entered government in October 1964 its leader,
Harold Wilson, raised hopes of creating a ‘new Britain’, based on further-
ing the ‘white heat’ of technological change and aiming to pursue
egalitarianism at home and abroad. In June 1970 Labour was ejected
from office having lived up to few of these aspirations. Most analysts of
the party’s period in power consequently characterise it as a miserable
failure. The majority focus on the Labour leadership’s lack of ambition
and reserve much of their censure for Wilson’s strategic shortcomings.
Present-day ‘New’ Labour, for which the 1960s are clearly an embarrass-
ment, effectively endorses this glum assessment.
The three volumes in this series tackle different aspects of the 1964–70
Wilson governments’ record and assume contrasting approaches to their
subjects. Each, however, benefits from access to recently released govern-
ment files housed in the Public Record Office, as well as other documents
lately made available to historians. Together the volumes constitute the
most complete record of these governments currently obtainable. While
not denying Labour in office was a disappointment when measured
against party rhetoric, the authors assume a more nuanced view compared
with most previous accounts. In particular, they highlight a wider range
of reasons for the governments’ relative lack of achievement. If the dis-
position of Labour’s leaders played its part, so did the nature of the party,
the delicate state of the economy, the declining place of Britain in the
world order and the limited ambitions of the British people themselves.
In testing some well entrenched assumptions about these govern-
ments in light of new evidence, the authors dispute their status as the
black sheep of Labour history and establish some new perspectives. In
this respect, these volumes therefore mark an important stage in the
permanent revisionism to which all historians should subject the past.
It is hoped they will encourage more research on Labour’s period in
office and challenge their overly grim reputation among both academics
and lay readers alike.
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Introduction. Cultural and political
change in 1960s Britain
If they are to prosper, political parties must successfully engage with
change. For the British Labour Party during the 1960s, this imperative
seemed especially acute because, like other advanced capitalist societies,
the country underwent what has been described as a ‘cultural revolution’.
The viability of what many took to be immutable identities and divisions
based on class, gender, generation and ethnicity was widely questioned;
in addition, the relationship between individuals and political authority
was subject to sweeping critique. This book examines the nature of
Labour’s response during the 1964–70 governments led by Harold Wilson.
Yet, while a work of history, it views its subject with one eye on the
debate that began in the 1990s regarding how parties should react to
what was believed to be another period of flux. By establishing how
Labour thought and acted during the 1960s, it is hoped this work will
put into perspective certain issues currently preoccupying those inter-
ested in the viability of representative politics.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to clarify and contextu-
alise issues that will be later investigated in greater depth and to outline
the author’s approach to the subject. Taking the second concern first,
the critic Raymond Williams long ago remarked that, because there are
so many ways in which it can be defined, ‘culture’ is one of the most
difficult words in the English language.1 To avoid later confusion, it is
therefore necessary to clarify what in this work ‘cultural change’ implies.
Following Williams, ‘culture’ here means ‘relationships between elements
in a whole way of life’, something including not only the actions of
individuals but also what those actions were taken to signify – because
thoughts and feelings influence activity. Consequently, ‘culture’ embraces
not just what individuals did, but what they imagined they were doing
and what impact they believed their actions would have. ‘Cultural change’
therefore comprises both ‘objective’ transformation and what contem-
poraries – specifically members of the Labour Party – thought those
changes were and how they should react to them. The work is particu-
larly interested in what Williams described as the ‘felt sense of the quality
fielding ch 1.P65 10/10/03, 12:301
2 Fielding
of life … a sense of the ways in which particular activities combined into
a way of thinking and living’, what he called the ‘structure of feeling’,
comprising ‘the most delicate and least tangible parts of our activity’.
This focus is due to the assumption that the ‘structure of feeling’
sustained by Labour’s organisation helps account for its members’
understanding of cultural change. While that does not hold the key to
explaining Labour’s electoral performance – something due to other
factors, many of which were beyond its control – it nonetheless illumi-
nates the rationale for the party’s actions.
Given this concern with culture, the work casts its net wider than
most studies of contemporary British political history.2 The actions of
the Labour governments are placed in a milieu that includes more than
Cabinet ministers, top civil servants and members of the National Execu-
tive Committee, as a focus on the workings of Whitehall and Transport
House tends to abstract politics from society. For one of the purposes
here is to establish the extent to which Labour was a cultural entity as
much as – to take an almost random selection of 1960s artefacts – the
television soap opera Coronation Street, Anthony Burgess’s novel The
Clockwork Orange, the pop group Herman’s Hermits and Manchester
United Football Club. Nonetheless, albeit embedded in time and place,
Labour – in contrast to the likes of Herman and his Hermits – sought
to change the society that produced it. In particular, members of the
party talked of building ‘socialism’ and viewed cultural change with that
aim in mind. Leaders and members could not, however, agree what
form ‘socialism’ should take and so disputed the impact it might exert
on their party’s fortunes: more than a few in fact denied society was
transforming on any substantive scale.
One of the aims of this chapter is to establish that cultural change
provoked contrasting, and often flawed, readings. Given that contem-
poraries necessarily lacked the benefit of hindsight, they sometimes
questioned the existence of what would later be thought critical trends –
and occasionally exaggerated the importance of what would subse-
quently prove to be fads. Nonetheless, how change is first conceived
can be of critical importance and so the main emphasis here is not on
establishing the actuality of change but on what Labour members under-
stood it to be. This means taking account of party thinking since at
least 1945. For just as all armies prepare to fight only the last war, so
civil institutions look to the future through preconceptions cast from
past experience. In this regard, Labour was no different, except perhaps
in the especially pronounced respect that many members paid to the
party’s history.
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The ‘Golden Age’
The 1960s fall within what Eric Hobsbawm has termed ‘a sort of Golden
Age’, which began with Western Europe’s recovery from the Second
World War in the early 1950s and ended with the onset of global reces-
sion two decades later. Hobsbawm saw this as a time of ‘extraordinary
economic growth and social transformation’ within advanced capitalist
societies, ‘which probably changed human society more profoundly than
any other period of comparable brevity’.3 That which Arthur Marwick
called a ‘cultural revolution’ was not limited to a politically radical or
socially privileged elite but affected the ‘material conditions, lifestyles,
family relationships, and personal freedoms’ of ‘the vast majority of
ordinary people’.4 According to Ronald Inglehart, unprecedented growth
encouraged voters to embrace ‘post-material values’, such as a concern
for the environment, and to demand a more direct say in decision-
making.5 Yet, if all authorities agree that the decade saw marked change,
not all think it was a Golden Age.
Most historians believe that during the first half of the twentieth
century Britain was a singularly stable society, such that, be it in the
parlour, factory or polling booth, those in power were rarely challenged.6
The most developed expression of what sociologists Edward Shils and
Michael Young described as Britain’s ‘moral unity’ was thought to have
been the 1953 Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. This caused two
million subjects to express their devotion on the streets of London while
thirty million more watched events unfold on television or listened to
their description on radio. Even the politically progressive Manchester
Guardian believed this ceremony saw ‘the unity of a people expressed
more convincingly than ever’.7
The indigenous view that Britons were happy with their political
system was reinforced by US social scientists who, during the Cold War,
searched for viable models of liberal democracy.8 To Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba, the country’s ‘civic culture’ was exemplary, being
‘neither traditional nor modern but partaking of both’. It was a ‘pluralistic
culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus
and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it’. Most
notably, it had allowed the working class to enter mainstream politics
and, ‘in a process of trial and error, find the language in which to couch
their demands and the means to make them effective’. Almond and
Verba were confident that Britain’s civic culture could easily accommo-
date any new political forces on the same basis.9
Almond later admitted that this conceptualisation of civic culture
was both an independent and dependent variable: that is, it was thought
to be an influence on, as well as subject to, more intractable structural
factors.10 Thus, it was unclear how far Britain’s civic culture created the
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country’s stability or was itself a product of the country’s relatively placid
history. Just because Britain had enjoyed political constancy for much
of the twentieth century did not mean it would do so if its foundations
crumbled: and to the alarmed eyes of many transatlantic observers,
during the 1960s this began to happen. What Samuel Beer described
as the ‘romantic revolt’ gave rise to a new ‘populism’ – evident in sex,
music, clothing, marriage, the family, work, crime, sport, education,
religion and race relations – that infected the body politic. Beer blamed
the ‘counterculture’ for this, especially pop music: the Beatles, he wrote,
were the ‘unacknowledged legislators’ of the decline of that deference
which had underpinned the country’s civic character.11
Contemporary British observers, such as the journalists Christopher
Booker and Bernard Levin, also thought the decade undermined all
that was once good about their country. As Levin put it:
There was a restlessness in the time that communicated itself every-
where and to everyone, that communicated itself to the very sounds
in Britain’s air, the stones beneath Britain’s feet. These stones shifted
as she walked ahead with her once-purposeful stride, so that she
began to stumble, then to stagger, then to fall down.12
Expressed in less vivid terms, much subsequent academic analysis accepted
that Britain’s civic culture had been destroyed during this period, in-
augurating what historian Kenneth Morgan described as a ‘grim period
of dissolution and indiscipline’.13
This negative assessment is, however, not the only one on show. There
is, in fact, a school of thought that is its exact opposite, one that presents
post-war Britain as defined by repression and tired conformity. Advo-
cates of this view see change as heralding a much-needed liberation for
hitherto excluded groups, such as the young, women, workers and
ethnic minorities. According to them, instead of loss, the 1960s brought
considerable gains and on that basis should be celebrated rather than
mourned.14
Rather than seeing the period in zero-sum terms, others focus on
how Britain after 1945 engaged with ‘modernity’. Within this frame of
reference, even the emblematic Coronation can be seen not as the glori-
ous expression of an entrenched civic culture, but as one of a number
of ‘extraordinarily contradictory impulses towards the modern’.15 This
accords to some degree with the perceptive but neglected view of the
historian Henry Pelling, that the 1960s did not mark a decisive break
with the past but instead enjoyed an essential continuity with the late
nineteenth century.16
In light of such contrasting viewpoints, we should accept that, during
the 1960s, Britain experienced significant cultural changes that had
important political consequences – even if they had different causes
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and were more uneven, less dramatic and not as dire as some conceived
them. Thus, Britain’s civic culture was not so much destroyed as re-
configured and placed on a more ‘modern’ or, as Anthony Giddens has
it, ‘post-traditional’ basis, one notably bereft of deference.17 It was un-
doubtedly an invigorating moment for those individuals challenging
the status quo and a painful one for figures in authority. The period
should, however, cease to be the occasion for further emotion and
become subject to a sober analysis of its wider significance. That, at
least, is the perspective adopted here.
Having established the work’s overall approach, it is now appropriate
to survey those subjects usually seen as critical to Britain’s mid-century
transformation. The review is not exhaustive: in particular, it does not
directly deal with ‘permissiveness’, which fortunately has been very ably
tackled by others.18 This is because the purpose here is to address issues
both of intrinsic cultural importance and of great significance to
Labour, inasmuch as they brought some of the party’s long-standing
electoral, ideological and organisational problems to an uncomfortably
sensitive point.
Workers
However important were other forms of cultural change, contem-
poraries were most preoccupied by the transformation of the working
class, as the days of the class-conscious worker appeared numbered.
While still forming a majority, the manual working class was undeniably
contracting in size, from about two-thirds of the workforce in 1951 to
somewhat over half by 1971. Decline was, moreover, steepest in un-
skilled and semi-skilled occupations – those with the lowest pay and
most insecure conditions (see Tables 1.1. and 1.2). Observers believed
this meant the future lay with administrators, technicians and secre-
taries, those who thought of themselves as middle class – even when
their incomes were often inferior to those of skilled manual workers.
On the eve of the 1960s, the working class was richer than ever
before. Between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s, a male workers’ average
income rose by a third in real terms; the proportion of households
owning fridges went from one in ten to one in three; and those with a
television set increased from two-fifths to two-thirds. In this context it
was not unreasonable for the Conservative Prime Minister, Harold
Macmillan, to declare that ‘most of our people have never had it so
good’ and to urge his audience to go ‘round the country, go to the
industrial towns, go to the farms and you will see a state of prosperity
such as we have never had in my life-time – nor indeed ever in the
history of this country’.19 Rising incomes were thought to be so altering
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Table 1.1 The distribution (%) of economically active men by
occupational category, 1951 and 1971
1951 1971  Difference
Self-employed and higher-grade
salaried professionals 2.8 6.1 +3.3
Employers and proprietors 5.7 5.2 –0.5
Administrators and managers 6.8 9.9 +3.1
Lower-grade salaried professionals
and technicians 3.0 5.5 +2.5
Inspectors, supervisors and foremen 3.3 4.5 +1.2
Clerical workers 6.0 6.1 +0.1
Sales personnel and shop assistants 4.0 3.9 –0.1
Skilled manual 30.3 29.4 –0.9
Semi-skilled manual 24.3 21.2 –3.1
Unskilled manual 13.8 8.2 –5.6
Total active male population (in 1,000s) 15,584 15,609
Source: A. H. Halsey, Change in British Society (Oxford, 1985), Table 2.1.
Table 1.2 The distribution (%) of economically active women by
occupational category, 1951 and 1971
1951 1971  Difference
Self-employed and higher-grade
salaried professionals 1.0 1.4 +0.4
Employers and proprietors 3.2 2.9 –0.3
Administrators and managers 2.7 3.3 +0.6
Lower-grade salaried professionals
and technicians 7.9 10.8 +2.9
Inspectors, supervisors and forewomen 1.1 1.2 +0.1
Clerical workers 20.3 28.0 +7.7
Sales personnel and shop assistants 9.6 9.4 –0.2
Skilled manual 12.7 9.3 –3.4
Semi-skilled manual 33.6 27.3 –6.3
Unskilled manual 7.9 6.4 –1.5
Total active female population (in 1,000s) 6,930 8,762
Source: A. H. Halsey, Change in British Society (Oxford, 1985), Table 2.1.
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lifestyles that, according to the social investigator Ferdynand Zweig, ‘a
deep transformation’ in workers’ values was in process: they were ‘on
the move towards new middle-class values and [a] middle-class existence’.20
Yet how many workers could be described as ‘affluent’ and the conse-
quences of this condition were keenly debated.
As early as 1951, the researchers Seebohm Rowntree and G. R. Lavers
claimed full employment and the welfare state meant poverty afflicted
only one in twenty households.21 Some thought this meant poverty was
virtually a thing of the past, although others believed Rowntree under-
estimated the problem; by the mid-1960s this latter view was taken more
seriously.22 Later studies suggested that poverty was three times more
prevalent than noted by Rowntree; it certainly remained easy to find
families for whom the world of televisions and fridges remained an
exotic ideal.23 Recent analysis indicates that poverty was neither as low
as suggested by Rowntree nor as extensive as critics alleged.24 Thus, if
poverty remained a feature of working-class life, for most the threat of
becoming poor had largely lost its sting.
Some believed rising working-class wages were accompanied by a
redistribution of wealth: workers were not only better off in absolute
terms but also catching up with middle-class incomes. The welfare state
and the higher taxes required to finance it were, as one observer had it,
‘relentlessly, year by year … pushing us towards collectivism and property-
less uniformity’.25 Others were less sure, if only because assessing the
extent of redistribution was bedevilled by contentious concepts and
partial data.26 By the end of the 1960s, however, it was generally accepted
that while there had been a modest redistribution as a consequence of
policies introduced during and immediately after the Second World
War, the process had ended in the 1950s.27 Similarly, the much-made
claim that class barriers had broken down, allowing unprecedented
social mobility, was subsequently shown to be wide of the mark.28
Even so, some thought rising incomes had by themselves called an
end to the established collectivist proletarian way of life. In particular,
ill-provided – but ‘neighbourly’ – working-class districts were broken
up as residents decamped to socially mixed housing estates or were
placed in high-rise tower blocks to live more isolated lives.29 While it is
unquestionable that what social historians term the ‘traditional’ working
class began to fragment during the 1950s and 1960s, observers exag-
gerated the extent to which workers had ever shared a common way of
life.30 Social patterns were highly differentiated well before the advent
of ‘affluence’: class was never more than one influence on a worker’s
identity, as status, gender, generation and ethnicity also played their
part – and sometimes the dominating one.31 In particular, there had
always been elements within the working class – at the start of the
twentieth century they were called ‘labour aristocrats’ – whose incomes
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enabled them to ape traits associated with their social superiors.32 Con-
temporaries in addition underestimated how far new private housing
estates remained marked by class differences.33 Nonetheless, while
changes promoted by affluence were not exactly novel, their scale was
such that many felt they were – and that was significant enough.
If extensive, the impact of affluence was uneven: rising incomes were
concentrated in particular industries located in the South East and the
West Midlands. Unemployment, especially in the North, Scotland and
Wales, where heavy manufacturing was in decline, remained an issue.
There was, nonetheless, superficial evidence of affluence in such places –
like the virtual disappearance of the wearing of clogs and shawls in
Bolton.34 However, ‘traditional’ workers did not experience so much
cultural disruption as did employees in the more favoured parts of the
country. Thus, while miners, of whom there were still half a million in
1960, enjoyed historically unprecedented standards of living, many
remained in the same village, went to the same pubs and clubs, and
worked in the same pit as their grandfathers. They consequently experi-
enced a sense of continuity with the past.35 In contrast, as many of
Coventry’s ‘affluent’ car factory workers were émigrés drawn from towns
in Britain’s former industrial heartlands, to them more or less every-
thing appeared new.36
As the sociologists John Goldthorpe and David Lockwood discovered
during their study of Luton car workers, even the lives of the affluent
remained bounded by class.37 While some shopfloor workers enjoyed
higher incomes than white-collar employees, their jobs were more insecure
and there was little chance of promotion. Moreover, even if they thought
themselves to be individuals and were preoccupied with purchasing an
expanding array of consumer goods, affluent workers could not afford
to be entirely individualistic. In order to maintain their standard of
living, they still needed shared institutions – most notably a trade union.
The number of trade unionists rose during the 1960s: at the start of
the decade they accounted for 44.2 per cent of the workforce but by its
end this share had reached 48.5 per cent.38 If some took this to be
sufficient refutation of the claim that workers had become middle class,
the fact that the 1960s saw a steep rise in the number of industrial
disputes appeared to settle the argument. Indeed, far-left observers
believed that by the end of the decade workers had embraced a militant
class consciousness.39 The number of strikes certainly rose, from the
2,832 called during 1960 to 3,906 in 1970, resulting in three million
and eleven million days lost, respectively. The majority of conflicts were,
however, short and located in a small number of industries – the most
prominent being car manufacturing.40 That affluent workers were among
those most inclined to industrial action led some, for example the
journalist Alan Watkins, to assert that such strikes were expressions of
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middle-class individualism.41 Certainly, the parochial nature of most
disputes meant they did not represent a concerted assault on the status
quo. They did, nonetheless, confirm that the workplace remained a
place of conflict where, however much money they might earn, workers
were unhappily subject to managerial authority. Even in industries un-
touched by strikes, the incipient hostility between manager and worker
was evident to those who took the time to look.42
Given this, it is probable that the historian Nick Tiratsoo reached the
right conclusion – that, while rising living standards enabled workers to
abandon some of the characteristics associated with the ‘traditional’
proletariat, it did not make them any more middle class. Instead, he
suggested, it allowed them to pursue ‘different ways of being working-
class’.43
Women
The 1960s is often associated with militant feminism – a not entirely
accurate impression, for the first British women’s liberation group was
founded in 1968. Moreover, the preoccupation of feminists, generally
young and middle class with backgrounds in the far left, with what they
supposed was an inherent gender conflict meant little to most women.44
The period nonetheless saw changes to many women’s lives, although
their impact needs to be understood in relation to the fact that the
overwhelming majority were married with children and looked on their
domestic role as life’s priority.
Ironically, given what was to follow, affluence helped consummate
the Victorian ‘cult of domesticity’, based on the notion that men and
women operated in separate spheres.45 This was partly due to the desire
of policy-makers to reinforce family life after the disruption of the
Second World War. Thus, while the welfare state improved the quality
of women’s lives, it proceeded from the assumption that they should
remain at home, bringing up children.46 Child psychologists also em-
phasised the importance of mothers staying at home, some suggesting
that working mothers were responsible for juvenile delinquency.47 In
this climate, few found it remarkable that the 1956 Royal Commission
on Marriage and Divorce urged wives to take their responsibilities
seriously and warned them against exploiting their rights.48 Popular
women’s magazines also promoted the idea that their readers’ lives were
rightly defined by homemaking and depicted the domestic sphere as a
major source of pleasure.49
Historically, women had never fully lived up to their role as ‘angels
in the house’: necessity meant some were forced to seek paid work.
During the 1960s, the dissonance between ideal and reality became
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especially keen. First, greater access to sophisticated birth control meant
women could have fewer children and better regulate when they gave
birth, meaning they had offspring during a much shorter period than
hitherto. Accordingly, if earlier marriages and births took women out
of the labour market at younger ages than previously, mothers could
then re-enter the workforce much sooner.50 Rising real wages, moreover,
gave married women with children an incentive to seek employment
outside the home, while the expansion of the service sector created a
greater demand for their skills. More women entered the world of work
as a result: in 1951 one-quarter were in employment but by 1971 this
figure had reached two-fifths, with much the greatest part of this growth
occurring in part-time work.51 The late 1960s also saw a rapid rise in
the number of women enrolling in trade unions, from 26.3 per cent of
female workers in 1965 to 31.5 per cent five years later – although that
was still half the rate evident among men.52
Women had always operated in a gendered labour market, receiving
less pay than men for similar work, a position that had not much
changed by 1960. Those in authority, however, began to see women
workers as an important means of overcoming the labour shortages
created by full employment. The Royal Commission on Trade Unions
and Employers’ Associations, chaired by Lord Donovan, which reported
in 1968, predicted that women would ‘provide the only substantial new
source from which extra labour and especially skilled labour can be
drawn’. If women were not fully utilised, the nation’s future growth
would be placed in jeopardy. Some believed the national interest now
dictated that women should be helped to escape low-skilled occupations
and be paid more for the work they performed.53
Given these contradictory impulses, the 1960s was a time of some
confusion. However, if women came to terms with the fact that they
could be wives, mothers and workers, in their own minds the role of
homemaker predominated.54 Surveys undertaken during the period
proved depressing reading for feminists. In her 1957 study, Viola Klein
claimed working women were so preoccupied with being wives and
mothers that they made only the weakest of claims to a ‘right to work’.
Not much had changed by the mid-1960s, when Nancy Seear bemoaned
the lack of any female protest against sexual inequality.55 Towards the
end of the decade, a few working-class women did claim equal pay with
men but they formed a small minority.56 This lack of overt radicalism
did not necessarily mean women willingly accepted their subordination:
it is possible they considered it futile to focus on something they felt
unable to change. In any case, some found being a housewife a fulfilling
experience. Older married women, in particular, could establish a pre-
eminent domestic position that gave them a powerful role, not just in
their own home but also in the wider neighbourhood.57 To them,
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feminism threatened a satisfactory way of life. Even female trade union-
ists criticised feminists for thinking freedom could be obtained only
through paid employment rather than homemaking.58
In understanding women’s lives, it is important to appreciate that a
higher proportion entered matrimony during the 1960s than at any
other time in history. The greater prominence of wives at the workplace
only slowly challenged the strict gender division upon which most
marriages were established. In ‘traditional’ working-class households,
where working wives were less common, such differentiation remained
as profound as ever.59 Some contemporaries believed, however, that in
more recently established, affluent households, roles were less demarcated,
so husbands spent a greater part of their time at home and assumed a
more active domestic role.60 A number also thought such relationships
were based on more fulfilling sexual relationships and a more intense
emotional bond.61 A few even claimed men and women were finding
marriage more enjoyable, as it became more like an equal partnership
than a master–servant relationship.62
The extent of ‘companionate’ marriages remains uncertain. While
contemporary investigators Peter Wilmott and Michael Young were con-
vinced they detected its emergence, those who came later were less sure.
According to the latter, the ‘companionate’ concept glossed over the
majority of marriages, in which wives remained subject to their husbands’
will.63 There were in any case limits to companionship – even in affluent
Luton, wives and husbands participated in distinct social networks, the
former mainly based around neighbours and family, the latter origin-
ating at work. While nearly a third of Luton wives worked outside the
home – half full time – less than one in twenty husbands took primary
responsibility for shopping or washing up. Perhaps an indication of
better things to come, just over one in five husbands claimed they shared
some responsibility for child care.64
Black immigrants
When the Empire Windrush docked in London from the West Indies in
1948 it opened a new chapter in the history of immigration to Britain,
albeit one reiterating familiar themes.65 Since industrialisation, immi-
gration had formed an integral, if controversial, part of British life. Irish
Catholics, who arrived in significant force during the mid-nineteenth
century, and Eastern European Jews, who entered at the turn of the
twentieth, generated much hostility.66 Zealots believed both were racially
inferior to those derived from Anglo-Saxon stock, but most were
agitated by their cultural differences, specifically ones based around
religion. In addition, immigrants settled in areas characterised by grim
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housing and insecure occupations; their presence only made matters
worse. Yet, while first-generation settlers were often subject to violence,
the passage of time saw their offspring secure a niche in many towns
and cities, although tensions based on supposed racial and actual cul-
tural differences never completely disappeared.
Post-war immigration formed part of this continuum, inasmuch as
most immigrants were white and came from Ireland or Commonwealth
countries like Australia and Canada. What made it distinct was that an
increasing proportion originated from undeveloped parts of the Common-
wealth, mainly the West Indies and the Indian sub-continent: and they
were black. Figures vary, but in 1951 there were probably 100,000 non-
white Commonwealth natives resident in Britain; by 1961 this number
had risen to something over 400,000; and by 1971 had reached about
700,000, meaning they represented not much more than 1 per cent of
the population.67 Few considered immigration a problem if – as the
1949 Royal Commission on Population put it – newcomers ‘were not
prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the host
population and becoming merged into it’.68 Contemporaries became
obsessed with the small number of black immigrants because it was
believed they could never be ‘merged’ into that vague but evocative
entity known as the ‘British way of life’. National identity at this point
was exclusively associated with whiteness, so many took it for granted
that blacks could never properly become Britons.
Colour prejudice existed well before 1939; imperial propaganda had
long emphasised the backwardness of native peoples.69 During the Second
World War many found themselves face to face with non-whites for the
first time, although as these were usually US servicemen responses were
muted because they did not threaten to leave a permanent mark. Just
to make sure, the authorities discouraged women from forming relation-
ships; they also did their best to segregate black members of the Empire
who filled vacancies in British factories or served in uniform.70
In 1948 the Labour administration introduced a Nationality Act,
which gave those born in the Empire and Commonwealth an equal legal
status to that of Britons: government became obliged to allow the free
movement of all those now effectively designated British subjects.71 Few
officials anticipated blacks would want to take advantage of the Act and
settle in Britain, so the arrival of the Empire Windrush came as an un-
pleasant surprise; but it was something they could do nothing about.
Doubts about black immigration were apparently confirmed when West
Indians became quickly associated with a variety of social problems.72
As with earlier waves, these difficulties were largely due to the poverty
of those districts in which immigrants settled and the fact that estab-
lished inhabitants imagined their new neighbours threatened their own
precarious position.
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The situation was most acute in London, where, during the 1950s,
up to half of West Indian immigrants settled.73 As the capital was experi-
encing a severe housing shortage, decent accommodation was hard to
find. Local authorities lacked the resources to overcome the problem,
while Conservative ministers made matters worse with their 1957 Rents
Act. Believing privately rented accommodation was scarce because of
statutory limitations on how much landlords could charge, the govern-
ment deregulated new tenancies. In their pursuit of a higher income,
unscrupulous landlords pressured tenants to quit, so they could be re-
placed with those no longer subject to controls. Many of these new tenants
were black; in fact, some landlords moved blacks next to sitting white
tenants, expecting the latter’s own prejudices would force them to leave.
In addition, black immigrants pooled their resources to buy properties
to rent out in the hope that this would give them financial security. Not
only did they pay over the market price but they also borrowed from
disreputable figures levying exorbitant interest rates. Having purchased
overpriced (and often run-down) properties, these new owners were
keen to replace tenants with those willing to pay higher rents. Thus,
while only some employed intimidation to secure their tenants’ exit,
prevailing bigotry meant it was generally viewed as a problem caused
by wicked blacks forcing out noble whites.
Racially motivated attacks had long punctuated immigrants’ lives but
it was only when disturbances broke out in the St Ann’s district of
Nottingham and Notting Hill in London during August and September
1958 that the issue gained prominence.74 Having thus been alerted to
this problem, the public decided the best solution was to end unre-
stricted black immigration. This led to the Conservative government’s
1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, which introduced a system of
vouchers to regulate the immigration of members of the Commonwealth
who lacked a skill or were not guaranteed a job on entry.75 Ministers
were embarrassed to admit it but these controls were designed to cut
black immigration while leaving white immigration unhindered. These
controls were extremely popular: 70 per cent of those polled supported
the Act.76 Yet, while it curtailed primary (and largely male) immigration,
the Act permitted the entry of dependants. The Conservative victory at
Smethwick in the 1964 general election with a candidate backed by the
slogan ‘If you want a nigger for a neighbour vote Labour’ suggested
the issue had not gone away.
Students of white opinion believed ‘education’ held the key to over-
coming prejudice. Writing in 1958, the sociologist Michael Banton
stated that white hostility was based on the belief that immigrants’ very
colour denoted their ‘strangeness’. Once they got to know individual
black immigrants, Banton expected these associations would disappear,
as white people came to appreciate any differences were outweighed by
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compelling similarities.77 A 1966 survey by the Institute of Race Relations
(IRR) endorsed this perspective: it indicated that while 53 per cent of
white people considered black immigrants inferior, only 5 per cent said
this was due to colour, the single most important reason being their
supposed lack of education, followed by general ‘cultural differences’.78
As a Smethwick housewife interviewed in 1964 stated, when justifying
her antipathy to Asian neighbours: ‘they just don’t seem to know how
to hang curtains’, which, she believed, made her street look ‘awful’.79
Superficially, this woman formed part of what the IRR calculated was
just over half the public, in that she adhered to a ‘conditional’ type of
hostility. In contrast to the 10 per cent of whites deemed irredeemably
prejudiced, the IRR believed such people could be encouraged to look
on immigrants more generously.80
It was, however, possible that what appeared conditional hostility was
a polite expression of intractable chauvinism. It is straining credibility to
accept that the Smethwick interviewee’s support for controls was based
on immigrants’ incompetence with curtains. In this case, at least, it more
likely denoted unbridgeable differences that followed from her percep-
tion of blackness.81 Surveys can tell us only so much and the balance
between conditional hostility and outright racism will never be truly
established. In any case, white prejudice of whatever sort inhibited the
kind of interaction Banton hoped for. As one mid-1960s survey con-
ducted in north London discovered, while two-fifths of respondents
claimed some sort of personal acquaintance with a black person, one-
fifth still objected to working with blacks; half did not want to live next
door to them; and nine-tenths disapproved of mixed marriages.82 Ironic-
ally, these attitudes threatened to bring about that which opponents of
immigration said they feared most: black ghettoes cut adrift from the
British way of life.83 If dominant assumptions about blackness gave minor
cultural distinctions an inflated significance, they also meant that even
when non-whites acted in the approved manner they might still be viewed
as alien. As the experience of subsequent decades was to suggest, it would
take more than ‘education’ to overcome hostility, while even those adopt-
ing the most archetypal ‘British’ ways remained vulnerable to abuse.84
During the 1960s, white attitudes appeared immutable: after 1964
never fewer than 80 per cent of those polled believed too many blacks
were entering the country. If anything, opinion hardened: by 1970 over
one-fifth wanted blacks repatriated and just under half wanted all non-
white immigration stopped.85 Support for Enoch Powell after his 1968
‘rivers of blood’ speech illustrated the entrenched nature of attitudes.86
Powell painted a picture of a white population who had become
‘strangers in their own country’, their neighbourhoods having been
changed beyond recognition by blacks, who also jumped to the front of
the queue for social goods such as hospital beds and school places.
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Unlike previous immigrants, Powell asserted, few blacks wanted to belong
to mainstream society and their numbers were such they could ignore
pressure so to do. Thus, he concluded by saying that, looking to the
future, he was ‘filled with foreboding’ as ‘[l]ike the Roman, I seem to
see “the River Tiber foaming with much blood”’. If few appreciated the
classical allusion, most understood Powell was predicting a race war,
one that could be prevented only by drastic action. Although he was
sacked from the Conservative front bench and condemned by the great
and the good, Powell won massive public support – especially among
the working class.87
The young
‘Youth culture’ – a distinct way of life embracing recent school-leavers
who had yet to marry – is generally taken to have first emerged in a
developed form during the 1960s. As Hobsbawm has it, the period
marked ‘a profound change’ in relations between the generations, as
the young asserted their autonomy.88 This was a sometimes violent pro-
cess, with manifestations ranging from, at the start of the decade, the
formation of street gangs to, at its end, university students demanding
greater control of their curriculum. Some saw these expressions of inter-
generational conflict as of great moment: a few suggested the ‘generation
gap’ had even replaced class as the most important social cleavage.89
Tension between young and old was not new. The former had long
socialised separately and created ways to emphasise their distinctiveness,
and some authorities believe a fully formed youth culture was established
during the inter-war decades.90 The 1960s nonetheless represented a
distinct stage in generational relations. First, if historically nothing special,
the post-war ‘baby boom’ increased the proportion of those aged between
15 and 19 compared with earlier decades, from 6.8 per cent in 1951 to
7.8 per cent in 1966.91 Second, improvements to diet meant children
physically matured earlier than hitherto, so, biologically, adulthood came
more quickly. Third, young workers’ real wages rose steeply, such that
those steering clear of marriage and children enjoyed a disposable in-
come possibly double that of the 1930s.92 Finally, affluence encouraged
the unparalleled expansion of the commercial youth market, which in
turn allowed the young to express their identity through consuming
particular magazines, television programmes, films, music and clothes.
The development of youth culture was popularly associated with
rising crime, so older contemporaries viewed it with apprehension,
but closer inspection suggested working-class youths were no more in-
clined to delinquency than in the past.93 While later analysts believed
working-class youth culture contained anti-capitalist values, this was not
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apparent at the time.94 Instead, it seemed that youngsters were increas-
ingly immersed in lifestyles dominated by commercialised pursuits, and
that this encouraged antisocial activity and spawned groups such as the
Mods and Rockers.95 Commentators already convinced of the degener-
ation of working-class culture cited the young as evidence. Thus, Richard
Hoggart thought that those he termed ‘juke box boys’ were ‘portents’
of how others would fall victim to the pursuit of ‘sensation without
commitment’ through lives dedicated to consumption.96 Others thought
commercialism had reduced the young to passive consumers, whose
politics – if they had any – expressed material contentment and led to
Conservative voting.
Middle-class youths were considered to be travelling in the opposite
direction: for them, generational conflict was believed to be assuming
an overtly politicised form, albeit one consciously rejecting the ‘middle-
aged game of politics’.97 An early manifestation of bourgeois youth’s
supposed new orientation was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
(CND), established in 1958. CND was novel in a number of ways, not
the least being the prominence of young people on its annual Easter
marches. How far this represented a new level of political awareness is open
to question. As one Young CND branch secretary complained, many joined
just because it ‘was the thing to do’ and would ‘annoy the grown-ups’.98
Many of CND’s younger members were students and this group
became the focus of increasing attention as the 1960s progressed. In
the late 1930s, there were only 70,000 students; by the later 1950s, their
number had reached 150,000 and the expansion inaugurated by the
1963 Robbins report saw the total reach 400,000 in 1970. Yet, while
their numbers increased, students remained middle class: less than one-
third came from working-class backgrounds. Moreover, even by the end
of the decade, students accounted for no more than 10 per cent of those
in their late teens and early twenties.99
British students were not famous for their revolutionary fervour – as
late as 1963 they were the acme of moderation.100 By the middle of the
decade, however, they had acquired a reputation for extremism. Many
supported the North Vietnamese in their war with the United States
and attended demonstrations organised by the Vietnam Solidarity Cam-
paign (VSC). Tariq Ali, who led the VSC, asserted that the Vietnamese
conflict would eventually provoke students to oppose the entire capital-
ist order.101 Others argued that, owing to the role played by universities
in the reproduction of capitalism, students were a strategic group,
comparable to the working class in orthodox Marxist theory.102 This
perspective was apparently vindicated when Parisian students rioted in
May 1968 and in July 3,000 VSC militants charged the US embassy in
Grosvenor Square, which led to unprecedented violence, something cele-
brated by the Rolling Stones’ song ‘Street Fighting Man’.
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Complementing these events were disturbances following from student
demands for a greater voice in the running of their universities. Many
higher-education administrators were unused to taking students’ views
seriously and their paranoia regarding the radical intentions of some
provoked demonstrations and occupations on a number of campuses.103
For the most part, students wanted modest reforms but when articulated
in a quasi-Marxist language these could appear as the first step towards
revolution. Matters were worst at the London School of Economics (LSE),
where the newly appointed director was a former Rhodesian university
official implicated in the apartheid regime. Even there, however, few
students wanted a say in academic appointments and no more than
two-fifths sought an influence over the content of their curriculum –
although in excess of two-thirds demanded a role in running the library.104
Talk of student radicalism nevertheless disappeared as quickly as it
had emerged: by the end of 1969 it was clear the French May events
had led nowhere, the LSE disruptions had run their course and the
VSC had fallen in on itself. Young militants had always been divided:
the Trotskyists adhered to a ‘vanguardist’ view of change, and those
associated with the ‘New Left’ wanted to build from the bottom up.105 If
this did not help, the basic problem for far-left radicals was most young
people’s profound lack of interest in political issues; and of those con-
cerned with political change, few were ever revolutionary. With only
22,000 out of 350,000 students belonging to a political club, one
National Union of Students official described the politically minded
undergraduate as a ‘freak’.106 As James Jupp put it, the young were
mostly ‘conformist, conservative and respectable’: the fact that by 1966
three-fifths of women in their early twenties were married possibly tells
its own story.107 Even those demonstrating behind VSC banners were
not as militant as their leaders hoped: a survey of protestors at an
October 1968 demonstration suggested that while half wanted an out-
right Vietnamese victory, two-fifths sought a compromise solution. More
bizarrely, that protest ended with police and protestors linking arms to
sing ‘Auld Lang Syne’. As some suspected, that so many so-called street
fighting men (and women) participated in such events said as much
about fashion as it did about politics.108
Analysts thought this relative conservatism was due to the fact that,
however affluent Britain was in the 1960s compared with the 1930s, the
likes of France, Germany and the United States were even better off –
and it was material well-being that lay at the root of the youth revolt.
Thus, Inglehart suggested, in Britain the young were less committed to
‘post-material values’ than were their counterparts elsewhere.109 What-
ever the reason, despite the fears – and hopes – of some, the development
of youth culture did not drag down the established order. Nevertheless,
however modest was the actual threat, the ‘generation gap’ did briefly
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send shockwaves through many institutions – although that probably
said more about the declining confidence of the latter than it did about
the menace posed by the young.
Participation
One reason for the authorities’ uncertainty was that, across the West,
the 1960s saw demands for greater popular participation in decision-
making reach unprecedented levels. The proliferation of strikes and
violent demonstrations, as well as the emergence of single-issue pressure
groups, suggested that an increasing number of individuals questioned
the pre-eminence of representative institutions and wanted a more direct
say in determining their fates. Inglehart saw this as evidence of how
affluence encouraged the growth of ‘post-material values’, while some
contemporaries considered it a natural reaction to the progressive con-
centration of power required by the post-war welfare state and economic
efficiency.110
While most prominently embraced by the young, in particular student
radicals, ‘participation’ denoted a disparate set of new and old concerns
that together appeared to challenge the basis of the political order.
Established academic opinion even suggested that too much partici-
pation, beyond simply voting in elections, threatened the stability of
representative institutions and might open the way for totalitarianism.111
Some also doubted how typical were those demanding to participate:
even enthusiasts conceded greater political involvement interested only
a minority, albeit, they claimed, a significant one.112 Most manual
workers, for example, appeared happy to vote for Labour candidates
who promised to advance their material interests but were unwilling to
assume a more direct role in achieving that outcome. Despite earlier
hopes that the Second World War had prompted the development of
an ‘active democracy’, a rise in the number of voters and members of
the main political parties aside, the character of British democracy
remained unchanged in the years following 1945.113 The extent to which
popular indifference was due to how the parties practised politics or
the result of an ingrained antipathy to participation is open to doubt.
While some commentators believed that affluence encouraged people
to retreat into their private domains, others argued that the majority
only appeared apathetic because they did not believe meaningful
participation was possible. The events of 1968, the latter suggested,
encouraged many to revise their sense of impotence.114
According to Des Wilson, director of the pressure group Shelter, despite
‘participation’ achieving the status of a radical cliché by the end of 1968,
few of those demanding it had a clear idea of what it meant.115 Yet, as
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those with practical experience of trying to promote popular political
engagement conceded, participation was no trouble-free panacea. An
increase in the numbers involved in decision-making would require a
set of careful balancing acts. The most prominent of these was ensuring
that elected representatives, while promoting participation, could main-
tain their legitimate leadership role. Just as importantly, it would also
require opening up decisions to public scrutiny while preventing the
process being monopolised by those dedicated to negative protest.116 At
least a few of those who blithely insisted on the people’s right to partici-
pate refused to take such complications seriously, because they wanted
not to reform Britain’s established political order but to destroy it.
Although Britain’s institutions were praised by many US observers,
one did not have to be a revolutionary to find fault with them. The
extension of the post-war welfare state and the nationalisation of one-
fifth of industry had drained local government of much of its purpose
and concentrated power in Westminster to an unprecedented extent.
The accountability of the country’s elected representatives, both local
and national, was limited to say the least, as decision-making operated
in a shroud of secrecy. Moreover, if rising incomes and educational levels
meant that citizens were less inclined to defer to their leaders’ wisdom,
their sense of (at least relative) national decline by the early 1960s meant
they also had more about which to be critical.
The most compelling expression of the people’s apparent desire for
a more immediate political voice was the demand for devolution or
even full independence for Scotland and Wales. Since 1885 Scotland
had enjoyed some administrative autonomy from London through the
Scottish Office based in Edinburgh, headed by a Secretary of State with
Cabinet rank. Wales was less favoured and was treated as if it were an
adjunct of England. The demand for more self-government was not
novel. In the case of Scotland, controversy stretched back to the 1707
Act of Union. It reached a particularly fevered pitch during the late
nineteenth century, when radical Liberals embraced Home Rule for
each of the three Celtic nations within the United Kingdom. None-
theless, for much of the twentieth century the issue was less prominent
and the decade or so that followed 1945 saw the issue sidelined by
pressing economic matters.117
Ironically, given what was to come, when Labour debated its electoral
problems after the 1959 general election, Scotland and Wales did not
feature, because the party’s hold on the electorate there looked secure.
Labour’s position even improved in the 1964 and 1966 elections, such
that few considered it needed to take heed of the Scottish National Party
(SNP) or Plaid Cymru, as their demand for independence was thought
to appeal only to a cranky minority.118 However, even when they voted
Labour, many Scottish and Welsh people retained a strong sense of their
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own national identity and hankered for more freedom from Whitehall
to give this expression.119 That aspiration found political form after
Wilson’s re-election. In July 1966, Plaid took Carmarthen from Labour
in a by-election while, a year later in the party’s heartland of Rhondda
West, and Caerphilly in 1968, they ran Labour a very close second.
North of the border, the SNP trounced Labour in the Hamilton by-
election of November 1967. Contests held in the Glasgow constituencies
of Pollock and Gorbals either side of this triumph saw nationalists push
Labour firmly on to the defensive. These unprecedented parliamentary
performances were, moreover, reflected in innumerable local government
contests. By the end of the decade, nationalists appeared to constitute
a serious political force. Indeed, the SNP claimed to have tripled the
size of its membership between 1966 and 1969, to 120,000, which meant
it probably had more members than Labour north of the border.120
It is hard to be sure how far these developments marked a funda-
mental shift in opinion or merely expressed passing discontent. While
undoubtedly a mixture of both, the latter probably predominated, as
only a minority of those voting nationalist in the late 1960s supported
full independence. Yet, even if many voters abandoned Labour as a
protest against rising unemployment, rather than anything else, their
dalliance with nationalism still reflected something substantial. For, just
like before 1966, voters wanted more national autonomy.121 The tem-
porary success of the SNP and Plaid subsequently made it more difficult
for Westminster politicians to ignore this hitherto obscured desire.
Those who called for more participation undoubtedly identified a real
and long-standing deficiency within Britain’s political culture, although
it was not one that lent itself to a simple answer. According to Samuel
Beer, by bringing the issue to the fore, reformers actually helped destroy
the country’s traditional political culture by undermining the deference
widely deemed so vital to it.122 While some certainly wanted to devastate
Britain’s institutions, this was not true of all of those who talked of par-
ticipation. Many simply sought to ensure that liberal democracy lived
up to its full potential. It is, in any case, arguable that Beer’s analysis was
unnecessarily apocalyptical. For the most part, reforms inspired by the
aspiration to increase participation were modest, locally focused initia-
tives designed to bolster the ongoing reform of the political order.
Parties and change
Some imagine the Golden Age initiated the beginning of the end for
party politics.123 Yet, while both major parties’ fortunes waxed and
waned, Labour appeared at a distinct disadvantage compared with the
Conservatives. Of the seven general elections held between 1950 and
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1970, Labour won three, only one of which – the 1966 landslide – gave
it a working Commons majority. This was partly an effect of the first-
past-the-post system, as Labour’s average vote over the seven contests
was 45.7 per cent, only 0.3 per cent less than that of the Conservatives.
Even so, while Labour exceeded the Conservatives in terms of popular
support on four occasions, this difference only twice amounted to more
than 1 per cent of votes cast. In contrast, the Conservatives won four
elections out of the seven, each of which gave the party a working
majority, while at the three elections in which they gained a greater
proportion of votes the difference was in excess of 3 per cent (see Table
1.3). The Conservatives also ended the 1960s on a better note. In 1970
Edward Heath led his party back from its worst defeat of the period
with a hitherto unprecedented post-war switch of support from one
party to another. In contrast, 1970 was Labour’s worst result since 1935 –
although nothing compared with what was to follow.
There was a time when Labour’s relatively poor record would have
been directly linked to the decline and transformation of the working
class. Indeed, the decades following 1945 were once regarded as the
culmination of long-term social trends of which the party system was a
more or less accurate reflection.124 To many it appeared that the two
classes had spawned their own parties, within which arrangement
Labour was, a few eccentric bourgeois voters aside, literally the party of
those who laboured while the Conservatives, other than some aberrant
proletarians, appealed to the middle and upper classes. This led
Hobsbawm to suppose proletarians voted Labour as ‘an automatic con-
sequence of being workers’.125
Recent work by political historians questions whether political
allegiances reflect social position in such a straightforward way. As
Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor suggest, interests and identities are not
Table 1.3 Labour and Conservative votes compared, 1950–70
Number of votes    Percentage of vote
Labour Conservative Labour Conservative
1950 13,266,592 12,502,567 46.1 43.5
1951 13,948,605 13,717,538 48.8 48.0
1955 12,404,970 13,311,936 46.4 49.7
1959 12,215,538 13,749,830 43.8 49.4
1964 12,205,814 12,001,396 44.1 43.4
1966 13,064,951 11,418,433 47.9 41.9
1970 12,178,295 13,145,123 43.0 46.4
Source: D. Butler, British General Elections Since 1945 (Oxford, 1989), Appendix 1.
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‘predetermined and self-evident, only requiring recognition and ex-
pression by the parties’. Instead, voters’ interests are just ‘signposts for
political behaviour in so far as language allows them to be described
and articulated’.126 The political scientist Anthony Heath and his col-
laborators anticipated this emphasis when they outlined how far parties
can shape, rather than react to, voter attitudes.127 Yet, if parties enjoyed
more freedom to influence electors than has been previously assumed,
this autonomy was only relative, as none could react to events in a purely
‘pragmatic’ manner. Thus, in his study of European social democracy,
Herbert Kitschelt noted how far a party’s ideological tradition could
influence what members took to be ‘acceptable arguments and ideas’
and so restrict how they might respond to change.128
Few argue that Labour was blessed with a tradition that fostered a
productive response.129 The party was apparently in good company:
according to Donald Sassoon, owing to their more ideological nature,
all European social democrats failed to respond flexibly to cultural
change; only those on the right enjoyed the necessary pliability.130 Yet,
like their left-wing counterparts, many British Conservatives also looked
on change with misgivings and often echoed a similar sense of despair.131
In any case, irrespective of particular party tradition, it was hard for
any contemporary politician to accurately identify a significant cultural
trend and virtually impossible to predict with precision what its political
impact might be. As the ex-Labour MP John Freeman observed in 1955,
politics is ‘not a precise science which permits a diagnosis to be con-
firmed and presented with certainty’. Analysing Labour’s decline was,
he believed, a subjective exercise, in which ‘anybody’s guess is as good
as the next man’s’.132 The greater use of opinion polling and the increas-
ing number of academic politics specialists did not change matters much.
While the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell and his revisionist followers
were confident their diagnosis of the party’s late 1950s troubles was
endorsed by the ‘facts’, left critics believed the leadership cited surveys
deliberately constructed to serve its agenda.133 More disarmingly, in 1964
the academic Richard Rose conceded that the power of socio-economic
trends, which in 1959 appeared to make ongoing Conservative victories
inevitable, should be reconsidered. He stated that the ‘simple socio-
logical or economic explanation’ of politics – of which he had been an
advocate – was ‘incomplete’.134 In this uncertain context, it is little wonder
some believed ‘pragmatism’ no better a guide than ideology.
Labour and change
Perhaps Labour’s most significant ideological characteristic was the ex-
tent to which members were unable to agree what their party ultimately
fielding ch 1.P65 10/10/03, 12:3022
Introduction 23
stood for. As the leading left-wing MP Michael Foot wrote in 1966,
Labour encompassed a ‘coalition of differing interests, ideas and aspira-
tions’, embracing a ‘pale-Pink Right and a near-Red Left and all shades
in between’. If ‘Socialist by definition’ thanks to a formal commitment
to nationalisation, Labour was ‘social reformist’ ‘by tradition and prac-
tice’, although the balance between the two was ‘constantly shifting’.135
Labour’s course in the late 1950s and early 1960s appeared to vindicate
Foot’s assessment. As the New Left writer Perry Anderson noted, by
passing the policy document Industry and Society in 1957 the party con-
ference legitimised capitalism, although it assumed an anti-capitalist
stance when Signposts for the Sixties was embraced three years later.136
Despite this apparent indeterminacy, many authorities believe the
key to Labour thinking was its association with the unions. This sup-
posedly gave rise to ‘Labourism’, characterised as a preoccupation with
the immediate interests of male, unionised, manual workers.137 Yet, while
the unions enjoyed a special place in the party, there were other mem-
bers of the Labour coalition.138 Many who originally established the
party adhered to a moral vision, of which the improvement of working-
class living standards was but one element; and by 1918 a number of
‘New’ Liberals had joined Labour’s ranks. These contrasting concerns
were drawn together by Ramsay MacDonald while he was leader and
sometime Prime Minister during the 1920s to create what has been
termed a ‘Labour socialist ideology’.139 MacDonald believed socialism
could emerge only from the gradual development of the most progress-
ive elements of the status quo: revolutionary overthrow would result in
totalitarianism. This meant following the parliamentary road and using
the opportunities presented by a largely unreformed constitution to
their fullest extent. MacDonald’s organic, incremental approach entailed
promoting harmony rather than conflict and fostering community, not
class, consciousness. Hence he couched Labour’s programme in terms
of universal principles rather than class interests, although, given in-
equality, improving workers’ incomes was presented as a moral act. Labour
socialism consequently sought to lift up all individuals, whatever their
class, from selfish material concerns and, through education, endow
them with an ennobling collective purpose. In spite of his defection to
lead a ‘National’ government in 1931, MacDonald’s outlook set the tone
for much subsequent Labour thinking.140 Thus, while the post-war
membership continued to dispute the ends of party activity, invariably
how far Labour should take the economy into state hands, MacDonald
furnished them with an agreed means.
If the party encouraged members to think within certain parameters,
Labour’s was for the most part not an overly prescriptive creed. Just as
there was scope for different interpretations of socialist ends, so members
perceived cultural change in a variety of ways. Writing in 1962, the
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veteran Scottish MP Arthur Woodburn considered that, during the
course of his life, he had ‘seen a revolution in outlook and living con-
ditions’. People were better off, healthier, better educated and expected
to perform less arduous work; there were fewer class distinctions and
even manners had improved. Prosperity had ‘lifted the eyes and spirits
of people, while the march of science gave hope for the future’.141 This
optimism was remarkable, given that Labour had just lost three elec-
tions in a row. If Woodburn was sanguine, the recently ennobled MP
Reginald Sorenson, writing in 1968, was less happy, despite the fact
that in 1966 Labour had seemingly been fully restored to electoral
health. Sorenson believed that Britain was marked by ‘the lure of easy
leisure, nihilistic philosophies, the cult of the ephemeral and the
irrational, the craze for bingo, casinos, football pools, gambling and
betting, the sedatives of drugs and drink and a congealed indifference
to choicer qualities of living’.142
There were also considerable differences over the extent to which
Labour should accommodate change, however it was characterised. The
1966 national conference of Labour women was informed by Joan
Liddle, who chaired the gathering, that in the ‘kind of society we have
in Britain today, we have to deal with a new generation, new habits,
new interests and new reactions to the political problems of the time’.
Labour, she believed, should ‘adapt our political methods to the social
and political realities of our time’.143 The following year, Millie Miller
addressed the same gathering as chair but outlined a contrary perspec-
tive. She declared that Labour should not bow down to each and every
development, for members had ‘a duty to assess what our society is to
become and what we have to offer the nation’ and to ask:
Was it for their descendants to be slaves to the managerial age that
the Tolpuddle Martyrs were sent into exile? Was it to have their mates
chosen by computer that the Women’s Labour League first sought to
bring emancipation to women? Was it so that the people should spend
their leisure time in gaming clubs that our early pioneers looked
forward to universal free education? And what of the values for which
they fought in the early days of our movement? Are the virtues of
loyalty, brotherhood and international socialism just old hat?
With student discontent in mind, Miller concluded with a rhetorical
flourish that would have made MacDonald proud. Hence, while it was
‘very modern at the moment to attack established institutions’, those
present should be aware ‘that to destroy a society and offer nothing to
replace its organisations will lead only to anarchy and eventually to a
darkness of the spirit such as has not been seen since the Dark Ages of
history in Britain’.144
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Approach
Writing in 1957, Raymond Williams believed a ‘structure of feeling’,
once it has passed, is largely irrecoverable. Since then, an army of social
historians have done their best to prove him wrong by exploring
popular experience from any number of angles. For much of the post-
war period, the Labour Party was mostly untouched by such research. It
remained the preserve of traditional political historians, who viewed
their subject in elitist terms, focused on ‘high’ politics and stressed the
importance of party and trade union leaders. Some of their more
radical colleagues did highlight the role of militant activists of whom
they approved, but that merely substituted a concern with one kind of
elite for another.145 As a result, Labour history was preoccupied with the
internal machinations of party activity or was measured against ex-
traneous definitions of ‘socialism’. It generally failed to study the wider
context in which political activity occurred; nor did it explore the deeper
dynamics that invested such activity with meaning. To some of those
living in Margaret Thatcher’s shadow, a Labour history couched purely
in terms of class, socialism, party, union and great men looked increas-
ingly distant from reality.
Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of historians have there-
fore situated Labour politics more firmly in its cultural setting, to recover
what the party and its purpose meant to voters, members and leaders.
This has transformed our picture of Labour’s earliest years and helped
challenge narratives based on the assumption that the party’s ‘rise’,
thanks to the development of a homogenous working-class culture, was
unproblematic, not to say inevitable.146 This has been complemented
by similar work on the Conservatives, whose continued success led some
finally to question exclusively class-based interpretations of politics. It
is no accident that this new approach to Conservative history was largely
the product of those who had also made a distinctive contribution to
our understanding of Labour’s past.147
Much of the present author’s previous work was set in this post-
Thatcher mould. On his own and in collaboration with Nick Tiratsoo
and Peter Thompson in ‘England Arise!’ (1995), he applied the methods
and insights generated by social history to revise dominant perceptions
of the post-war Labour Party, especially in relation to the critical decade
of the 1940s.148 At the heart of this enterprise was the desire to question
the assumption, central to the work of Ralph Miliband and those follow-
ing in his footsteps, that by not being a ‘proper’ socialist party Labour
impeded the development of a radically class-conscious proletariat.149
Despite the earlier optimism of the likes of Edward Thompson but in
line with the more circumspect work of Ross McKibbin, it was believed
British workers’ socialist potential was much exaggerated.150 ‘England
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Arise!’ even suggested that, instead of Labour inhibiting the develop-
ment of the people’s socialist potential, the party was often in advance
of popular attitudes. Members of the Labour leadership, such as the
usually reviled Herbert Morrison, were consequently forced to take
Britons’ widespread cultural conservatism into account when devising
the party’s strategy and policies. Needless to say, not everyone agreed
with that viewpoint.151
The present work aims to develop this so-called revisionist approach
chronologically, by moving into the 1960s, and conceptually, by looking
more closely at how Labour understood and responded to its cultural
setting. As already indicated, various authorities suggest that the
relationship between any political party and the society in which it oper-
ates is more complicated than previously thought. The inversion of the
Milibandian problematic, which underpinned ‘England Arise!’, is there-
fore itself in need of some revision, especially in light of work stressing
the impact of what has been variously described as party ‘discourse’,
‘language’ or ‘rhetoric’ on popular political attitudes.152
Given this work’s focus on cultural change, it is useful to establish
how it relates to what James Vernon describes as a new post-modern
‘cultural history of politics’.153 In Vernon’s articulation, this proceeds
from the belief that the nineteenth-century ‘rise of party’ depended on
politicians regulating popular sentiments. Through the law, physical
constraint and above all language, the parties created and then imposed
what they considered were suitable political identities on the popu-
lace.154 In one of the few attempts to apply this approach to Labour,
Jon Lawrence considers the party was also something of an imposition,
for Labour’s assertion of its vision of the people’s ‘interests’ meant it
denied the legitimacy of other voices, which might have more accurately
expressed popular desires.155 Ironically, then, while disparaging the
Milibandian school for its assumption that politics is rooted in class,
post-modernists agree that Labour stymied popular potential. Whereas
the former imagine Labour stopped workers acquiring a socialist out-
look, the latter are less certain what the party prevented the people
achieving. Both are clear, however, that Labour impeded the develop-
ment of something they appear to presume would have been superior
to that actually achieved by the party.
As was ‘England Arise!’, this present work is sceptical of such a
conclusion, resting as it does on a whole series of significant counter-
factual assumptions. Most importantly, it exaggerates Labour’s ability
to stand outside the context which gave it birth – ‘history’ for want of a
better word – and impose itself on the populace. As already suggested,
parties have the ability to alter popular perceptions – something post-
modernists are rightly keen to stress. There were, however, limits to this
influence – and more compelling, entrenched competitors for the
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public’s attention, including what Karl Marx once referred to as ‘the
dull compulsion of economic relations’.156 Even so, the post-modern
contribution should be welcomed insofar as it has problematised the
direct nature of the relationship between party and people. Lawrence is
surely right that Labour’s claim to represent people was more rhetorical
than real, for, as he points out, the world views of highly politically
motivated, self-educated activists often found few echoes in those
embraced by the majority of less committed voters – a point also made
by the political scientist John May some time ago.157
Most pertinently for this work, Lawrence additionally notes that only
‘constant processes of negotiation and renegotiation’ can sustain the
party’s relationship with its supporters.158 Labour’s claim to represent
people was certainly questioned during the 1960s, especially in relation
to workers, women, black immigrants and the young. In addition, the
institutional means through which Labour sought to act for its sup-
porters – both as a party and as a government – were heavily criticised.
How far the party’s dilemma was exclusively played out in language –
as those who have taken the ‘linguistic turn’ emphasise – is doubtful.
While perception played a critical role in determining the party’s
responses, so did established institutional cultures, some of which had
been appropriated by Labour’s own activists, who succeeded in sub-
verting their leaders’ wishes. It is easy to forget that Labour was not a
unitary political actor articulating one vision but, as Raphael Samuel
and Gareth Stedman Jones put it, a ‘perpetually shifting fulcrum’ over
which contesting discourses and interests constantly battled.159
Sources and structure
Consistent with the work’s wider purpose, each chapter is underpinned
by research that exploits sources rather different to those usually
consulted by political historians of post-war Britain. Much energy has
nonetheless been expended uncovering conventional material, notably
recently released government files stored at the Public Record Office,
national Labour records and the papers of prominent political figures.
However, the work also benefits to an unprecedented degree from the
insights provided by papers generated by seven regional, four borough
and some forty constituency Labour parties. These ensure that the views
of the party’s most humble active members are given more than just
passing mention and fully complement the opinions of the party elite
to construct what aspires to be a ‘total history’ of Labour’s dealings with
cultural change during this period.
Like all historical work, the author’s reach has inevitably exceeded
his grasp, for even this array of records can tell us only so much. First,
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because of their uneven survival rate, there was little hope of construct-
ing a statistically representative sample of sources, although taken as
whole they cover much of Britain. Secondly, and more profoundly, these
records are not written from the perspective of ‘ordinary’ Labour members,
the vast majority of whom rarely attended or spoke at meetings. Thus,
historians can never completely recover Labour’s ‘structure of feeling’:
no matter how far they look, only those who left paper trails – in this
case minutes, reports and letters – find themselves caught in the re-
searcher’s gaze.
The chapters that follow build on the survey contained in this intro-
duction. The first further sets the scene by outlining the nature of
Labour Party culture at the start of the 1960s. Chapter 3 then analyses
the contrasting ways in which members understood post-war affluence,
to establish the ideological and organisational state in which the party
entered office in 1964. The next looks at the key issue of class and how
Labour attempted to reconcile those differences said to have survived
into the ‘affluent society’. Chapter 5 highlights Labour’s attempts to
draw younger women into the party and how it handled the issue of
equal pay once in power. The following chapter takes up the issue of
black immigration and establishes the party’s dilemma, given both its
commitment to integration and its need to retain the support of preju-
diced white voters. Chapter 7 looks at the implications of the ‘generation
gap’ for Labour and how members tried to bridge it. Chapter 8 assesses
the party’s response to calls for more direct political participation. The
conclusion establishes how the party approached the 1970 general
election and why members responded in the way they did to Labour’s
decisive rejection by the electorate.
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Labour’s organisational culture
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the institutional context for
Labour’s response to cultural change.1 It surveys the character of the
party’s organisation and the nature of its membership on the verge of
the 1960s, and in particular highlights the activities and assumptions
of those most responsible for the party’s well-being. Before that can be
done, however, it is necessary to outline Labour’s organisational struc-
ture and identify some of the issues to which it gave rise.
The basic unit in all 618 constituency Labour parties (CLPs) was the
ward or, in rural areas, local party. All members were entitled to attend
their monthly gatherings, something that enabled them to elect a man-
agement committee and decide who should represent them on the CLP’s
general management committee (GMC). On the GMC also sat those
appointed by affiliated organisations, usually local union branches, as
well as by the women’s or youth section if there was one. While a GMC
might be guided by an executive committee (EC), the former deter-
mined who should attend Labour’s annual conference as a delegate and
how they could vote, and what resolution to submit (if any) for the con-
sideration of conference. It also agreed whom to support in contests for
the constituency section of the National Executive Committee (NEC).
In addition, the GMC ratified the wards’ preferred local government
candidates and selected the constituency’s parliamentary nominee. CLPs
sometimes employed a professional agent to ensure its efficient admini-
stration but for the most part these matters were left in the hands of
volunteer members.
In large urban areas where different constituencies were located with-
in the same municipal boundary, borough or city parties coordinated
activity relating to council elections. Above these entities existed a variety
of bodies, such as county federations of CLPs and regional councils,
whose purpose was often obscure even to experienced local members.
Of more importance were the twelve Regional Offices, each staffed by
one Regional Officer (RO) and two assistants. They answered to the
National Agent operating from Transport House on Smith Square in
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Westminster, Labour’s headquarters. The Agent in turn was responsible
to the NEC, and tried to ensure – not always with great success – that
the party’s rules were enforced.
Labour’s structure was set in place by its 1918 constitution. At the
time it was seen by some as a temporary settlement, particularly with
regard to the influence it gave to the trade unions, but the constitution
survived up to the 1960s without fundamental modification.2 The con-
stitution allowed for the development of two contrasting approaches to
political mobilisation. On the one hand were those who considered that
so long as Labour won Commons or council majorities, it did not much
matter if the party had few members and engaged in little activity out-
side election time. On the other hand were those who thought Labour’s
principal purpose was to transform the outlook of individual voters: to
them, a large and energetic membership engaged in a dynamic relation-
ship with the electorate was as important as winning elections.3 Despite
their other differences, these instrumental and transformative approaches
were both underpinned by what some may think a condescending view
of the electorate: the former considered that the actions of a small number
of bureaucrats could achieve more than the people; and although the
latter ostensibly promoted mass participation, it did so only on terms
acceptable to the party.
Labour’s poor electoral performance during the 1950s and early
1960s encouraged some to believe neither approach held the key to
success and led to numerous proposals to improve party organisation,
culminating in two major NEC investigations, one conducted by Harold
Wilson in 1955 and the other by Bill Simpson during 1967–8. Wilson
famously concluded that Labour was ‘still at the penny-farthing stage
in a jet-propelled era’ and its organisation ‘rusty and deteriorating with
age’.4 While Simpson was less pessimistic, the party having recently won
two elections, Labour’s return to power did not convince everybody that
all its problems had disappeared – especially as the 1966 victory was
immediately followed by a collapse in membership.5
One of the most informed critics of Labour’s organisational short-
comings was Jim Raisin, RO for the Northern Home Counties Region
during the 1960s and before that a London organiser.6 In 1966 he com-
plained that the party ‘functions to-day in almost exactly the same manner
as it did 50 years ago’, and asserted that it was ‘probable that part of
our relative failure as an instrument for change … is as much due to
the unsuitability of some of our own devices as to external causes’. There
was, Raisin suggested, a desperate need for a ‘more sophisticated’ struc-
ture. The GMC was, he claimed in 1955, deeply flawed, being both a
‘very inefficient form of management’ and unrepresentative of the wider
membership. As he stated in 1968, while Labour claimed to be ‘the
Party of the People’, ‘the great bulk of those who belong to our Party
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simply will not come into our “market place”, that is, the Ward or Local
Party meeting’. Moreover, ‘genuine contact’, even between those few
who attended meetings and their parliamentary leaders, was ‘slight,
occasional and accidental’. This meant the NEC’s ‘intentions and even
… decisions’ in relation to party affairs were ‘little understood and
hardly ever put into effect’. If matters reached crisis proportions at the
end of the 1960s, Raisin believed that was merely the continuation of
long-running trends, showing ‘comparatively little variation with the
changes in our political fortunes’.
Despite this, Labour’s basic organisational character remained the
same: the reasons for this inertia, which were cultural rather than overtly
political, provide further insight into members’ response to post-war
change.
The union link
The defining characteristic of Labour organisation during the 1960s is
widely supposed to have been its close connection with the trade unions.
They were certainly of critical financial importance: in 1960, 86
national unions affiliated 5,512,688 of their members, thereby contri-
buting £204,711 or 83 per cent of Labour’s annual income; ten years
later they donated £401,792 or 78 per cent of party revenue. In return
for their invaluable assistance, those drafting the 1918 constitution had
granted the unions’ formal dominance within the party, at least as
measured by numbers of annual conference votes and NEC seats.
Locally the unions were linked to the party in three ways. First, about
two-thirds of Labour members were trade unionists and among activists
the proportion was even higher.7 Secondly, union branches could affili-
ate to their local CLP and so send delegates to GMC meetings; in areas
dominated by one particular industry this arrangement often gave a
single union effective control. Finally, unions commonly made a variety
of financial contributions to offset the habitual poverty of most CLPs,
which could include underwriting an agent’s salary, sponsoring a parlia-
mentary candidate or granting free use of office space.
While, for the most part, they made little use of their formal authority,
it was common for trade unionists – such as Tom Jones, a leading Welsh
Transport and General Workers’ Union official – to look on Labour
and the unions as forming a single entity which they rightly dominated.8
Some even believed Labour’s essential purpose was limited to improv-
ing the material existence of the ‘man on the shop floor’.9 Indeed, more
than a few of Labour’s middle-class activists adhered to that view: it was
a retired schoolteacher who promised to support the unions’ attempts
to increase wages ‘to the utmost of my strength and sensitivity’.10
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Despite these formal and rhetorical links, local union–party relations
were rarely intimate. Most affiliated unions paid little heed to CLPs
except in relation to candidate selection – and only then when one of
their favourites stood some chance of preferment. Apart from such
moments, union GMC delegates were conspicuous by their absence:
when only two attended Coventry North’s 1958 annual general meet-
ing, those present urged the unions to ‘play their part in the Political
life of our Movement’.11 This was an often-made plea, one echoed by
the Wilson report, which noted that even in industrial areas unions
usually played a minor role in CLPs.12 Indeed, Raisin reported that for
many agents in London contact with the unions was so slight that a
discussion of how to improve relations ‘had, for them, a somewhat aca-
demic quality’.13
To address this problem, in 1957 the NEC created the temporary
post of Industrial Organiser, whose purpose was to bring together CLPs
and local union branches in urban Essex. This initiative merely under-
lined the intractable nature of the problem, for after five months the
Organiser had affiliated only three branches to the appropriate CLP
and ensured a mere four already affiliated branches sent delegates to
GMC meetings. This meagre return was blamed on a profound lack of
interest shown by union officials and the post was not made perma-
nent.14 Leading members in the Eastern Region believed the NEC had
not given the Organiser enough time, but his failure was reflected else-
where: Coventry Borough’s union liaison committee had also withered
in the face of union indifference.15 Moreover, even if branch officials
had been willing to help improve relations, it is unlikely that Labour
would have benefited by much: as one trade unionist later conceded,
branches were often the ‘semi-private empires of political cliques’.16 Thus,
while it was possible for a CLP to establish contact with a branch official,
as Raisin pointed out, given that so few unionists attended their own
meetings, there was little chance the party would make an impression
on the rank and file.17
The desire to strengthen party–union links was revived before the
1964 election.18 While some on the NEC wanted a national Industrial
Organiser to help establish relationships that would survive the cam-
paign, ambitions were soon focused on immediate electoral activities,
such as encouraging branches to disseminate propaganda at the work-
place and recruiting members to help in marginal seats.19 The model
for these kinds of efforts was the Birmingham Borough Party’s impress-
ive mobilisation of union support, which in 1964 involved contacting
over 4,000 shop stewards.20 Even so, in the aftermath of the 1966
electoral landslide, some activists persisted in trying to establish more
organic links. Believing unions should play a greater role in the party,
Labour’s Scottish Council asked every CLP to establish a union liaison
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committee and organise workplace meetings. Like all such earlier schemes,
however, these efforts bore little fruit.21
Membership: ideal and reality
It is hard to escape the conclusion that most CLPs had a distant and
instrumental relationship with local unions because that is how the latter
were content for it to be. In practice this meant that Labour’s grass-
roots organisation hinged on the exertions of its individual members. In
fact, a study of political activity in Greenwich, south London, conducted
during 1950 noted that, compared with the Conservatives, Labour
membership was the more onerous. Investigators believed the party’s
relative poverty explained why members contributed more of their time:
CLPs could not afford the kind of professional help Conservatives took
for granted.22
Poverty was undoubtedly a factor but so was the belief that, as Herbert
Morrison declared in 1951, Labour was ‘not only a vote winning machine’
but also ‘something great and glorious that stands for a new way of
life’.23 Members had long been told that, working together, they would
transform society and themselves, for they would acquire ‘fellowship’
and develop a ‘more vital kind of citizenship’. Such ‘selfless service’ was
considered ‘the reality of Socialism and the guarantee that it would
“work”’.24 Hence, if members constantly reminded each other that belong-
ing to Labour entailed numerous ‘duties’ and ‘obligations’, they were at
least comforted by the belief these tasks were vital.25 Thus, after Clement
Attlee failed to retain office in 1951, members in Stockport were solemnly
informed that the ‘destiny of this great Movement’ now resided ‘in the
hands of each one of us’.26 In deference to this belief in the virtues of
voluntarism, and despite its many criticisms, the Wilson report warned
against turning Labour into a ‘streamlined professional machine’.27
As part of their mission to build socialism, members were exhorted
not only to be active in the party but to do the same outside and embrace
a diverse range of ‘socially useful tasks’, such as donating blood and
becoming a special constable, for the good of the party, society and
themselves.28 Activity – of the appropriate sort – was presented to
Warrington members as a good in itself:
[for even leisure] gives wisdom IF USED RIGHTLY; not in idleness,
doing NOTHING … ‘Nothing to do’ should be just the opportunity
to do something which we have been wishing to do for a long time.
To read some particular book, to see someone who somehow or other
has not been available; to tackle a job for which there has never been
time. And if the reason of our idleness be summer, well, it is a poor
soul who then says, ‘There is NOTHING TO DO.’29
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Given this outlook, the extension of television ownership was looked on
as a largely negative development. As one Bristol activist – also a
member of a parent–teacher association and amateur dramatic group –
believed ‘our most precious gift’ was time, he condemned the millions
who sat apparently stupefied for hours on end in front of their newly
acquired sets.30
Despite this stress on participation, only a small minority of those
counted as members actually helped build Labour’s ‘new way of life’.
Most did no more than attend the occasional meeting or help during
an election campaign; the majority probably responded only to a col-
lector’s infrequent request for their modest monthly membership fee;
and more than a few did not even do that. A study conducted in
marginal Stretford during the early 1950s discovered that only 19 per
cent of members had attended a meeting during the previous six
months.31 In safer Labour territory such a proportion would have been
thought high. At the start of the 1960s only 11 per cent of Glasgow
members were described as ‘active’ – which meant that little more than
500 individuals maintained the party’s vital functions in a city with fifteen
CLPs (see Table 2.5, p. 49). The extent to which only the dedicated few
did what was expected was indicated by attendances in Salford East’s
Trinity ward. There, during 1958–66, fifty-two people were recorded as
being at one time or another present at meetings – but only six went to
more than half.32 This situation was, moreover, not unique to parties in
Labour’s heartlands. In Ongar, Essex, where the Conservatives enjoyed
predominance, between 1958 and 1962 twenty-three members attended
twenty-one meetings held in Loughton ward; of those, only five went to
more than half.33
The members
As academic surveys conducted across the country reiterated, Labour’s
members were largely, but not disproportionately, drawn from the
manual working class.34 In some CLPs, such was the dominance of
working-class members that those from the middle class were viewed as
intruders, although officials did their best to discourage ‘petty class
distinctions’.35 In the main, however, only a particular kind of proletarian
became active in the party. As Labour’s agent in Hulme, Manchester,
stated in 1947, it was ‘the better types’, the sort that even then were
moving from the inner city to the suburbs, who formed the backbone of
CLPs in working-class districts.36 Across Manchester as a whole, over
two-fifths of ward secretaries in the late 1950s had taken a National
Council of Labour Colleges course and nearly a third had attended
Workers’ Education Association classes.37 Labour’s active working-class
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members therefore often constituted what the cultural observer Richard
Hoggart described as an ‘earnest minority’ of autodidacts, those who
considered themselves ‘thinking men’.38 As a result, and despite their
commitment to egalitarianism, many activists looked on fellow workers
from an elevated position, a phenomenon exemplified by the case of a
29-year-old organiser and councillor from East Anglia interviewed dur-
ing the late 1960s. Describing himself as an ‘ordinary country boy’, he
nonetheless appreciated that he was more intelligent than those among
whom he lived – albeit in a superior newly built house. His higher status
was also reflected by the fact that neighbours referred to him as ‘Mr’ –
just as they would an employer – although he claimed to apply his
talents not for selfish ends but to ‘serve’ the people.39 In any case, while
constituting a majority of members, manual workers were less promi-
nent among activists: one national survey confirmed that 49 per cent of
Labour ‘leaders’ came from outside the proletariat. Even in predomin-
antly working-class areas, professional, self-employed or white-collar
members might hold the majority of party posts, although many such
activists originated in proletarian homes. Even so, such could be their
prominence some believed active middle-class members deterred manual
workers participating in CLP affairs.40
Well before 1960, the vast majority of members were middle aged at
best. In fact, one Salford ward was described in 1955 as ‘largely made
up of old age pensioners’.41 As the party’s official membership increased
fivefold to one million between 1942 and 1952, this meant many 1960s
activists had experienced a very specific politicisation, one that com-
bined keen memories of inter-war unemployment with the hope of a
new society created through wartime collectivism. This perspective
appeared increasingly anachronistic to those outside the party but stal-
warts measured the present against what, as the years passed, appeared
a golden age. Indeed, as early as 1952 one portrayed the 1930s as a
much happier time because, he claimed, Labour members then were
more enthusiastic and attended meetings in greater numbers.42
Although official figures indicated that just over 40 per cent of party
members were female, women were less well represented among
Labour’s keenest volunteers.43 There was considerable variation across
the country: in Salford’s Trinity ward just over one in twenty of those
attending meetings held during the late 1950s and early 1960s were
women but in Southall’s Hambrough ward they accounted for more
than a third.44 Elsewhere, women might even dominate gatherings:
during the 1950s in one of marginal Halifax’s wards they formed nearly
two-thirds of attendees and held most posts.45 It would therefore be
wrong to describe all CLPs as ‘male clubs’, even though female activists
usually performed tasks that revealed how far most in the party were
wedded to conventional gender roles.46
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Such was the association between membership and family, partici-
pation in Greenwich was said to be ‘a family rather than individual
commitment’.47 At one 1951 Halifax ward gathering, among the eight
present there were two married couples, one of whom had also brought
a relative, and two sisters; of the 16 who turned out for a meeting in a
Southall ward ten years later, half came as part of a married couple.48 It
is probable, however, that Pontefract’s Tanshelf ward, in which five of
seven members came from the same family, was an extreme case.49 This
did not always reflect a genuine political commitment: in more than a
few instances relatives attended meetings just to maintain a family
member’s hold on power. In one Bristol ward, for example, a councillor
was said to control the selection of municipal candidates by dragooning
otherwise inactive relatives to relevant meetings.50
Fellowship
If not all were related, Manchester activists apparently attended meet-
ings ‘rather as they would go to a club’, that is ‘to meet friends’:
friendship helped sustain many in their party work.51 This aspect was
also noted in Huddersfield, where wards were seen as promoting social
bonds, just like bowls clubs or brass bands.52 The regular round of party
events undoubtedly encouraged ‘fellowship’. During 1954, one local
party in Birmingham not untypically held monthly social evenings; organ-
ised a coach trip and a ‘mystery’ evening; put on a jumble sale; and at
Christmas arranged children’s and pensioners’ parties, as well as a festive
bazaar.53 As a result, activists could exhibit a familial concern for their
associates. Meetings stood in silence in respect for the deceased; wards
organised visits, dispatched flowers or at least a sympathetic letter to
members or their families during periods of illness; and sent gifts to
mark the birth of children.54 Indeed, one hospitalised member was so
hurt after not receiving any solicitous communication from his party that
he wrote to Labour’s London News to complain. ‘I expected’, he stated,
in a party ‘with the traditions of humanitarians like William Morris,
Keir Hardie and George Lansbury, at least a short letter, hoping for my
speedy recovery, but I was disappointed’.55
However strong was the fellowship within particular wards or con-
stituencies, it was rarely extended to those in adjacent parties. Wilson
noted the ‘lamentable’ assistance granted by CLPs with guaranteed
majorities to more marginal neighbours.56 Personal loyalty could impede
Labour’s general interest in other ways, especially when the redrawing
of electoral boundaries forced unfamiliar members together and
pushed apart old friends. After some Bermondsey wards were abolished
or amalgamated, a few activists became so alienated they refused to
collect subscriptions for their new comrades.57
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Familiarity could also breed the very opposite of fellowship. In Burnley,
such was the antipathy between two prominent figures they ended up
in a street brawl.58 Some conflicts derived from political differences, but
NEC investigators were aware that claims of far-left take-overs some-
times resulted purely from personal conflicts.59 As a consequence,
gatherings could be anything but pleasant. One retiring Halifax ward
secretary claimed he had never ‘encountered in any Organisation with
which I have been connected so much apathy, bigotedness and petty
jealousy such as I have discovered in the Labour Party’.60 After one too
many GMC meetings, an East Hertfordshire delegate stated that, after
every gathering for the past three years, ‘my wife has asked me “how
did it go” and I have said “terrible”’. ‘I have said’, he confessed, ‘more
than once that I wouldn’t come to any more of them’.61
Counting the members
The need to raise the number of members and increase their level of
participation was one of the most insistent imperatives conveyed by
Transport House to the constituencies. Even when Labour was officially
a million strong, Raisin thought it could do better; and in the wake of
Wilson’s 1966 re-election, the NEC launched an ambitious recruitment
campaign.62 If the message got through, it made no discernable impact:
Table 2.1 Labour’s official membership, 1955–70
Year Number of members
1955 843,356
1956 845,129
1957 912,987
1958 888,955
1959 847,526
1960 790,192
1961 750,565
1962 767,459
1963 830,346
1964 830,116
1965 816,765
1966 775,693
1967 733,932
1968 700,856
1969 680,656
1970 690,191
Source: Report of the Sixty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Labour Party (1970).
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official membership went into steady decline after 1952 and suffered a
collapse during 1966–8 (see Table 2.1).
If nothing else, members were a key resource: as Wilson stated, no
other single development would improve Labour’s weak financial posi-
tion more than an increase in their number.63 Some officials also hoped
the introduction of new blood would reduce the influence of older activists,
whom they thought ineffective or troublesome.64 Raisin, for example,
wanted not just more but also different members, in particular young
married couples living on private housing estates. Too many working-
class activists, he complained, ‘heavily handicapped’ the party, as they
were incapable of managing their affairs without constant guidance. In
contrast, Raisin believed administrators, teachers, skilled mechanics
and the like ‘soon grasp the value of really good electoral schemes’.65
Membership was certainly cheap. Between 1944 and 1966 it cost only
6 s (30p) per annum, although it was subsequently raised to 12 s. For-
mally, at least, it was also easy to join. While some wanted procedures
tightening up, National Agent Len Williams stated that a ‘loose kind of
Table 2.2 Proportion of constituency Labour parties (CLPs) affiliating
the minimum number of members, revised membership and average
CLP membership, by region, 1965
Region Number of Percentage Revised Average
(in order of of CLPs affiliating membershipa per CLP
average CLP size) minimum
Eastern 43 21 70,401 1,637
London 42 26 66,531 1,584
Northern Home Counties 54 26 67,318 1,247
Southern 66 52 81,275 1,231
North West 80 49 81,985 1,025
Wales 36 61 24,951 693
South West 43 71 27,213 634
East Midlands 41 71 25,208 615
Northern 37 68 21,631 585
Scotland 71 86 33,304 469
West Midlands 54 83 24,003 445
North East 51 82 22,195 435
Total 618 58 546,015 884
aCalculated on the assumption that CLPs claiming the minimum (1,000) members
actually had a membership of 250, whereas those returning over that figure were
accurate.
Source: National Executive Committee minutes, 19 July 1966, Individual member-
ship, NAD/43/5/66.
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organisation recruiting as many supporters as it can’ was ‘more in accord
with the purpose of a democratic party’ wanting to win elections.66 An
interested individual was supposed to apply to the secretary of the local
CLP, who would then put the matter before the EC; taking its advice
into consideration, the GMC decided whether the person concerned
could be issued with a membership card. So long as an applicant did
not belong to a rival political organisation, this should have been a
straightforward and quick process.
In fact, to the chagrin of Transport House, many parties gave away
membership cards indiscriminately during recruitment campaigns to
those prepared to give a canvasser their initial monthly subscription of
6d (2.5p). Oftentimes this was the last the CLP saw of their new ‘member’.67
One consequence of this lax approach was that nobody knew how many
individuals truly belonged to the party – although that was not the only
reason. For official figures were compiled on the basis of how many
members CLPs affiliated to the national party. To help secure some non-
union income, Transport House stipulated that CLPs had to affiliate a
minimum number of members, which was increased from 240 to 800 in
1957 and then set at 1,000 in 1963. If it failed to do this, a CLP was not
Table 2.3 Proportion of constituency Labour parties (CLPs) affiliating
the minimum number of members, revised membership and average
CLP membership, by region, 1968
Region Number of Percentage Revised Average
(in order of of CLPs affiliating membershipa per CLP
average CLP size) minimum
Eastern 43 45 43,118 1,003
Greater London 100 58 85,911 859
Southern 64 73 43,970 687
North West 79 78 44,378 562
Wales 36 78 18,270 508
Northern 38 87 14,416 379
Scotland 71 90 26,446 372
West Midlands 54 91 18,464 342
South West 43 91 14,485 337
East Midlands 40 93 12,887 322
North East 51 94 15,511 304
Total 618 78 337,856 547
aCalculated on the same basis as in Table 2.2.
Source: National Executive Committee Organisation Sub-committee minutes, 21
May 1969, Individual membership 1968, NAD/58/5/69.
fielding ch 2.P65 10/10/03, 12:3145
46 Fielding
Table 2.4 Official and ‘actual’ memberships compared in the South
West Region, 1965
Constituency party Official membership ‘Actual’ membership
Bath 1,344 880
Bodmin 1,000 100
Bridgwater 1,382 1,127
Bristol Central 1,000 625
Bristol North East 1,000 400
Bristol North West 1,608 1,352
Bristol South 1,000 684
Bristol South East 1,000 400
Bristol West 1,000 342
Cheltenham 1,129 1,000
Chippenham 1,000 508
Cirencester 1,000 493
Devizes 1,503 1,274
Exeter 1,000 638
Falmouth and Cambourne 1,000 300
Gloucester 1,000 370
Honiton 1,000 241
North Cornwall 1,000 150
North Devon 1,000 150
North Dorset 1,000 700
North Somerset 1,247 1,250
Plymouth Devonport 1,569 Not given
Plymouth Sutton 1,656 1,263
Poole 1,000 232
St Ives 1,000 180
Salisbury 1,000 450
South Dorset 1,905 1,200
South Gloucestershire 1,743 1,100
Stroud 1,398 1,000
Swindon 1,000 373
Taunton 1,916 1,100
Tavistock 1,000 500
Tiverton 1,000 350
Torquay 1,000 353
Torrington 1,000 530
Totnes 1,000 350
Truro 1,000 200
Wells 1,024 960
West Dorset 1,000 500
West Gloucestershire 1,000 800
Westbury 1,079 800
Weston 1,000 300
Yeovil 3,500 3,000
Total 52,003 28,525
Source: Bristol Record Office, Labour Party South West Region papers, 38423/14.
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allowed to send a delegate or submit a resolution to conference. As a
consequence, during the 1960s an increasing number of CLPs affiliated
exactly 1,000 members: between 1965 and 1968 the proportion rose
from 58 to 78 per cent. Nobody believed this reflected reality: Sara
Barker, when National Agent, guessed parties claiming the minimum
were between 200 and 300 strong.68 On that basis, Labour’s actual
membership in 1965 was two-thirds of the official total of 816,765 and
just under half the 700,856 claimed for 1968 (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
Data for the South West Region suggest Barker’s calculations were
possibly slightly pessimistic. Insofar as they knew what their number of
members was, CLPs in the region claiming 1,000 admitted to their RO
an ‘actual’ membership of, on average, 400, with one as low as 100.
Offsetting this, however, was the fact that those officially claiming more
members than the minimum also often exaggerated their position (see
Table 2.4). As a rough guide, then, Barker’s estimates appear as good
as any, as it is impossible to determine the truth of the matter precisely.
Even had they not been obliged to return mostly fictional figures,
few CLPs could have given Transport House an accurate total, owing to
the means by which subscriptions were gathered. Members largely paid
their fee in monthly instalments to a collector visiting them at home: as
so few attended meetings, the collector was often their only link with
the party. Despite this, and the financial importance of the post, many
collectors performed the task erratically: some were overburdened with
party duties, while others were simply incapable of performing the job
properly. Given the high turnover of those willing to perform this un-
popular task, membership lists were often lost.69 Such was the inefficiency
of collecting, it led to an ‘unofficial understanding’ that those paying
half their annual subscription would still be counted members.70 A fully
paid-up member was almost as rare as the dodo: in 1960 only 10 per
cent of the supposedly 230-strong Stockwell ward in Brixton were in
this happy state, while 77 per cent had made no recorded contribution
for more than four of the previous twelve months.71 When the East
Midlands RO estimated that, on average, CLPs in his region collected
two-thirds of their membership income, this was considered laudable.72
It took the Simpson report to suggest that members should be encouraged
to pay annually direct from their bank accounts – although, as many
workers were still paid in cash, little progress had been made by 1970.
Recruitment
It had long been apparent that CLPs whose MPs enjoyed the largest
majorities often had the lowest memberships. This concerned the authors
of the Wilson report, if only because it meant such local parties were
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not making their proper financial contribution to Transport House.
Wilson therefore proposed setting the affiliation fee that CLPs were to
pass on to the national organisation at 6d per member or £2 per 1,000
votes, whichever was the greater. While increasing income for the centre,
this would also have encouraged local parties to increase their member-
ship. While endorsed by numerous ROs and agents, this proved too
controversial a step.73 Thus, the situation became progressively worse,
such that by the late 1960s CLPs in heartland regions such as North
East England and Scotland probably had as few as one-third the members
of regions in the south of England, where the Conservatives dominated
(see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
Despite officials’ frequent promptings, many of those running CLPs
with secure (albeit small) incomes in safe Labour areas saw little reason
to recruit more members or indulge in electoral work. Parties in mining
districts were among the most reluctant, enjoying as they did the gener-
ous financial support of the National Union of Mineworkers and the
loyal votes of its members and their families.74 Yet, whatever the source
of financial security – be it a successful bingo competition, tote scheme
or a large Labour club – CLPs were inclined to neglect recruitment,
despite officials arguing that a healthy bank balance without a large
membership would ultimately prove an electoral handicap.75
The position in the big cities was particularly bad: in 1966 the National
Agent described the situation as ‘deplorable’.76 The NEC suspected that
borough and city parties diverted the energies of too many activists
from ensuring the healthy running of their own CLPs.77 This would have
been a credible explanation if borough parties were not themselves in a
dire state. Glasgow was by far the most horrible example of a city party
gone from bad in the 1950s to worse in the 1960s.78 In 1961 the NEC
described membership in Glasgow’s fifteen CLPs as ‘deplorably low’:
on average they had 320 members and 35 activists, figures that had
slipped to 119 and 29, respectively, seven years later (see Table 2.5).
Slum clearance played its part, as did administrative incompetence, but
so did the fact that low memberships served the interests of those cliques
that ran the party in Glasgow. Allowing CLPs to atrophy, such that EC
and GMC meetings became rare events, meant they were more easily
managed. Moreover, reformers who challenged the situation were con-
fronted by an array of unconstitutional practices. Yet Glasgow was but
the most extreme example of what Raisin feared was a widespread ‘un-
spoken reluctance’ to take membership recruitment seriously. He and other
organisers believed that at the heart of this indolence was the fear of
local party notables that new members would threaten their position.79
There was one further cause of low recruitment, especially relevant
to parties in working-class districts. It is very likely that had more activists
been willing and able to recruit, many CLPs would have significantly
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increased in size, as there were numerous instances of a few nights’
canvassing producing spectacular results. For example, in Salford’s
Trinity ward during one September evening in 1962, three councillors
claimed to have recruited thirty-nine new members inside thirty
minutes.80 Yet such new members required someone to collect their sub-
scriptions and, as it was anticipated that few recruits would help out,
this meant more work for already stretched activists. Therefore many
stalwarts looked on new members as more trouble than they were –
literally – worth. To the frustration of one constituency agent, after two
keen Ebbw Vale activists had enrolled 160 recruits, ward officers simply
refused to issue them with membership cards.81
A professional solution?
By the 1960s, some feared the party’s attachment to voluntarism was
electorally debilitating. As Socialist Commentary noted in 1965, Labour
suffered from a ‘distrust of the professional … [and] in a mistaken
Table 2.5 Numbers of members and activists in Glasgow, 1961 and
1968
Constituency party 1961 1968
Members Activists Members Activists
Bridgeton 250 20 45 32
Cathcart – 30 95 46
Central 130 8–10 44 27
Craigton 370 24 175 36
Gorbals 350 20 39 27
Govan 400 60 38 26
Hillhead 30 5 57 14
Kelvingrove 80 60 24 12
Maryhill 983 50–60 212 30–40
Pollock – 23 320 43
Provan 354 70 242 25
Scotstoun 1,000 50 185 50
Shettleston 200 20 30 11
Springburn 200 40 200 32
Woodside 450 40 80 26
Totals 4,797 526 1,786 442
Source: National Executive Committee Organisation Sub-committee minutes, 14
February 1961, Enquiry into party organisation in Glasgow, NAD/21/2/61, and 18
February 1969, Enquiry into party organisation in Glasgow, NAD/14/2/69.
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interpretation of what “democracy” means, the Party clings to the belief
that almost anything can be done by almost anyone’.82 There were plenty
of instances in which elemental electoral work appeared to be beyond
the abilities of long-standing activists. As was said of one struggling
Welsh branch secretary, ‘I have no doubt that he is giving of his best,
but like so many of us, his best is not good enough’.83 Hence, while
Wilson disavowed transforming Labour into a professional body, the
report still criticised the extent to which CLPs adhered to ‘time-honoured
rituals’ and ‘ancient techniques’.84
One device to increase membership especially favoured by organisers
was to give collectors a commission on subscriptions successfully
gathered in. They hoped this would increase the number of those will-
ing to undertake such work and give them an extra incentive to be
efficient: as a result, more members could be recruited and organisers
would be safe in the knowledge they would not be misplaced. Despite
its theoretical advantages, even CLPs in decline, like Bethnal Green,
sometimes rejected the measure: wanting to maintain the ‘spirit of
voluntary service’, commissions were, that GMC believed, ‘opposed to
Socialist principle’.85 Even CLPs that gave collectors a commission
undermined its effect by asking elderly, disabled or unemployed people
to do the work, that is, those whose need was often greater than their
ability.86 This charitable practice subverted officials’ covert reason for
introducing a financial element to recruitment: they hoped it would
sidestep the influence of local worthies, who ‘insisted they had a right
to determine the rate at which the Party should advance’.87
Reformers also expected that the employment of full-time constitu-
ency agents would improve Labour’s organisation, as they could devote
all their time to increasing income, membership and ensuring affairs
were conducted along approved lines.88 The spread of agents was prob-
ably the only means of promoting a ‘professional’ ethos. Yet, while Wilson
and Simpson both called for a National Agency Service, Transport House
claimed it could not afford one, although subsidies were increased to
marginal constituencies to encourage their employment. As most CLPs
were expected to underwrite all an agent’s salary, officials were in no
position to compel them to employ one. As a result, only a minority
ever used a professional agent for any length of time: most made do
with part-time volunteers. In fact, as membership declined, so did the
financial ability of local parties to employ an agent: from 296 in 1951,
the number of CLPs with full-time agents fell to 144 by 1970. Cost,
however, was not the only reason: some activists were said to be ‘anti-
Agent in principle’, because they feared a professional would reduce
the need for voluntary effort.89 Some established cliques also feared
that, as in Stockton-on-Tees and Burnley, a keen agent would challenge
the dubious methods that helped sustain them in power.90
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Education
It was a common complaint that activists devoted most of their time to
managing the party but hardly any to talking about political issues: as
various surveys confirmed, less than half of GMC or ward meetings
featured invited speakers or policy debates.91 Yet, during the 1950s, ROs
supported attempts to incorporate policy discussion into meetings, and
they held regular weekend and day schools on a variety of topics. Even
so, Wilson urged the NEC to look into education ‘as a matter of urgency’
and members of the NEC’s Organisation Sub-committee agreed it was
‘desirable to bring political education more easily within the reach of
the active Party member in circumstances which will enable him [sic]
really to understand the problems of policy and organisation and to
discuss their implications in a detailed and practical way’.92 Over a
decade later, Simpson reported matters had not improved, as too much
of the party’s educational work was ‘haphazardly and unsystematically’
applied, while ‘far too much of it stays at an elementary level’.93 By the
end of the 1960s, Transport House feared it was failing to give members
a clear idea of the party’s principles or the background to government
policy, thereby limiting their ability to contribute to debate.94
Nonetheless, as local studies also discovered, there was a ‘very genuine
interest’ in preventing routine business dominating every meeting, and
when political issues were discussed a lively debate often ensued.95 Many
CLPs appointed a Political Education Officer (PEO); formed education
sub-committees to encourage discussions at meetings; published news-
letters; and established libraries. To some activists, member education
was a critical part of their work. Thus, in 1967, Birmingham Yardley’s
PEO wrote in the first issue of his constituency newsletter that ‘Making
Socialists is an educational process and there is a pressing need for
people to gain an understanding of the socialist solutions to the grave
social problems of the day’. Therefore, he proposed using the newsletter
‘to stimulate discussion and understanding among you … the members
… and through you … the general public’.96 Southall’s PEO also
believed that, through education, Labour would create an ‘enlightened
and educated democracy’, defining his ambition as:
to educate every Party Member up to a certain standard. When each
member is able to judge political programmes in their proper light
and choose the one which will benefit mankind the most then they
have reached that standard. From this the Party should be able to
surge ahead and spread this learning to the general public, the
voters.97
It might be expected that middle-class members would see merit in
education and debate, so it is no revelation that during the mid-1950s
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Warwick and Leamington Spa CLP regularly held discussions at meet-
ings; organised a constituency-wide speaking contest; published a
newsletter addressing contentious issues; and that its PEO established a
Sunday discussion group.98 Yet Poplar in London’s East End also pro-
moted discussion and in 1952 responded to national officials’ request
that constituencies debate Problems of Foreign Policy.99 The GMC urged
wards to study the pamphlet and report their conclusions. Most did;
some even held two meetings to discuss it and as a result attendances
were said to have improved. This was no isolated episode: wards would
also use pamphlets specially designed by Transport House to aid argu-
ment. Furthermore, the 1952 exercise was repeated a year later when
copies of Challenge to Britain were distributed to wards. If less extensive
than the previous initiative, the process concluded with a special GMC
meeting that saw an unusually large number of delegates contribute to
discussion.
Poplar’s initiative was not sustained and in this respect it was typical.
Numerous CLPs periodically promoted education, only to fall foul of
members’ lack of enthusiasm. Thus, in Brixton during 1950–1, dele-
gates failed to attend the GMC’s propaganda committee meetings;
there was little support for its weekly discussions; a quiz night failed to
attract many; and open-air gatherings were abandoned because of
insufficient support. Despite this, two years later the GMC resolved to
re-establish its political education committee, although some opposed
this move. In 1953 a resolution submitted to the GMC suggested that
policy discussion be placed higher up the agenda – although, ironically,
it was debated only one full year after having first been tabled. Having
been passed, it made no difference and in 1956 a frustrated CLP chair
complained that meetings contained no real discussion of politics, and
exhorted members to ‘take more interest in Socialism and not the
“Social Committee”’.100
Not all activists, many of whom possessed only a basic education,
were comfortable debating ideas and complicated issues.101 There were
undoubtedly many like the Brixton stalwart who was described after his
death as ‘a good member not an outstanding one as regards getting up
and making speeches or voicing his thoughts at meetings but he was
one that helped to keep the Party going by his background work’.102 If
such reticence resulted from a lack of confidence, others aggressively
dismissed debate as an unnecessary luxury. As one councillor stated in
opposing political discussions becoming an integral part of his GMC
meetings, it would be a ‘waste of time’, as those present ‘all know what
we mean by the Labour Party’.103 To such activists, the job of Labour
members was to knock on doors and tell people the good news, not
debate the nature of the message.
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A hegemonic party?
Some believe that the party was uninterested in establishing a relation-
ship with the voters that went beyond the electoral – that Labour saw
no point in becoming a hegemonic cultural institution promoting a
distinctively socialist vision of society.104 A number of CLPs certainly
adhered to an instrumental view and there were sound practical (usually
financial) reasons for avoiding activities that did not directly relate to
electing Labour representatives. Yet some CLPs in safe Labour areas
did try to establish a more lively relationship with voters. Bethnal Green
was, however, unusual in having a sports section, which organised a
darts league, table tennis competitions and a cricket team – and by the
early 1950s even that was ailing.105 At the start of the 1960s, members
in Gateshead hoped to make their party more attractive to locals by
establishing a club for pensioners, a coffee bar for adolescents and a
‘space-age’ club for children.106 If North Kensington lacked a social wing,
it attempted to mobilise voters through more directly political activities,
such as an annual autumn propaganda campaign, which in 1954 con-
sisted of four open-air and three indoor meetings and the distribution
of 10,000 leaflets.107 One reason why few other parties experimented
with similar kinds of initiative was that they invariably failed to generate
a popular response. Leith CLP was another party whose MP sat on a
large Commons majority but, unhappy with the apparently apathetic
nature of the 1955 general election campaign, the GMC decided to go
out and preach ‘basic Socialism’. To that end they formed a propaganda
committee that ran a ‘Brains Trust’ and printed 2,000 tickets for a
proposed public meeting, whose main speaker was to be Tony Benn.
Unfortunately, the former did not generate much support and was dis-
continued, while advance sales for the latter event were so bad it was
cancelled.108
More salutary still was the experience of Shoreditch and Finsbury
CLP. In 1952, London’s Assistant RO considered membership in this
safe Labour constituency ‘lamentably small’, so the newly elected MP,
Victor Collins, decided to reinvigorate the party.109 ‘Let people see’, he
declared, that ‘the Labour Party is alive and caring for their welfare
and happiness, not only in Whitehall, but here in Shoreditch’. ‘We
need’, he announced, ‘new blood, new ideas’, and active members in
every block of flats and on every street. Specifically, Collins wanted to
double membership to 3,000, employ an agent and acquire a constitu-
ency headquarters. By the end of 1955, he had achieved this and more,
including launching a paper, The Citizen. Success, however, brought its
own problems. First, the agent and party premises imposed a painful
financial burden. Secondly, the collection of new members’ subscrip-
tions proved too much for what remained a small band of activists, who
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were also now expected to deliver 10,000 copies of The Citizen. The
result was that most new recruits were quickly lost, while The Citizen
failed to reach many homes. By 1961 the party was heavily in debt and
membership had fallen to 1,611, little more than before Collins’ adventure.
One of the more popular means by which local parties tried to establish
a presence in wider society was through their May Day celebrations.110
In London and across the country, tradition stipulated that a march
should be held, followed by speeches, the purpose of which was to
demonstrate the strength of the forces supporting Labour, to impress
onlookers and encourage participants. Yet, by the later 1950s, some
wanted May Day rethought, especially in London, where it was custom-
ary for members to gather at Victoria Embankment on the first Sunday
after 1 May and process with bands and banners to Hyde Park. At the
1958 London Labour conference, both Acton and Woolwich CLPs pro-
posed reform, and reported that their members considered the event a
shambles and participated only out of a sense of duty. As such, it neither
enthused participants nor created valuable publicity; its small size, more-
over, was judged a ‘disgrace’. The form taken by the celebration, Acton’s
secretary suggested, was out of tune with changes in popular leisure. ‘If
the present method continues’, he warned, ‘May Day, like the Street
Corner meetings, will shortly be a thing of the past’, a view echoed by
Deptford’s agent, who thought marching behind brass bands belonged
‘to the times of mass unemployment and empty bellies’.
Discontent was not confined to the capital. As early as 1955, May
Day in Glasgow was described as ‘a mere shadow of its former self ’ and
questions were asked about its purpose.111 In Coventry, leading figures
also considered the march tended ‘to demonstrate our weaknesses
rather than our strength’.112 In Bristol, by the early 1960s, even left-
inclined activists feared their march had just become the occasion for
‘undesirable elements’ to win publicity for themselves.113 This echoed
the opinion of Wilson’s first Chief Whip, Edward Short, who com-
plained that Newcastle upon Tyne’s May Day celebrations were ruined
by a ‘ragtag and bobtail’ of Communists, Trotskyists and anarchists, who
made it their business to heckle speakers.114
Asked by Tribune in 1966 what May Day meant to them, two trade
unionists summed up both sides of the argument. One from South Wales
stated that, for him, it recalled workers’ conditions before the war, and
he thought the ‘memory of those conditions is needed because so many
workers, having achieved a reasonable standard of living, believe that
the objects of trade unionism have been accomplished’. In contrast, a
West Indian-born councillor from Camberwell confessed it meant little
to him, as he had not participated in any of the struggles it honoured.
He called for the celebrations to be made more relevant, not just for
the sake of immigrants but also for native-born youngsters.115
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As a result of criticisms made in 1958, the committee charged with
arranging the London event was instructed to give the celebrations a
‘more varied and colourful nature’, while it should still retain its essential
character. Consequently, May Day was marked in much the same way as
before, until a decision was taken to ‘present the traditional celebration
in a modern setting’. Thus, in 1969, the party marked May Day at the
Royal Festival Hall, the first half of the evening consisting of a per-
formance by the Royal Shakespeare Company and the second being
taken up by political speeches. While committee members considered
this a success, after the third Festival Hall event, in 1971, at which the
audience was entertained by classical music, they were forced to take
account of other points of view. Constituencies and union branches were
asked whether they approved of this innovation or wanted to revert to
the former format: an overwhelming number wanted the latter and,
despite the committee’s misgivings, that is what they got.
Conclusion
The debate provoked by how the London Party marked May Day neatly
encapsulates the dilemma faced by Labour across the country. A few
activists and officials recognised that the form adopted to observe 1
May was considered antediluvian outside the party and so called for
change, although in truth their proposals were not guaranteed to be
any more popular. In any case, those for whom the shape assumed by
this ritual was inextricably associated with the message they hoped to
convey ultimately prevailed. So far as opponents of change were con-
cerned, there was nothing wrong with marching behind brass bands – if
that evoked the 1930s, so much the better. The party actually needed
more brass bands playing their tunes with greater enthusiasm.
That Labour’s active membership formed a contracting and ageing
group, who by the mid-1960s possibly numbered only 50,000, helped
sustain hostility to change. The commitment required to work within
the party, compounded by a remoteness from popular concerns, im-
bued many – whether they formed self-interested cliques or embraced
the transforming power of education and voluntary service – with an
implacable (if often unconscious) sense of superiority. Their inability to
appeal to the majority of Labour members, let alone those who merely
voted for the party, only further underpinned this conservatism. For, so
far as many activists were concerned, the refusal of most of the popu-
lation to follow their lead reflected badly on the people rather than on
themselves. Within this frame of reference, cultural change was some-
thing that might – or might not – be accommodated, but only on their
own terms, which, so far as most were concerned, were beyond reproach.
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Not everybody assumed this stark attitude to change. As the debate on
‘affluence’ (to be analysed in the following chapter) indicates, those in
the parliamentary leadership, who were preoccupied with winning elec-
tions, could be more flexible. Even revisionists such as Hugh Gaitskell
were, however, less pragmatic than they liked to imagine.
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Responding to affluence
Many commentators viewed Labour’s failure to win the 1959 general
election as evidence that, without fundamental change, the party could
not prosper in what they described as the ‘affluent society’.1 By 1966,
many of the same people believed Labour had been transformed and
was largely in tune with contemporary developments. In accounting for
this turn-about, most pointed to the impact of Harold Wilson, who
became leader in February 1963. At Labour’s annual conference in
October that year, he tied his party’s fortunes to the development of
the ‘scientific and technological revolution’ and the promotion of ‘the
white heat of technological change’. Members drawn from across the
party believed Wilson had given Labour a new vision for a new era.2
This chapter examines the development of Labour strategy between
1959 and 1966 and highlights the debate it provoked, as this revealed
how members thought their party should best respond to change. Hugh
Gaitskell and his successor assumed – just like many other contem-
poraries – that rising incomes had restructured society and that popular
political attitudes had changed in step. As a consequence, they believed
Labour had to reform itself, in particular how it communicated with
key parts of the electorate: less stress was placed on the need to alter
the party’s organisation and policies. How far this approach contributed
to Labour’s 1964 and 1966 victories is moot. While it would be unwise
to think the party played the most significant role in its electoral revival,
it would be obtuse to imagine Labour contributed nothing at all.
The 1959 campaign
As with all such contests, it was only after the Conservatives won the
1959 general election that the result appeared inevitable. Armed with
the belief that rising incomes were blurring class differences, such that
better-off manual workers adhered to ‘middle-class’ values, many
observers argued that the basic cause of Gaitskell’s defeat was Labour’s
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failure to come to terms with ‘affluence’. Harold Macmillan’s party won,
in contrast, because it had responded with greater understanding. Auth-
oritative sources predicted that if Labour did not react in like manner,
it would probably never return to office.3 Having shared many of the
assumptions of such analysts for a number of years, Gaitskell and his
cohorts readily accepted their interpretation.
The result of the election had greatly disappointed Labour members,
as it was the fourth time in a row the Conservatives had increased their
share of the vote and the third in which their party’s had declined.4 How-
ever, the extent to which Labour’s defeat was the product of intractable
and progressive social processes is, despite what was said afterwards,
open to doubt. Certainly, before the election Gaitskell and many others
in the leadership believed their party had more than a fair chance of
winning. During the campaign, opinion polls indicated it was a close
contest, so close in fact that the Conservatives feared the possibility of
defeat. Even so, Macmillan was an assiduous operator, who invariably
bested Gaitskell over tactics, and opinion polls showed that voters re-
garded him as the more effective of the two. Moreover, in the immediate
run-up to the election the Conservative-inclined press had done its best
to present Labour as divided over nuclear disarmament and national-
isation. Despite that, Labour’s campaign was judged superior to the
ruling party’s, up to the point at which Gaitskell made what even sym-
pathisers viewed as a serious blunder. He promised that taxes would
not rise under a Labour government, as any extra spending would be
financed through growth. This the Conservatives successfully presented
as an irresponsible electoral bribe and Labour never recovered its
momentum.
How important such matters were to the final outcome is question-
able, as the contest was held during a period of general, sustained and
unprecedented prosperity, which inevitably favoured the government.
This was underlined by what was an exceptional two-year £500,000 Con-
servative advertising campaign, the basic message of which was, as one
poster put it, ‘Life’s better under the Conservatives. Don’t let Labour
ruin it.’ Instead of fighting on other ground, Labour compounded its
disadvantage by concentrating its campaign on the economy, thereby
encouraging voters to focus on an issue from which the government
could only gain.
Insofar as Gallup’s polling was accurate, some clear patterns emerge
from the 1959 poll compared with that of 1955 and it is worth bearing
these in mind (see Table 3.1). Labour lost support among upper-
middle-class, middle-class and even working-class voters but enjoyed
considerably more backing from those categorised as ‘very poor’. Among
the youngest cohort of voters the party’s position deteriorated, although
it held on to most support among the middle-aged and actually improved
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its popularity with the oldest voters. Labour also lost ground among
men, while women electors showed a marginally greater inclination to
support the party than previously – although far fewer still voted
Labour compared with men.
The numerous post-mortems written by Labour’s constituency agents,
candidates and regional officials broadly agreed that their party had
failed to appeal to enough younger, well-off workers. Husbands and
working wives in their twenties – that is, the most affluent members of
the working class – appeared especially resistant.5 It was, however, un-
clear how far the party’s promise to increase nationalisation had created
this situation, as Gaitskell was soon to claim. Reports from marginal
seats in the East Midlands, for example, concurred that voters’ prosperity
went against the party.6 The agent in Bristol South East also painted a
picture of Labour failing to win over young working-class couples enjoy-
ing a purchasing power beyond their parents’ dreams. Ominously, he
predicted that, ‘short of an economic calamity’, Labour was unlikely to
increase support among such voters.7 In accounting for their party’s
victory, Conservative officials privately believed nationalisation was much
less important than Gaitskell’s tax pledge.8 Moreover, while Macmillan
claimed the ‘class war is over and we have won it’, his party’s officials
were more cautious, appreciating that younger workers were unsteady
Conservatives and so could not yet be counted firm supporters.9
Although it appeared to leave certain affluent voters unimpressed,
Labour’s campaign was hardly antediluvian. Through lack of money
and inclination, the party did not use advertising to anything like the
extent employed by the Conservatives. Still, it did try to reach voters in
innovative ways, most especially with its pre-election statement The
Table 3.1 Labour’s vote by social category, 1955–66
1955 1959 1964 1966
Upper middle class 9 6 9 8
Middle class 21 16 22 24
Working class 57 54 53 61
Very poor 54 68 59 72
Men 51 48 49 56
Women 42 43 39 48
21–29 years 54 47 47 56
30–49 years 48 47 45 53
50–64 years 42 40 40 53
65 and above 45 51 44 48
Source: Gallup Poll, ‘Voting behaviour in Britain, 1945–1974’, in R. Rose (ed.),
Studies in British Politics (1976), p. 206.
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Future Labour Offers You (1958), which summarised Labour policy in an
accessible and attractively illustrated manner. Commentators and voters
alike thought the party’s television broadcasts impressive – although
some activists thought them ‘a little too “clever”’.10 The national cam-
paign directed from Transport House was, additionally, generally
regarded as supremely professional.
The party’s overall message was that its leaders were economically
responsible, better able than the Conservatives to increase growth, and
reflected the interests of the whole of society, while their opponents
were concerned only for the rich. Promising to promote individual free-
dom, Labour believed this should not occur at the expense of wider
social justice. Britain Belongs to You, its manifesto, stressed that Labour’s
socialist ethic meant ‘none of us, however lucky or well-off we may happen
to be, ought to feel comfortable in a society in which the old and sick
are not decently cared for’. It pointed to the ‘many millions’ of ‘have-
nots’, and promised to raise pensions and improve provision for widows.
Yet the manifesto also addressed the ‘haves’, and promised to extend
personal liberty by setting up enquiries into betting restrictions, Sunday
observance statutes and licensing laws. Labour’s desire to enable people
to take advantage of the opportunities created by full employment was
more completely articulated in Leisure for Living (1959), issued some
months before the campaign. This constituted an attempt to promote
what Roy Jenkins described as ‘gaiety, tolerance and beauty’ and thereby
extend party competition to areas beyond the economic.11
Labour tried to appeal specifically to the young as well, by promising
to enhance their opportunities through creating a maintenance grant
for sixth-formers and increasing it for university students, while improv-
ing access to education and training for those leaving school at fifteen
years of age. It also pledged to improve leisure facilities for young people
and promised that a Labour government would at least consider lower-
ing the voting age from twenty-one.
Similarly, the party made numerous discrete appeals to women,
largely – but not exclusively – on the basis of their domestic respon-
sibilities. Thus, in a list of housewives’ supposed ‘Top Ten points of
interest’, one leaflet had, at number one, the ‘house you live in’, declar-
ing it should be ‘easy to run with modern amenities’. Number three was
‘good health’, and here the leaflet focused on pre- and post-natal care;
numbers four and five also related to children, being ‘education’ and
‘careers’. Six and seven referred to prices and consumer protection.
Perhaps less conventionally, number eight – ‘leisure’ – asserted that the
welfare state should give wives and mothers time to find paid employ-
ment or develop a hobby. Point nine stated that the party’s pension
plan would give housewives equality with wage earners.12 Labour’s main
emphasis nonetheless fell on consumer issues. It promised to guarantee
fielding ch 3.P65 10/10/03, 12:3364
Responding to affluence 65
‘value for money’ by preventing monopolistic prices, ensuring the
accurate labelling of goods and encouraging the activities of the Con-
sumers’ Association.13 This message was reflected in the party’s television
broadcasts. In one, the front-bench MP Eirene White claimed Labour’s
women MPs were especially concerned to keep down the cost of living,
while, in contrast, the ‘housewife’s voice’ was not heard on the Conser-
vative side. Moreover, shown returning home with some shopping, White
described herself as a ‘working housewife’ and sympathised with women
trying to reconcile jobs with domestic duties, a message strikingly
underlined by film of the redoubtable MP Bessie Braddock dressed in
a pinafore wielding a Ewbank cleaner.
Labour’s message was therefore a mix of appeals designed to maxi-
mise its vote among a variety of groups. It contained measures to maintain
support among the ‘traditional’ working class while gesturing towards
voters who had become more affluent. There were undoubtedly some
at the top of the party, such as Morgan Phillips, the General Secretary,
who believed unemployment ‘marked the real difference’ between the
parties.14 Yet Labour’s programme also addressed the concerns of those
who took a well paid job for granted, rather than thinking it something
for which they should be permanently grateful. Nonetheless, leading
academic commentators believed that if the party was to stand any
chance of ever again winning power, it had to abandon what they termed
its ‘schizophrenic image’. If Labour’s manifesto had been a mixture of
appeals, it was thought the party had to alter the balance and more
explicitly win over the young and well-off. For, they believed, so far as
Labour was concerned, the electoral consequences of social change
meant things could only get worse.15 Thus, while Labour’s national cam-
paign had largely reflected their outlook, to Gaitskell and his closest
lieutenants defeat meant the party should adhere ever more closely to
their ‘revisionism’.
Accommodating affluence
Although associated with Anthony Crosland’s The Future of Socialism,
first published in 1956, revisionism traced its immediate origins back
to Evan Durbin’s The Politics of Democratic Socialism (1940), which was
written in the late 1930s, when Britain still experienced mass unem-
ployment. Crosland gave this perspective a more contemporary gloss –
although even his thinking was clarified during post-war austerity. In
1950 he had claimed that capitalism was evolving into a new economic
configuration, one that mitigated the worst excesses of the unbridled
free market.16 While not socialism, this new order produced ineluctable
growth and attenuated class conflict by improving incomes and increasing
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the size of those ‘intermediate classes’ who were neither manual workers
nor employers. This new system resolved what Karl Marx supposed
were capitalism’s inherent contradictions and was capable of delivering
continued rising living standards to the working class. As a result, the
worst injustices and miseries associated with capitalism were on the verge
of abolition. Yet, while making life better, what Crosland termed ‘Pro-
gressive Capitalism’ could never eliminate class distinctions and would
not evolve into socialism without further political pressure. Socialism
was therefore still necessary but might take several generations to come
about – and in order to win power Labour had to make a special appeal
to the ‘intermediate classes’, as they would in future determine the out-
come of elections.
In 1951 a Socialist Commentary editorial elaborated on Crosland’s view
and outlined what would become party strategy under Gaitskell and
Wilson. This stipulated that if Labour was to regain power, it had to win
over the ‘floating vote’, which meant standing on the centre ground.
The ‘glaring grievances of the past’ had been ‘eliminated’ and while
‘no one pretends that the whole job has been done’, poverty was much
diminished and a substantial redistribution of income had taken place:
Britain was experiencing ‘at least the beginnings of an egalitarian
society’. This meant Labour had to ‘look beyond the old gospel of more
and more nationalisation, “workers’ control” or class appeals to “soak
the rich”’.17 Gaitskell’s response to the party’s 1955 defeat reflected this
perspective and anticipated his attitude to the 1959 loss. Hence he
believed unprecedented access to ‘TV, new gadgets like refrigerators
and washing machines, the glossy magazines with their special appeal
to women and even the flood of new cars on the home markets’ meant
‘more and more people are beginning to turn to their own personal
affairs and to concentrate on their own material advance’. It was, he
advised members, ‘no good moaning about it’; policy should be made
to fit in with this new individualism and presented in terms sympathetic
to it.18 After becoming leader in 1955, Gaitskell consequently did his
best to dilute Labour’s close connection with state ownership and en-
sured it went into the 1959 campaign committed only to renationalising
steel and long-distance road haulage companies.
The revisionists were determined, as Jenkins put it, to ‘use this shock’
generated by defeat to promote Labour’s further transformation.19 Thus,
Gaitskell or those closest to him: demanded that the party recast its
links with the unions; called for a rethink about its relationship with the
Liberals; and suggested Labour should change its name. Gaitskell’s own
preoccupation, however, was with nationalisation, specifically clause four
of the party’s constitution, which associated Labour with a seemingly
unqualified aspiration to increase public ownership. Although he
considered it irrelevant to policy-making, Gaitskell believed the clause
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distorted affluent voters’ perception of his party because it allowed the
Conservatives to claim Labour wanted to nationalise everything. Revising
the clause would, he thought, more accurately reflect Labour’s purpose
and thereby make the party seem more relevant to modern Britain.
This analysis underscored Gaitskell’s contribution to the debate on
the election held at Labour’s 1959 conference.20 The fundamental cause
of defeat, he argued, was the transformation of capitalism, to which
Labour had to fully adapt. This meant members needed to accept that
most workers were well off and free of the fear of unemployment. They
also had to appreciate that the party could no longer rely on manual
workers’ ‘instinctive loyalty’ to secure power. White-collar employees
would, he predicted, eventually outnumber the proletariat, who, in turn,
would be transformed, such that the ‘typical worker of the future’ would
be a ‘skilled man in a white overall, watching dials in a bright new
modern factory [rather] than a badly paid cotton operative working in
a dark and obsolete 19th-century mill’. Owing to the ‘particularly notable
increase in comforts, pleasures and conveniences’ in the home, women’s
lives were, Gaitskell stated, now ‘a good deal easier’. Yet, owning wash-
ing machines, refrigerators and the like made them even less likely to
vote Labour than in the past. It was, he warned, no use ‘dismissing the
problem, as some do, by saying that women are too snobbish or too
politically apathetic’: they were, Gaitskell declared, ‘voters and count
just as much as men’. In order for Labour to improve its appeal, he
told delegates, the party should revise its aims.
While not dissenting from his analysis, members of Gaitskell’s shadow
Cabinet, along with those at the top of the Transport House bureauc-
racy, thought it foolish to try to change clause four.21 Most believed it
less electorally significant than their leader and feared the process of
revision would expose divisions in the party, for activist members
thought the promotion of public ownership inherent to the party’s basic
purpose and looked on clause four as a guarantor of its commitment to
socialism.22 The year 1959 was in fact the first to see the clause printed
on the back of membership cards, which was the result of a campaign
by activists in Newcastle upon Tyne who were concerned by the leader’s
lack of enthusiasm for nationalisation.23 This sentiment was, in contrast,
less obvious among the party’s wider membership: indeed, at the height
of the controversy, 54 per cent of those in the Newcastle-under-Lyme
party claimed never to have heard of clause four.24
Gaitskell lacked sufficient support among trade union representa-
tives on the National Executive Committee (NEC) for revision, although
he was allowed to add a statement of aims that could sit side by side
with the clause. This additional statement claimed Labour’s ‘central
ideal’ was ‘the brotherhood of man’, which meant it rejected ‘discrimin-
ation on grounds of race, colour or creed’ and held ‘men should accord
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to one another equal consideration and status in recognition of the
fundamental dignity of man’. As it stood for ‘social justice’, Labour also
sought a ‘classless society’, in which the ‘wealth produced by all is fairly
shared among all’, where ‘differences in rewards depend not upon birth
or inheritance but on the effort, skill and creative energy contributed
to the common good’ and where ‘equal opportunities exist for all to
live a full and varied life’. The party also embraced ‘democracy in
industry, and … the right of the workers both in the public and private
sectors to full consultation in all the vital decisions of management,
especially those affecting conditions of work’. It, moreover, remained
convinced that these objectives could be achieved only through ‘an
expansion of common ownership substantial enough to give the com-
munity power over the commanding heights of the economy’ –
although private enterprise had a legitimate place in the economy and
nationalisation would be applied only ‘according to circumstances’.
Finally, Labour stood for ‘the happiness and freedom of the individual
against the glorification of the state’ and ‘any exercise of arbitrary
power’.25 Few in the party were impressed with these additional aims:
Bradford East’s general management committee (GMC) considered
them an ‘unnecessary and meaningless conglomeration of words’, while
Frank Cousins, left-wing leader of the Transport and General Workers’
Union, believed they meant ‘all things to all people’.26
Criticising affluence
After his leader’s rebuff over clause four, Crosland wanted to reduce
the influence of the left by expelling about twenty MPs from the Parlia-
mentary Labour Party, including those, such as Michael Foot, he termed
‘Tribune extremists’. The left needed to be reined in, Crosland figured,
because they prevented Gaitskell taking full account of the electorate’s
new mood by forcing him into compromises that blurred the necessary
message.27 Unfortunately for Crosland, more than a few rebellious MPs
stood between Labour and what he considered the correct reaction to
defeat. Many of the left’s misgivings about ‘affluence’ were widely shared,
even by some normally defined as revisionists.
For most party members, ‘affluence’ was neither expected nor wel-
come. Labour entered opposition in 1951 believing it had won a moral
victory because Clement Attlee had gained more votes – if fewer seats –
than Winston Churchill. Members generally believed the outgoing gov-
ernment had applied policies that were both correct, in terms of moving
the country closer to socialism, and popular. To them, it was self-evident
that the state was superior to the market and that collective provision
was more effective than any system dependent on individual resources.28
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Few considered there was any need to adapt the programme first out-
lined in 1945. As one Labour journal published in Essex put it, after a
brief hiatus, the people would:
return to the Socialist planning now interrupted, which has saved
and revived this country, and will turn again with relief to the policy
of social justice which is implicit in Labour’s principles, and of which
Toryism knows nothing.… This Tory night can only be brief … they
cannot reverse the march of social progress. With the first light of
dawn, they and their misdeeds will vanish.29
Activists expected the Conservatives, in attempting to reverse ‘pro-
gress’, would attack living standards and raise unemployment. In the
face of much contrary evidence, that is what many claimed to see. In
1953, for example, members across the country were informed that the
return of the ‘hungry’ thirties was imminent.30 At the 1955 election,
some candidates claimed the Conservatives had caused real wages to
fall and inequality to increase.31 In 1957, Judith Hart similarly drew the
attention of her selection meeting in Lanark to the apparent fact that
poverty was ‘striking again at the underprivileged’ owing to the impact
of conscious Conservative strategy.32 At the time of the 1959 contest, a
number claimed inter-war conditions were returning to some parts of
the country.33
Even members who accepted the reality of ‘affluence’ and believed
the party needed to adapt were often critical of its wider impact. One
of Gaitskell’s own additional aims asserted that, as the ‘pursuit of
material wealth by and for itself ’ was ‘empty and barren’, the party
rejected the ‘selfish, acquisitive doctrines of capitalism’ and strove to
create a ‘socialist community based on fellowship, co-operation and
service’. As one of Labour’s few teenage activists had it, affluence caused
the people to lose their sense of purpose: they were ‘working all day for
money and then making their main hobby gambling for more’ because
they were wallowing in an ignorance induced by bingo, fashion and
pop music.34 It was this crude materialism that offended those like the
MP Reginald Sorenson, who feared the ‘feverish obsession with com-
petition for private gain’ threatened to submerge those ‘deeper values’,
based on ‘communal service and co-operation’, that Labour cherished.35
It was for this reason the revisionist Douglas Jay led the campaign to
prevent the introduction of independent television during the early
1950s; after its authorisation by Act of parliament in 1954, the loyalist
MP George Rogers deprecated it as further strengthening the ‘cor-
rupting influence of commercialism’.36 Later in the decade, many
opposed the introduction of Premium Bonds on the same basis.37
Some held those who rose up the social ladder during this period in
withering contempt. A Labour veteran from Wapping noted that affluence
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enabled former residents to move to the suburbs and buy cars, television
and radios. This new-found individual security had, however, caused
them to abandon the pursuit of ‘disinterested public service’.38 Writing
in the late 1960s, the left-wing MP Leah Manning recalled canvassing
in Chingford during the 1950 campaign, where she noted early signs
of ‘a phenomenon which is part of our changing society’: having moved
to a more middle-class district, voters born into the working class had
apparently changed their party affiliation. ‘One can only admire’, she
conceded, ‘their anxiety to do better for their children and obtain the
amenities which make their homes and lives more comfortable’.
Manning, nonetheless, doubted they had changed party through con-
viction and believed it was merely ‘an outward and visible sign of that
inward grace which had transferred them into “middle class”
respectability’.39 Others were less patronising but equally disappointed
by evidence of such aspirations: when a meeting of Bedford’s GMC was
informed that a majority of council tenants wanted to own their home,
those present let out audible sighs of dismay.40
Like their revisionist counterparts, the left had a ready-made explan-
ation for defeat in 1959, one prefigured in debates conducted at least
as far back as the late 1940s. Indeed, many believed matters had gone
awry when the Attlee government refused to nationalise even more of
the private sector than was promised in 1945.41 The MP Geoffrey Bing
accepted that the Conservatives returned to office in 1951 on the back
of support from a significant minority of the working class. His solution
was, however, the reverse of that proposed by Socialist Commentary: Bing
thought Labour would win back proletarian Tories if Labour advocated
a ‘clear, simple Socialist policy’ of drastically extending public owner-
ship.42 The ex-MP John Freeman later argued that, if Labour chased
middle-class voters by watering down its commitment to state control,
it would not only fail but would also alienate working-class supporters.43
Thus, Cousins was not alone in believing that what one activist
described as the leadership’s ‘wishy-washy thinking’ had prevented up
to six million ‘Socialists in embryo’ from supporting the party in 1959.44
As Aneurin Bevan’s Ebbw Vale constituency Labour party (CLP) advised
the ailing Daily Herald, the paper – just like Labour – would revive its
popularity if it decided to ‘rededicate itself to a socialist policy, divesting
itself of the idea that we can make capitalism work better than the
establishment’.45
What Crosland thought a permanently reformed capitalism, the left
took to be a ‘halfway house that cannot endure’, which would inevitably
usher back mass unemployment.46 Revisionists tended to look to the
United States for clues to Britain’s future and saw merit in emulating at
least some aspects of American society.47 On the left, only economies
dominated by state ownership were thought worthy of study, for they
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alone had permanently freed themselves of the threat of unemploy-
ment. As Labour’s candidate in Folkestone told activists in 1959,
collective ownership was the reason why the Soviet Union had achieved
unknown levels of prosperity and equality and had outstripped the
United States in economic performance.48 Edinburgh Fabians were in-
formed by one of their number that too much was made of the drabness
of life in the Soviet Union. The people now dressed in colourful fashions
and, while their styles were not too modern, the material was more than
adequate. Moreover, consumer goods were in ample supply and gener-
ally of the same quality evident in Britain. Furthermore, and possibly
for a Fabian audience more importantly, workers were tidier and more
civil than their British counterparts.49 Thus, as affluence would inevit-
ably give way to depression, Labour should remain what the MP Richard
Crossman described as a ‘Fighting Socialist Opposition’, unsullied by
compromise.50
If accommodating the needs of a transient affluence was thought
unwise, many also considered it unscrupulous. The Conservatives won
in 1959 because they had appealed to what one Basingstoke activist
said was ‘Snobbery, Selfishness and Fear’. If Labour emulated its rival,
the party would betray socialism.51 As Foot had it, ‘we have to change
the mood of the people of this country, to open their eyes to what an
evil and disgraceful and rotten society it is’.52 One self-consciously ‘old-
fashioned Socialist’ active in Falmouth argued that Labour’s purpose
was to ‘liberate the people from this TV–Bingo pseudo-culture, and in
its place make the people of this country feel that life can be a grand
adventure, and give them a horizon that they never thought possible’.53
The secretary of Warwick and Leamington Spa CLP also argued that
Labour should persuade voters that socialism was a ‘way of life that can
lead to a better understanding between man and man, nation and
nation; that it is an alternative to the way that glorifies the money lender
and the gambler, that it can lead to a better life for all’.54 Thus, Mary
Sutherland, Labour’s Chief Woman Officer, considered that rather than
change policy, the party should ‘think hard about how to improve our
methods of educating the electors’.55 In particular, Labour’s task was,
the agent in Bristol Central believed, to alert affluent voters unconcerned
about the plight of ‘those less well off, either the older folk in their own
country or the underprivileged overseas’, to their ‘responsibilities’.56
It was not, therefore, Labour’s job to change itself, but to reform
society in its own image. As it was believed workers voted Conservative
owing to the deliberate manipulation of their most irrational impulses,
just because the party lost votes did not mean it was wrong.57 A delegate
at the 1959 Labour Party annual conference forcefully advanced this
perspective by declaring how appalled he was that so many speakers
proposed ‘appeasing public opinion’. Instead, he suggested:
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Let us show we are basically a moral Party, who believe in truth and
believe in socialism! If we do that, it does not matter whether we
become a Government in 1964, 1974 or 1984. When we do form a
government, I know that we have something to offer the country. We
have a new world to offer them, and a new society, not a botched-up
old system. Let us go forward from this Conference! Let us go
forward and not turn back!58
Many believed this approach would work. MPs like Coventry’s Maurice
Edelman, a long-time left-winger, believed their own constituency vic-
tories derived from ‘our advocacy of an uncompromising Socialism with
nationalisation’.59 If Gaitskell wanted to win national office, he should
adopt a similar strategy.
Focus on image
Crosland opposed his leader’s attempt to alter clause four because he
thought Labour could transform its fortunes without substantially chang-
ing principles or policies. Instead, he thought the main task should be
to reshape its ‘image’.60 As the West Leeds MP and Gaitskell loyalist
Charles Pannell suggested, Labour lost in 1959 mainly because it had
not resonated with affluent voters ‘kidded’ by the Conservatives’ posters.61
This interpretation was also favoured at Transport House, where Phillips
was keen to avoid a divisive debate about policy and ideology.62
Crosland had long considered that ‘intermediate’ groups, such as
white-collar workers, were politically unstable because of the tension he
detected between their incomes, often no more than those of skilled
manual workers, and their conviction that they belonged to a superior
class. This contradiction between objective and subjective position
meant non-manual workers were, Crosland thought, fated to ‘float’
between the two essentially class-based parties. Moreover, as he believed
rising incomes had reduced class differences, Crosland thought voters
as a whole were less inclined to make ‘automatic’ assessments of their
interests than hitherto. Instead, they were more ‘pragmatic’ in their
judgements and so amenable to ‘rational persuasion’. This meant
Labour should concentrate on how it presented ‘itself and its policies
to the public, to the tone and content of its propaganda, and generally
to the impression which it makes on the voters’. Labour also needed to
abandon the ‘sectional, traditional class appeal’, which Crosland con-
sidered still dominated the 1959 campaign, and to portray itself as ‘a
progressive, national, social-democratic party’. As others suggested,
Labour should develop an all-embracing image, one that appealed to
the interests of both ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’.63
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After failing to revise clause four, Gaitskell and his advisers fully en-
dorsed this perspective, considering the best way to project Labour’s image
was through an advertising campaign based on research into voter atti-
tudes similar to the one undertaken by the Conservatives. They believed
there was no other way of reaching affluent voters, as they were unlikely
to attend public meetings, preferring as they apparently did to stay at
home watching television. As they were also deemed to have no interest
in the minutiae of political debate, these electors were thought likely to
be swayed by comparatively unimportant, non-intellectual influences.
Hence the right image was critical to advancing Labour’s fortunes.
Employing techniques associated with advertising proved not much
less controversial than trying to revise clause four. Some Labour
members viewed them as immoral, owing to their association with the
Conservative enemy. Given that one of the least savoury aspects of
affluence was considered to be the burgeoning of advertising, others
were queasy about using the same methods to promote their party.64 As
one agent declaimed: ‘Ad men are no more interested in the Labour
Party than they are in my Aunt Fanny … all they know about is appeal-
ing to people’s greed, whereas we are trying to appeal to their ideals’.65
Others, including the National Agent, thought Labour could recover
its position through better organisation; to his mind, advertising would
just waste precious funds.66
Opening up the organisation
Given the leadership’s emphasis on advertising, one constituency agent
claimed a growing number of activists were ‘beginning to wonder if
some of our more traditional activities are not just a sheer waste of time
and energy’.67 Yet even the most enthusiastic advocates of advertising,
such as the pollster Mark Abrams, believed members could still help by
opening up their parties to uncommitted groups of voters.68 As subse-
quent chapters focus on attempts to attract women, black immigrants
and the young, this section concentrates on initiatives to increase the
participation of ‘intermediate’ voters. In his analysis of Labour’s
problems, Phillips laid great stress on the fact that Labour was ceasing
to be a ‘mirror of the nation at work’, owing to the relative lack of non-
manual workers in its ranks.69 This imperative dominated after 1959
and was underlined by the spectacular Liberal 1962 by-election victory
in the Conservative stronghold of Orpington, which suggested that even
suburban voters disenchanted with Macmillan’s government were resist-
ant to Labour’s charms.70
To encourage activists to help change Labour’s image, and make local
parties more attractive to non-manual workers, a national competition
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was established in 1961 to improve the appearance of constituency offices.
Members were asked whether passers-by would, ‘from looking at YOUR
premises, get the idea that Labour is finished, down at heel, out of date,
or do they get an impression of a modern forward looking Party, clean,
efficient and belonging to the space age?’71 Officials urged activists to
hold special meetings for doctors, teachers and managers in what they
supposed would be amenable surroundings, like hotels, where cocktails
might be served.72 Opposition to these proposals was not necessarily
due to politics: left-wingers were not averse to attracting middle-class
supporters so long as this was not accompanied by any watering down
of policy.73 Some hostility, though, was due to cultural prejudice, so that
in the eyes of one agent, ‘petty bourgeois wine bibbing’ appeared ‘a
load of gimmick-dressed tripe’.74
Officials initially hoped the unions would help them attract more
white-collar members. Yet discussions held in Transport House during
1961 with eleven non-manual workers’ unions affiliated to the party
were inconclusive: few were prepared to make a special effort.75 In light
of that, Labour would have to approach such workers not as trade
unionists but as individual voters.76 One possible means was revealed
during Tony Benn’s campaign to remain an MP after being forcibly
elevated to the Lords after the death in 1960 of his father, who
happened to be a hereditary peer. This saw Labour in his Bristol South
East constituency tap into support normally beyond its reach and raised
questions in Benn’s mind about how Labour nationally could attract
‘progressive’ members of the middle class.77 Benn and others believed
the Bristol experience – as well as that of the Democrats in the United
States – showed the advantages of establishing a more flexible organis-
ation he called ‘Citizens for Labour’. He hoped to create the category
of ‘associate member’, which would allow individuals to avoid being a
full party member but would encourage them to donate their cash and
help at election time.
Considering his own CLP ‘effectively dead’, Benn believed his
scheme would help create ‘a more or less new Party which can somehow
be latched on to the old one’.78 While a party on the left – which in
1960 called for Gaitskell’s resignation – Bristol South East was run by a
small aged coterie of about fifteen activists whose secretary had been in
the party since 1918. GMC meetings rarely involved policy debates –
unless Benn was present, which, as a busy MP with wider responsibilities
within the national Labour Party, he rarely was. When it was suggested
they should have speakers to promote discussions the proposal was
rejected ostensibly because, as so few attended GMC meetings, it was
not worth the effort.79
Benn’s scheme required the permission of the NEC. Despite the fact
that in 1929 the NEC had proposed a similar scheme, members of the
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Organisation Sub-committee (OSC) thought it dangerously novel and,
after what Benn described as an ‘appalling row’, refused to endorse it.80
The majority felt associate membership would leave Labour’s basic prob-
lems untouched, as it would not challenge the control of ‘small cliques
of full members’, who dominated too many local parties. Instead, Labour
needed to bring new groups into full membership so they could change
the organisation from within. In fact, the OSC mainly reproduced objec-
tions to a not dissimilar proposal aired in the wake of Labour’s 1955
defeat.81 Undeterred, Benn put his case to the Sub-committee again.
Despite the shadow Cabinet minister Ray Gunter warning of its ‘subver-
sive’ potential, this time the NEC allowed Benn to launch Citizens for
Labour, although only on an experimental basis in Bristol South East.82
Transport House officials remained doubtful. Sara Barker, the National
Agent, thought there were too few activists to develop such informal
arrangements: above all else, Labour needed more active members.83
Few in Benn’s local party believed in the scheme. While endorsing
Citizens for Labour in the MP’s presence, the GMC was unwilling to
take it seriously in his absence. From the start some believed they should
oppose ‘anything out-of-line with general thinking’. Unfortunately for
Benn, the NEC stipulated the CLP had to form a sub-committee drawn
from GMC members to supervise the initiative, so it remained firmly
under activists’ control.84 It was therefore no surprise that it made little
impression. Local activists also opposed Benn’s other initiative of this
period, the New Bristol Group, which was again founded in the wake of
his campaign to stay in the Commons. The aim of this body was to
bring together those the MP termed ‘thoughtful people’ to stimulate
debate about the city’s problems. The extent to which his GMC looked
with disfavour on the Group was reflected in its endorsement of the city
council’s decision to prevent libraries stocking its publications.85
‘Let’s Go!’
Attempts to make CLPs more attractive to non-manual workers largely
foundered, but more headway was made centrally in improving the party’s
image. In 1961 the NEC established the Campaign Sub-committee to
take command of the party’s election preparations.86 This took note of
surveys conducted by Abrams, all of which underlined the importance
of projecting Labour as a ‘classless’ organisation that was representative
of the interests of the entire working population. The main result of
this work was a £100,000 advertising campaign, which ran during the
second half of 1963, the main purpose of which was to convince affluent
voters that Labour could improve their standards of living. Its basic
message was summed up in the first press advertisement, which comprised
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a large picture of the Labour leader and a brief explanation of the
party’s case, under the legend, ‘Harold Wilson explains Labour’s New
Plans for making Britain Dynamic and Prosperous Again’.87
As affluent voters were supposed to decide how to vote on the basis
of ‘impressions and instincts’, it was ‘their idea of what kind of party’
Labour was that mattered. Thus, the campaign was thought to require
a phrase and symbol to encapsulate what Labour stood for. After some
debate, a supposedly cheerful thumbs-up sign accompanied by the
slogan ‘Let’s Go with Labour and we’ll get things done’ became the
favoured devices. Some found them distasteful. When the ‘Let’s Go’
campaign was launched, Pannell confided to his Leeds members, ‘I am
afraid we will have to do it that way’ to win over the ‘soft south’, that is,
inhabitants of ‘rootless constituencies – those places without collective
memory which have sprung up over night with no long civic tradition’.88
Even worse, from Pannell’s perspective, Transport House encouraged
Labour mothers to put ‘Let’s Go’ badges on their children; there was
also ‘Let’s Go’ window posters, envelope and car stickers – in Doncaster
activists even held a ‘Let’s Go’ balloon race.89
Wilson’s reference to ‘white heat’ during his 1963 conference speech
was designed to complement this work. Although his emphasis on the
‘scientific revolution’ appeared to distinguish the Labour leader from
his late predecessor, others had called for the party to associate itself
with science some years before.90 If any one person was responsible for
Labour’s invocation of science, it was Morgan Phillips – although he
owed much to the unacknowledged help of Richard Crossman and Peter
Shore.91 Phillips initially hoped science would draw members away from
their disagreements over clause four – only later on did it appear an
important means of signifying the party’s modernity.92 With these
objects in mind, in July 1960 Phillips presented to the NEC a document
entitled ‘The state of the party’, which: was subsequently expanded and
given the more optimistic title of ‘The future of the party’; eventually
became Labour in the Sixties; was elaborated into the pamphlet series
Signposts for the Sixties; and finally formed the basis for Labour’s 1964
manifesto.
The NEC commended Labour in the Sixties to the 1960 conference,
although it did not, as was customary with such documents, endorse it.
Instead, it was designated as ‘the work of the General Secretary’, an
unusual formula, the result of Gaitskellites and their left-wing oppon-
ents being initially unable to agree on its merits.93 Introducing it, on
behalf of an ill Phillips, Ray Gunter told delegates that its intention was
to ‘project our thoughts away’ from internal disputes. In anticipation of
Wilson’s speech three years later, he affirmed that ‘never in history have
Socialist principles been more relevant than they are in the 60s’, owing
to the need for the state to direct scientific developments. Wilson in fact
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closed the debate by hoping the document marked the end of ‘sterile’
arguments over nationalisation and would help Labour face the future
rather than dwell on the past.94 If most on the left saw it as marking a
welcome move from revisionism, at least one conference delegate, from
Toxteth, considered the document so ‘obviously intended to attract middle-
class votes’ that it should be renamed Signposts for the Right.95
What the leadership hoped would be a reforging of Labour’s image
went hand in hand with the projection of Wilson, for the successful
dramatisation of Macmillan’s supposed traits was thought to have been
one of the reasons for the Conservative 1959 victory. So far as affluent
voters went, Labour’s image needed personification and this was obvi-
ously to be achieved through the leader.96 In this process even Michael
Foot played a part, penning a hagiography of Wilson during the run-
up to the 1964 campaign. These efforts were undoubtedly helped by
the fact that, by 1963, Macmillan was widely regarded as ‘old, effete,
worn out’. Labour strategists could not believe their luck when he was
replaced in 1963 by the epitome of upper-class languor, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home.97
While Labour’s approach was established before Wilson’s election as
leader, he made it his own in a series of speeches delivered between
January and April 1964.98 These took as their theme the hope for a
‘New Britain’, which deliberately echoed the late President Kennedy’s
‘New Frontier’ rhetoric. Wilson linked the economy’s by now obvious
decline (relative to the faster-growing French, German and Japanese
economies) to the failure of the aristocratic Conservatives fully to utilise
the talents of skilled manual and non-manual workers. As he suggested
in 1963:
We need a shake-up in industry. There’s still too much dead-wood –
too many directors sitting in boardrooms not because they can
produce or sell, but because of their family background. To make
industry dynamic we need vigorous young executives, scientists and
sales experts chosen for their abilities – not their connections.99
Wilson’s contention was that the Conservatives, by their very nature,
were unable and unwilling to accomplish this task because theirs was a
sectional party that identified with those who made money by specula-
tion, not with those who earned it through work. A Labour government
would use state planning to encourage industrial modernisation and
thereby represent the ‘thrusting ability, even iconoclasm’ of grammar
and comprehensive school pupils. It would also remove impediments
to initiative endured by scientists, technicians, artisans and skilled
workers. While the Conservatives allowed ‘the spiv, the speculator, the
take-over bidder, the tax evader, the land grabber’ to prosper, Wilson
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promised Labour would promote ‘the useful people’, ‘who earn money
by useful service to the community’.
Only Labour, Wilson claimed, could liberate the energies of ‘the
useful people’ and grant them the status they deserved. In so doing,
Wilson was, as he admitted, ‘making myself acceptable to the suburbs’.100
Indeed, such was the fear of being exclusively linked with ‘traditional’
working-class concerns that, during the 1964 campaign, a Labour official
bemoaned a Daily Mirror ‘shock issue’ on housing because it associated
the party with slums.101 This national emphasis was echoed in numerous
local campaigns. In marginal Rugby, for example, Labour tried to appeal
to young professionals by ensuring its candidate, a university lecturer,
was ‘pushed as a young technocrat and the word DOCTOR was
pushed on every occasion’.102 In marginal Berwick the candidate, John
Mackintosh – coincidentally another university lecturer – also echoed
Wilson’s rhetoric by suggesting that the Conservatives could not appreci-
ate ordinary people’s problems because they ‘live in country houses or
Mayfair’.103
Complementing this focus, strategists tried to address what they took
to be women’s concerns by underlining domestic issues. In particular,
one internal discussion paper asserted that prosperity was ‘nowhere
more deeply felt than in the home’. Moreover, it went on, ‘home to the
housewife, irrespective of whether she goes out to work or merely
remains at home, is the focal point of her life’. In such women’s lives a
‘new house (Council or private), a family car, a television, an electric
washer, cooker, and perhaps even a “frig”, predominate’. Moreover, if a
young housewife did not possess such things, she ‘aspires to do so as
quickly as possible, and the “telly” is a daily reminder that life is not
complete without them’.104 With that in mind, the party largely talked
to women as consumers, which entailed a particular emphasis on the
cost of living. As one delegate to the 1967 national conference of
Labour women stated, ‘all women were aggressive on the question of
prices’, in comparison with which other issues ‘faded into insignifi-
cance’.105 Women’s dependence on a male breadwinner was taken for
granted: even one Labour woman defined the female electorate as
consisting of ‘the wives, the mothers, the widows, the sweethearts’.106
The party also assiduously appealed to them as mothers; one leaflet
issued before the 1964 election, on which appeared a photograph of
two children, simply urged women to ‘Vote for Them’. Echoing the
themes of 1959, they were exhorted to support Labour because it
offered a ‘new deal for the family’ that focused on housing, education
for children, improving pensions and provision for widows. By this time,
however, there was a greater emphasis on the workplace: the promises
to introduce equal pay and to improve nursery facilities for working
mothers were both highlighted.107
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Despite this frenetic activity, the substance of Labour’s 1964
programme was strikingly similar to that of 1959. Only a few industries
were to be nationalised; and the party’s main aim was to promote
expansion to the benefit of all, but most especially those in greatest
need, who would gain from more welfare spending. Labour was asserted
to be the party of all the people – as opposed to the sectional Conser-
vatives. While suffused with a self-conscious modernity, Wilson’s rhetoric
betrayed a more fundamental continuity of approach. His reference to
the ‘useful people’ could have been taken from speeches delivered by
Herbert Morrison during the 1940s; indeed, the juxtaposition of
‘unproductive’ with ‘productive’ labour would have been familiar to any
eighteenth-century radical. Wilson’s emphasis on the need for hard
work to increase productivity also had a 1940s tinge to it: implicitly at
least it stood as a criticism of what many Labour members took to be a
morally dubious affluent society in which easy money took precedence.
Impact
On 16 October 1964, Harold Wilson entered Downing Street as Prime
Minister. While cause for celebration, Labour’s victory was slender in
terms of seats – it won a Commons majority of but four – and based on
the share of votes cast, only 0.3 per cent higher and 10,000 votes fewer
than in 1959.
The 1964 result was due more to the collapse of Conservative strength
rather than any Labour recovery, the main beneficiary being the Liberal
Party. The government had been unable to restore its authority after the
Profumo scandal and Macmillan’s failure to take Britain into the Common
Market. Moreover, it was increasingly apparent that the relative perform-
ance of the British economy was unimpressive, as other countries were
beginning to catch up. As a result, some suggest, there was a change in
the national mood, from the optimism of the late 1950s to a pervasive
cynicism, which undermined support for the governing party.108 Yet the
Conservatives still presided over rising standards of living after 1959,
even if the rate of increase had slackened. On the eve of the campaign,
47 per cent of those asked by Gallup still considered the Conservatives
the better able to maintain prosperity, as opposed to only 34 per cent
who thought the task better entrusted to Labour.109 It appears that while
Labour was seen to be more sympathetic to the needs of voters, it was
still thought less economically competent than the Conservatives.110
Detailed evidence for the effectiveness of Labour’s post-1959 strategy
is limited but suggests strategists were not entirely successful in their
efforts (see Table 3.1, p. 63). Labour increased its support among the
middle classes but lost substantially among the ‘very poor’ and marginally
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so among the working class. Given that Labour’s campaign concentrated
on affluent voters, this was perhaps to be expected. More surprisingly,
in terms of age, the party made no measurable gains in any category –
even among those in their twenties – while significant losses were regis-
tered among those over sixty-five years old, possibly because Labour
did not stress pensions to the same degree as 1959. Similarly, with male
voters the gains were marginal, while, despite its greater emphasis on
women voters, the party had lost female support.
Even though it showed little immediate return for Labour’s attempt
to alter voters’ perceptions, Conservative research discovered that by
1964 Labour was at least considered the more ‘modern’ of the two
parties.111 More impressionistic still, during the campaign the Sun news-
paper asked first-time voters to explain why they favoured a particular
party. By no means all chose Labour, but a clear majority of letters
published did: given the Sun’s pro-Wilson inclination, this was no
revelation. Even so, the reasons proffered revealed the extent to which
Wilson’s rhetoric made an impact on younger electors. One cor-
respondent, for example, stated he would vote Labour as ‘I believe a
vast amount of talent and energy, especially among the young, will be
released if we give Labour a chance to make a new Britain’. Another
suggested that, under Wilson, ‘the Britain of the future shall be a class-
less one, where all petty snobbisms of accent, dress, education will be
defunct … [it will be] a society which seeks to harness the talents of all
in the best possible manner’. A third reader stated, ‘I shall vote for the
party of teachers and trained economists, the Labour Party; not the
party of company directors and blimps’.112 At least in relation to that
minority of young voters in the habit of writing letters to national news-
papers, Labour left some sort of mark.
While Prime Minister, Wilson tried to build on the party’s efforts
after 1959 by showing that Labour was both economically responsible
and able to live up to its spending promises.113 The result was what
many considered Labour’s landslide victory of 1966, a performance the
junior minister Tony Benn thought indicated it was on the verge of
becoming ‘a truly national party’.114 Gallup’s findings suggest there was
some merit to this claim, for Labour’s 1964 gains among the better-off
classes were sustained, while support from the working class and poor
rose markedly – as it did among both genders and all age groups (see
Table 3.1, p. 63). Academic analysts now speculated that Labour was
set to enjoy a prolonged period in office; in fact, because of the weight
they gave parental influence over voter allegiance, some suggested that
the Conservatives – lauded in 1959 as the ‘normal’ majority party –
were in danger of remaining out of office in perpetuity.115
Labour’s re-election was, in contrast, taken very calmly at Transport
House. The official report on the campaign was remarkably pessimistic
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but, as it turned out, prescient. The report identified the ‘most sig-
nificant feature’ of the 1966 contest as the drop in turnout, from 77.1
per cent in 1964 to 75.8 per cent. Moreover, the report also found it
worrying that the loss of two million Conservative voters since 1959
had been accompanied by only an 800,000 rise in Labour’s poll. Given
the party’s failure to pick up a majority of Conservative losses, that
many of the votes given to Liberals in 1964 went to Labour only because
fewer Liberal candidates stood in 1966, and that twenty-five seats were
won on a minority of the poll, the report firmly denied 1966 was any-
thing like an ‘overwhelming landslide’.116 Victory certainly did not mean
Labour’s organisational foundations were any less fragile than in 1959,
for it was still unable to attract the participation of many women, the
young or non-manual workers; existing activists remained too few in
number, too ignorant of policy and procedure, and in need of more
professional help.117 Despite appearances, Labour’s ‘landslide’ victory
did not mean anything had changed since 1959.
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Reconciling the classes
Many contemporaries were convinced that by the 1960s class barriers
had been at least attenuated compared with the 1930s. The children of
manual workers were believed to be better able to enter the middle
class; and it was thought that many of those remaining on the factory
floor were adopting bourgeois ways. Labour members appeared more
divided over this issue than they actually were. While the left considered
‘affluence’ made only a modest impact on the social structure and
revisionists thought its influence profound, few denied Britain remained
a society tainted by class. In 1956, Labour’s conference approved Towards
Equality, a document broadly in tune with revisionist thinking and which
confirmed the existence of ‘a strong, persistent trend towards economic
and social inequality’.1 Even Anthony Crosland, who in the same year
predicted that ‘primary poverty’ (i.e. insufficient incomes) would dis-
appear by the mid-1960s, still considered inequality a serious problem
that only government action could finally eradicate.2 A key element in
Labour’s solution to the persistence of class differences was the fostering
of a common culture based on co-operation rather than conflict. This
chapter looks at secondary education and industrial democracy to assess
how Harold Wilson’s governments tried to promote this culture – and
why they failed.
If Labour derived most of its electoral support from manual workers
and was dependent on trade union money, it was not a class party in
the Marxist sense. The desirability of promoting an identity other than
one based on class had inspired much Labour thinking since at least
Ramsay MacDonald’s day. Accordingly, Reginald Sorenson, MP for
Leyton until elevated to the Lords in 1965, believed that, whatever a
person’s class, all were ‘members of a common humanity’ and needed
to nourish what the poet William Blake referred to as ‘Mercy, Pity, Peace
and Love’ or succumb to ‘lethal enmities’.3 Similarly, Norman Willis, a
young activist in Surrey – and incidentally a future General Secretary of
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) – conceived of socialism as a society
in which ‘people really feel a sense of identity between themselves and
fielding ch 4.P65 10/10/03, 12:3386
Reconciling the classes 87
their neighbours’.4 More pertinently, Wilson’s appeal to the ‘useful
people’ (see Chapter 3) proceeded from the assumption that the work-
ing and middle classes shared a common economic interest, against
which their other differences paled.
Towards Equality confirmed Labour’s commitment to reduce in-
equality through ‘deliberate and continuous State intervention’.5 For
many on the left, this meant ensuring the economy was dominated by
the state. So far as the leadership was concerned, however, nationalis-
ation was less important than maintaining full employment, increasing
taxes on unearned wealth, creating a more generous welfare system and,
most crucially, accelerating economic growth. While this did not imply
totally abolishing income inequality, it nonetheless required establishing
a ‘decent’ minimum income and ensuring differentials reflected the
nature of the work undertaken.6 If confident their policies would pro-
mote a greater equality of outcome, revisionists still believed the party
needed to take further steps to increase equality of opportunity, for,
despite rising incomes, only the fortunate few were exploiting their full
potential. Hugh Gaitskell, for one, considered a society where class origin
determined opportunity and in which there were ‘feelings or attitudes
of superiority or inferiority between groups’ could not be considered
egalitarian.7 So far as revisionists – and others in the party for that
matter – were concerned, this meant focusing on culture as much as on
the economy, in particular ending segregated secondary education.
If most Labour members agreed that education needed reform, a
similar consensus was lacking over how to establish workplace harmony.8
Despite rising incomes, Britain’s industrial relations record suggested
the point of production remained the main venue for class conflict.
Indeed, soon after Wilson entered Downing Street, class feeling – as
measured in terms of number of strikes – increased. Industrial democ-
racy appeared a possible solution, as it was hoped it would improve
workers’ status, help them develop their own potential and promote
co-operation. However, while it appeared to some to be a panacea, it
raised awkward and fundamental questions that Labour was unable to
resolve. While all in the party aspired to create a more peaceful indust-
rial scene, members were seriously at odds regarding on whose basis –
the employers’ or the unions’ – co-operation should proceed.
Stopping snobbery
As the junior education minister Alice Bacon declared in 1969, Labour
believed education was ‘not only the means of individual development,
but an instrument for the creation of a better society’.9 The 1964
manifesto promised a ‘revolution in our educational system’ that would:
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reduce class sizes; raise the school-leaving age from fifteen to sixteen
years; improve technical training; and increase the number of places in
higher education. The main emphasis was, however, on reforming second-
ary education, in particular abolishing segregated schooling. Labour’s
overall aim was to equalise opportunities, to improve individual attain-
ment and to increase economic output, as it was asserted that a fairer
society would be more productive.10
The 1945–51 Labour governments had applied the 1944 Education
Act (passed by the wartime coalition) because it enshrined the principle
of universal free secondary education.11 Hitherto, those who had won
entry to grammar school by taking a competitive examination at the age
of ten were expected to pay a variety of costs: this impeded the progress
of working-class children. So long as all children of talent could win
free places in grammar schools, most members were little troubled by
the fact that they continued to be separated by examination, with at
most 20 per cent going to grammar schools and the rest entering
secondary modern schools. Even so, Labour was formally committed to
experimenting with ‘common’ or comprehensive schools that transcended
the grammar–secondary-modern divide. If ministers were uninterested
in innovation, Labour-controlled local authorities in places such as
London and Coventry built comprehensives. Subsequent investigations
also revealed the system established after 1945 was not as fair as some
thought, because middle-class offspring dominated grammar schools
owing to advantages imbued by family background rather than innate
intelligence.12
After 1951, support grew for a change to party policy and by 1955
Labour was committed to actively promoting comprehensive educa-
tion.13 The extent to which this shift was based, as Labour’s then deputy
leader James Griffiths claimed, on an empirical assessment of the edu-
cational system’s defects is moot.14 Michael Stewart and Margaret Cole –
leading party thinkers on this subject – certainly believed most members
did not object to ten-year-olds being examined but strongly opposed
their segregation.15 Towards Equality had also stressed the social harm
done to children educated in separate institutions, and concluded that
it was incompatible with a classless society.16 It was not until 1970 that
conference delegates expressed interest in how children were taught in
the new schools. Even then, their concern was mostly limited to the fact
that they often streamed pupils along academic lines, meaning children
were still taught in groups differentiated by background.17
Most of the arguments members used to convince each other of the
merits of comprehensive schooling therefore relied on social criteria: a
1953 headline in London News even dubbed them ‘Schools to Stop
Snobbery’.18 As one Abingdon alderman put it, in a comprehensive
school, children of ‘[a]ll levels of intelligence play games together, join
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the same school clubs and eat together’ and were subject to the ‘same
standards of behaviour, manners and social responses’.19 Members in
North Kensington were urged to support comprehensives because ‘if
everybody, whatever job they were to perform later in life’ were educated
together, they would enjoy a ‘common social and cultural background’
and create ‘a happier, more united and less class conscious nation’.20 A
comprehensive, members of a 1957 National Executive Committee
(NEC) Study Group on Education believed, could ‘benefit both bright
and less bright children’ by acting as a ‘useful focus’ for the growth of
‘community spirit’.21
While some local Labour authorities promoted comprehensives,
most remained loyal to grammars, which still retained popular support.
In the late 1950s, a Transport House survey revealed that only a small
minority of parents questioned the educational status quo; however,
while no more than 10 per cent believed selection undesirable, once
the case for comprehensives was put, over half wanted reform.22 The
party’s argument in favour of comprehensives was consequently tailored
to win over doubters by stressing the unfairness of selection while
guaranteeing that the standards established by grammar schools would
be maintained. Writing in 1964, one Bristol activist acknowledged that
grammar schools had a fine tradition but argued that comprehensive
schools would provide ‘an education in tune with the democratic 1960’s
which allows every child to fully develop his talents’.23 The impression
that class division was already weakening possibly helped the party make
its case, for it was argued at its 1967 annual conference that segregation
maintained ‘rigid and unjust divisions’ at a time when ‘social barriers
should be crumbling’.24
Even so, members remained at odds over the issue, with some activists
complaining that it was not just Conservatives who opposed compre-
hensives: their own local representatives could be equally ‘backward’.25
The nature of the division was highlighted during 1966 in the columns
of Warwick and Leamington Spa’s constituency magazine. This con-
tained an article praising comprehensives for encouraging the spirit of
co-operation and mutual respect and so showing society a way of escaping
the ‘jungle of capitalism’. That view was criticised by a lifelong member
who believed comprehensives denied the hereditary basis to education,
for if middle-class children won grammar places it was because they
were ‘innately more clever’ than the rest. While ‘it would be very nice if
the mental inferiority of working-class children could all be explained
away’, this member believed it could not.26
The Wilson governments’ move towards a national comprehensive
system was slower than enthusiasts demanded.27 Crosland’s personal
dedication to reform while he was at the Department for Education,
however, should not be doubted: as he announced to his wife, even if it
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was ‘the last thing I do, I’m going to destroy every fucking grammar
school in England. And Wales. And Northern Ireland’.28 Crosland was
mistaken about Northern Ireland, as his remit did not run there; and
nor did it extend to Scotland. Moreover, while mostly funded by central
government, education in England and Wales was the responsibility of
163 local education authorities. Without altering that relationship,
Crosland could not impose his will directly. Thus, in July 1965 he only
requested authorities submit plans for the reorganisation of education
along comprehensive lines. Much was done to encourage reluctant authori-
ties to toe the line. A year later he announced that only those authorities
committed to comprehensive education would be granted funds to build
new schools. This, at least, accorded with party policy as articulated by
the earlier NEC Study Group on Education, which determined that
comprehensives should develop according to ‘local wishes and circum-
stances’. On that basis the Group calculated it would take at least fifteen
years for the comprehensive system to become universal.29
Only a few authorities refused to adhere to Crosland’s request, but
he nonetheless sought compulsory powers.30 This was partly for political
reasons. Such had been the transformation in attitudes to compre-
hensive schools that Labour strategists thought there were electoral
advantages in forcing authorities to abide by government policy. They
believed this would appeal particularly to middle-class parents living
under rebel Conservative authorities, as they could ill-afford to send
children who had flunked the grammar entrance examination to fee-
paying schools (on which, see below).31 Thus, when Wilson announced
the date of the 1970 general election, legislation was in process to force
authorities to adhere to the comprehensive principle. Even without that
power, government had accelerated the move from selection, so that if
10 per cent of children were educated in comprehensives in 1964 by
1970 nearer one-third were. This proportion was guaranteed to rise, as
most authorities had established a comprehensive system or had immi-
nent plans to do so.
Playgrounds for plutocrats
The private sector comprised two different kinds of educational estab-
lishment: those termed ‘public’, whose intake was determined by the
ability to pay; and what were described as ‘grant maintained’, which, in
return for setting aside one-quarter of places to non-fee-payers, received
a government subsidy. By June 1970, Labour had done nothing of sub-
stance to reduce their influence, despite Crosland considering it was
the ‘greatest single cause of stratification and class-consciousness in
Britain’.32
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Although private schools had long been thought inimical to socialism,
Clement Attlee’s ministers left them alone, with a few openly expressing
their admiration for the education they provided. Even most reformers
called only for a minority of public school places to be made available
to non-fee-payers.33 As with comprehensives, after 1951 the leadership
showed a greater determination to challenge the status quo, with revision-
ists taking a lead. In 1953 Gaitskell went so far as to urge the next
Labour government to ensure that a majority of public school places
were immediately made free and to abolish all fee-paying soon there-
after.34 Revisionists did not want to destroy private schools but sought
to integrate them within the state sector. This meant they favoured change
through agreement – which Crosland thought possible, if only because
many private teachers felt guilty about perpetuating privilege.35 In con-
trast, while agreeing with their leaders’ ends, most who spoke on the
subject at Labour conferences demanded instant abolition.
Despite the consensus over aims, and the fact that the NEC Study
Group on Education confirmed that private education was ‘repugnant’
to party principles, Labour members could not agree how to approach
reform in time for the 1959 general election.36 With only a small minority
favouring immediate abolition, the Group was initially inclined to stop
grant maintained schools receiving state funds and to ensure that up to
75 per cent of public school places were opened to non-fee-payers.
However, the former two proposals were thought politically dangerous
and the latter raised an intractable issue, as it was unclear how non-fee-
payers should be selected. Gaitskell supported the use of intelligence
tests for selection, although others contended this would not prevent
public schools remaining socially exclusive. Whatever the criteria, selec-
tion was incompatible with Labour’s support for comprehensives and it
was to avoid this contradiction that friendly experts advised the Group
either to recommend immediate radical change or to leave private
education alone. Crosland agreed, as he thought limited change would
merely endow private education with greater legitimacy.37 In any case,
survey evidence indicated that voters broadly supported private school-
ing: 80 per cent – including a majority of the working class – claimed
they would pay for their child’s education if they could.38 Thus, having
toyed with reform, the Group recommended that no action be taken,
and it asserted Labour should instead concentrate on increasing invest-
ment in state schools and transforming them into comprehensives. The
professed aim was to raise the standard of state education so that it
would equal that provided by the private sector.39 Few thought this credible:
Stewart and Cole calculated the former would need at least four decades
to catch up with the latter.40
As part of the attempt to foster reconciliation within the party, Sign-
posts for the Sixties embraced a radical approach to private education: it
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committed Labour to establishing an educational trust that would deter-
mine how to integrate private schools into the state system.41 As Bacon
characterised it, Labour entered the 1964 campaign aiming to turn
public schools from ‘playgrounds for plutocrats into training grounds
for democrats’.42 Labour’s initially small majority encouraged Wilson
and Michael Stewart, his first Education Secretary, to tread with
caution.43 When Crosland replaced Stewart, however, he won Cabinet
approval in November 1965 to establish a commission to make good
the promise made in Signposts. This body was instructed to see how
private schools could best be used ‘to meet the needs of the nation’
while eliminating their ‘divisive influence’. If some feared ministers were
wary of fundamental change, Crosland remained committed to making
at least 75 per cent of public school places open to non-fee-payers.44
Even that would have disappointed contributors to conference debates:
in 1967 the only speaker from the floor to advocate something other
than immediate abolition was the MP Robert Maxwell, who was severely
heckled for his trouble.45
After being turned down by his first five choices, Crosland secured
the services of Sir John Newsom to chair the commission. Newsom proved
ineffective and after much prevarication delivered but the first volume
of his report in the summer of 1968. This agreed that private schools
were divisive and that society would benefit if their pupils came from
more diverse backgrounds. However, while proposing that public schools
be deprived of their lucrative charitable status, the report did not pro-
pose bringing them within the state system. Moreover, much of the
report focused on altering the intake of pupil boarders, with the sug-
gestion that up to half of boarding places should go to non-fee-payers.46
This eccentric emphasis failed to impress. Edward Short, Crosland’s
successor, was disappointed, while Tony Benn described the report as
‘ghastly’: consequently the Cabinet agreed it should be published with-
out comment, believing it best to await the final volume before drafting
legislation.47
Even had Newsom made a better fist of his commission, 1968 was an
inauspicious time for the government to take action: he called for spend-
ing on a few thousand children, while ministers had just delayed raising
the school-leaving age for state pupils, in order to accommodate post-
devaluation spending cuts. Endorsing the report would have further
alienated already disenchanted activists, while taking a more radical
line could have only reduced support among the middle class and made
little impact on working-class voters, at a moment when Labour was
losing elections at a record rate. Therefore, with NEC blessing, the 1968
conference rejected Newsom, with one delegate describing his proposal
for more government support but not control as ‘a travesty of Socialist
principles’.48
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The more radical David Donnison took responsibility for the second
part of the commission’s work and recommended the integration of
grant maintained schools into a comprehensive state system. Unfortu-
nately, his report was published in the run-up to the 1970 election and,
as one member of the commission admitted, it threatened to antagon-
ise middle-class parents, whose children were the main beneficiaries of
free places.49 Once again, this was not the best of times to discuss a
matter that could only lose Labour support; despite this, ministers were
prepared to stop funding grant maintained schools by 1974.50
It is not true, therefore, that Labour in power did nothing about
private education: fee paying in grant maintained schools was abolished
in Scotland, while a loophole was closed that allowed parents who bor-
rowed money to pay fees to avoid tax. These were, however, modest
measures, given the kind of impediment to an egalitarian society private
education was believed to be. Perhaps Crosland had spoken more truly
than he realised when laconically confiding to Cabinet in 1965 that
private education posed a ‘strictly insoluble problem’.51
Ministers and militancy
If for none other than pressing economic reasons, Wilson’s ministers
wanted to promote a greater understanding between the classes at the
workplace. While contemporaries influenced by Marxism believed that
impossible, even leading left-wing Labour MPs, such as Ian Mikardo,
thought conflict need not be endemic to industrial relations. In the
early 1950s Mikardo had echoed arguments normally associated with
revisionism when he suggested that the emergence of salaried, pro-
fessional managers lacking the ‘same urge to take unfair advantage of
workers’ as their inter-war predecessors meant both sides of industry
could co-operate to mutual advantage.52 As the more mainstream veteran
Scottish MP Arthur Woodburn stated in 1962, antagonism between
worker and employer was ‘[o]ne of the greatest tragedies’ of the con-
temporary scene and an entirely avoidable one at that. If irrational
mistrust were overcome, he predicted, productivity would increase,
‘scientific advance would leap ahead and poverty and a thousand ills
would disappear’.53 That workers’ rising living standards could be
sustained only if they were based on improving productivity was a point
reiterated with monotonous regularity by Wilson and his colleagues.54
From such a perspective, only politically malign or unaccountably
obtuse groups would promote unrest. Thus, Wilson erroneously
believed a dispute at the components firm Harvey Spicer, which broke
out during the 1964 election campaign, was provoked by Conservative
sympathisers to discredit Labour.55 Once in office, however, Wilson – as
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well as his Minister of Labour Ray Gunter and later Barbara Castle at
the Department for Employment and Productivity (DEP) – was inclined
to think disharmony the work of enemies to Labour’s left, in particular
the Communist Party (CP). The Cold War gave some credibility to these
suspicions, as did the prominence of individual Communists in a number
of unions. Wilson had, moreover, been warned by the security services
that the CP saw strikes as one way of destroying his incomes policy
(which it saw as exploiting workers), on the success of which so much
hinged.56
Most on the left believed the leadership was biased against the unions.
The government’s response to industrial disputes was, however, often
more conciliatory than confrontational, something illustrated by the
1967 rail strike. This was provoked by an inter-union dispute, between
ASLEF, the rail drivers’ union, and the National Union of Railwaymen,
whose members were encroaching on traditional ASLEF territory. In
the shadow of sterling’s devaluation, Wilson feared the economic impli-
cations of a strike: if it upset overseas speculators, confidence in the
currency might collapse.57 Taking this into account, Gunter’s television
broadcast explaining the context of the dispute was remarkably sympa-
thetic to ASLEF’s plight. He described the union as representing the
‘aristocrats of railwaymen’ and noted officials’ ‘understandable pride’.
Gunter then gave a sensitive outline of the unions’ position, even though
he concluded that any action would be unjustified.58
This is not to say Wilson was unaware of the political advantages of
defeating a union, given the right circumstances. As the Prime
Minister’s Private Secretary stated in 1965, he ‘would be glad to find a
case of a strike of unskilled men for which there was no legitimate
grounds and in which a direct attack on the public was involved’ so he
might send in the troops. Wilson initially thought a dispute concerning
milk delivery at United Dairies in London was such an occasion, but he
was persuaded that, before soldiers could commandeer the milk floats,
a state of emergency would have to be called. As a result he lost enthusi-
asm for the scheme.59
Leftist critics thought Wilson’s conduct during the prolonged 1966
seamen’s strike vindicated their suspicion that the government would
support employers against workers whatever the legitimacy of the
latter’s case.60 In fact, from the outset Wilson put numerous compromise
formulae to the National Union of Seamen (NUS) to avoid a strike he
knew would have a severe economic impact.61 In particular, he proposed
establishing an inquiry to consider reforming the draconian legislation
that governed seafarers’ conditions. The Prime Minister was, however,
unwilling to allow the NUS to gain what it wanted, in effect a pay rise
of 20 per cent, as that would have blasted a hole in his attempt to keep
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wage costs down. Nor was Wilson alone in becoming frustrated with the
union’s rejection of attempts to find common ground: so irritated did
the TUC become, it withdrew support for the NUS.62 Thus, when the
Prime Minister asserted that the dispute was due to the influence of a
‘tightly knit group of politically motivated men’, he did so with what he
imagined was just cause.63 Not all of Wilson’s colleagues were convinced,
and looked on his claims as evidence of Prime Ministerial paranoia:
Peter Shore even thought his boss had gone ‘completely bonkers’.64
Whatever the merits of Wilson’s case, Communist influence was a
deus ex machina that appeared to explain why the strike continued for so
long. The Prime Minister believed the intervention of CP members was
the only plausible explanation why an ‘otherwise sturdy union’, com-
posed of ‘realistic and reasonable men’, allowed the strike to drag on.
That some of the union’s executive were, as he put it, ‘very close’ to
Communists was undoubtedly true and it was known that these figures
exerted a disproportionate, if legitimate, influence within the union’s
upper echelons. Such was their sway that they discouraged moderate
but feeble executive members from openly calling for a return to work.
Indeed, Wilson’s rhetoric was partly aimed at shaming into action those
he thought lacked backbone.65
For the most part, the Prime Minister – and even the security services
– saw Communist influence as an irritant but not the basic cause of
most disputes.66 Ministers were much more concerned with their lack
of a proper administrative device to prevent disputes reaching the point
at which production would be disrupted. As Lord Brown, an indust-
rialist Wilson made a junior minister at the Board of Trade, suggested,
much of the hostility marking employer–employee relations was due to
‘sheer confusion’.67 That so many strikes in key industries were ‘un-
official’, that is, called without formal union sanction, added weight to
the view that if only agreements were adhered to, and appropriate con-
ciliation machinery were put in place, harmony could be maintained.
To that end, ministers promoted a variety of joint management–union
remedies, most especially in the strike-prone motor industry. They also
supported giving union leaderships more power. In 1965 Gunter pro-
posed that the motor unions should revoke the membership of workers
who took unofficial action. In return, he wanted employers to require
all employees to join a union. If this arrangement would increase union
influence at the workplace, it also meant dissidents would be barred
from working in the industry.68 Unfortunately for Gunter, union leaders
such as Hugh Scanlon of the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU)
and Jack Jones of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU)
were inclined to reflect the demands of workers ministers viewed as
trouble-makers.69
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Defending the unions?
The Wilson governments are generally assumed to have antagonised
Labour activists, largely because of the extent to which their policies
were thought to harm the unions. After 1966 the leadership certainly
suffered numerous reverses at conference over policies delegates felt
hurt workers’ interests. It is, however, impossible to be sure how far
these conference decisions represented the views of union leaders, who
were able to cast their block votes, rather than those of constituency
delegates, although one authoritative assessment suggests most of the
latter supported ministers’ attempts to control wages.70
It would be wrong, therefore, to imagine that all activists thought
their first duty was to defend the unions: given that only one-quarter of
manual workers routinely sympathised with strikers during an industrial
dispute, this should not be surprising.71 One member of Clapham’s
women’s section asked, as early as 1957, ‘if workers were pulling their
weight’ in the economy and suggested, on the basis that ‘in order to
take out we must also put in’, the answer was in the negative.72 A leading
Labour woman went even further in 1966, declaring that ‘in return for
a fair wage all workers must work to their utmost so their products could
be sold’. Indeed, anyone ‘who did not do that, or incited or joined in
unofficial action did disservice to the Government and the Nation, and
in wartime would have been referred to as Quislings’.73 Possibly with
such comments in mind, one delegate to the 1963 national conference
of Labour women stated that too many in the party were ‘only too will-
ing to condemn the trade unions and the industrial action they took’.74
The left nonetheless believed that Labour should follow policies
favourable to the unions, if only because they formed ‘an enormous,
and largely untapped potential of active support’.75 While Tribune MPs
feared Wilson was alienating union leaders, that at least had the wel-
come consequence of encouraging unions to make common cause with
the left.76 Michael Foot believed the shift leftwards of numerous union
bureaucracies was ‘one of the most significant events in modern British
politics’, because it meant the final transformation of Labour into a
party fully committed to socialism was at hand.77 While the left therefore
increasingly identified with the unions, Castle went a little far when
noting Tribune’s ‘constant propaganda to the effect that every wage claim
is sacrosanct and every industrial dispute noble’.78 If those on the left
did not endorse every unofficial strike, they usually suggested such dis-
putes arose from ‘fundamental inequalities’ and would stop only when
the economy was transformed through more public ownership.79
Support for union demands was, however, less certain at the party’s
grass roots, and was contested even in CLPs that generally endorsed
the Tribunite perspective, such as Chigwell and Ongar.80 There, in 1966,
fielding ch 4.P65 10/10/03, 12:3396
Reconciling the classes 97
the executive committee (EC) placed before its general management
committee (GMC) a motion endorsing the government’s incomes policy,
only to see it rejected by delegates, who condemned it as ‘detrimental
to the achievements of a Socialist Society’. Later in the year, the GMC
was faced with two resolutions, one of which regretted the NUS strike
while the other supported it: the former was defeated and the latter
supported by the same six-to-four margin. Similarly, a later motion
critical of an unofficial strike on the London docks took a Gunter-like
line by calling on the TGWU to withdraw membership from partici-
pants; this also was lost. The balance of opinion, however, shifted in the
wake of Castle’s attempt to regulate industrial relations and to reduce
unofficial strikes through her proposals set out in In Place of Strife. The
GMC sent for the consideration of the 1969 conference a resolution
expressing distress that some were:
completely deserting adherence to the cause of Socialism. This is
most marked in the vocal sections misnamed ‘the militants’ who have
succeeded in persuading the trade unionists in special key industries
that they have no concern with the rest of the movement. They
can, by a process of blackmail, obtain their demands even though,
under Capitalism, these tend to be at the expense of the rest of the
workers.
In other left-inclined local parties, support for the unions was con-
spicuous by its absence. In 1968 the Warwick and Leamington Spa GMC
mandated its conference delegate: to protest against the imposition of
prescription charges; to call for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
to be disbanded; to dissociate the party from US policy in Vietnam; but
to support the government’s incomes policy.81 A similar contrast in
attitudes was evident in Edinburgh South, whose GMC sided with the
left over Vietnam, Rhodesia and South Africa but which refused to criti-
cise the government’s wages policy.82
Industrial democracy
‘Industrial democracy’ was described in 1967 as ‘one of those splendid
catch-phrases with which the Labour Movement is so richly endowed
… a safe subject to wax platitudinous about’.83 If a harsh assessment, it
was true that, although it was discussed with increasing fervour during
the 1960s, industrial democracy remained a topic in need of clarification.
Most Labour members supposed that increasing employees’ involve-
ment in management would help to improve industrial relations, but
they remained at odds over the form such involvement should take,
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and even disputed its ultimate purpose. Precision was not helped by it
being seen as but one aspect of the wider demand for individuals to
‘participate’ directly in decision-making, something discussed in
Chapter 8.
While some enthusiasts believed in the existence of a ‘huge powder-
keg’ of interest in industrial democracy, others conceded that most
workers were unaware of its importance and would need to be ‘stimulated’
to demand it.84 Survey evidence confirmed that workers were, at best,
lukewarm. Fairly typical was a 1970 Ministry of Transport investigation
into the attitudes of British Rail employees. This concluded that a
majority were vaguely interested in contributing to decision-making but
only if it was limited to being consulted by management rather than
assuming responsibility themselves. Most were also concerned only with
issues of immediate relevance to their own work.85 This reluctance to
challenge managerial prerogatives confirmed Goldthorpe and Lockwood’s
suggestion that most workers adhered to an instrumental attitude to
work.86 Given that they saw their job as an unpleasant means to an end,
it was understandable why few employees wanted to spend time think-
ing about it any more than they had to. Most employers also angrily
opposed any proposals that threatened their freedom to manage: John
Davies, Director General of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI),
considered that while managers ‘should be susceptible to a great deal
of advice and help … that is as far as it should go’.87 Leading civil
servants in the Ministry of Labour were also sceptical and, only months
before Wilson took office, had decided that most employees were in-
capable of assuming the necessary interest in their workplace to make
it practical.88
Increasing workers’ influence had been the ambition of Labour
members earlier in the century: co-operators, syndicalists and guild
socialists aimed to give employees varying levels of managerial authority.
Most unions, however, refused to countenance such schemes, and con-
sidered it best to pursue their interests unhindered. Therefore when
Labour extended the public sector after 1945, the unions sought only
participation in joint consultative committees, while a few retired general
secretaries sat on nationalised boards, usually for industries of which
they had no experience.89 Writing in 1949, the MP Eirene White ex-
pressed the general view when she asserted that these boards ran the
nationalised sector on behalf of the whole community. Workers should
not have representatives on these bodies, as that would compromise
their ability to act for the nation, by tilting them too much in the direc-
tion of the employees’ interest. It would also inhibit efficiency: managers
still required the ability to take decisions workers might oppose. In any
case, the fact of nationalisation, White believed, had eliminated a major
disincentive to co-operation and so greater productivity: for miners and
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the like now laboured on behalf of the people rather than for the profit
of a few capitalists.90
Despite such hopes, as the Attlee government drew to a close, the
nationalised sector did not produce a marked increase in output:
Mikardo, for one, believed this was partly because, consultation notwith-
standing, publicly owned industries were still run in the traditional
manner. Others held that the consultation machinery was adequate but
believed neither managers nor unions took it seriously, because they
remained obsessed with the notion of conflict.91 As the MP Austen Albu
stated at this time, ‘[t]he creation of a feeling of common purpose in
the activities of industry remains … one of the outstanding unattained
objectives of socialist industrial policy’.92
An important issue?
During Labour’s years of opposition, how the party might promote this
‘common purpose’ did not exactly dominate members’ horizons. Most
remained preoccupied with maintaining full employment, improving
incomes and debating how far the public sector should be extended.
Yet, as Towards Equality put it, while full employment improved the
‘traditional manager–worker relationship’, an extension of industrial
democracy was still required if it was to transform into a ‘genuine
partnership’.93
The failure of the Labour left to take up this issue was surprising
given their critique of consultation. Left-wingers like Judith Hart, when
seeking adoption as a parliamentary candidate, certainly felt it advan-
tageous to refer to the need to give workers ‘greater satisfaction and a
greater sense of participation’.94 Indeed, Aneurin Bevan’s In Place of
Fear (1952) stressed how important it was that state employees experi-
enced a more co-operative relationship, for, he argued, ‘the individual
citizen will still feel that society is on top of him until he is enfranchised
in the workshop as well as at the ballot box’.95 As others argued later in
the decade, industrial democracy was a matter of political rights.96 Yet,
despite such fervour, thinking on the subject rarely became specific: to
many, simply expressing their aspiration that workers should achieve a
managerial role appeared sufficient.97
In contrast, two of the party’s leading revisionists, Crosland and
Douglas Jay, advanced clear proposals, although, like White, both ques-
tioned the wisdom of giving workers a direct say in management.98 As
had White, both men believed there would always be two sides to in-
dustry, with management taking the decisions while the unions assumed
the mantle of permanent opposition. Given the nature of the workplace it
was, they asserted, unrealistic to impose notions of democracy applicable
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outside the factory gate. In any case, Crosland argued, workers did not
need special measures to give them influence. Full employment, rising
real wages, social security and ‘a general change in the social climate’
had eroded many managerial prerogatives. He nonetheless hoped co-
operation would flourish outside the collective bargaining process; in
particular, he suggested that workers should be given more opportuni-
ties to influence how their own tasks were allocated. Moreover, Crosland
feared that incorporating the unions too closely within management
would allow more disruptive – inevitably Communist – elements to
usurp their role as the workers’ representatives. Jay’s outlook was similar
and he opposed putting union officials on company boards, fearing
officials would either suffer a conflict of loyalty or confuse the board’s
managerial function. However, he supported the election of employee
representatives who were neither workers nor union officials. In this
Jay echoed Albu’s belief that worker representatives could ‘ensure sanc-
tion for executive authority’ and encourage employees to ‘feel a direct
… responsibility for those who represent them in the making of
management decisions’.99
During the first half of the 1960s some unions became more
attracted to industrial democracy: it appears that affluence gave them
the confidence to claim more than just higher wages.100 Evidence sub-
mitted by the TUC to the Donovan Commission on Trade Unions and
Employers’ Associations in 1965 revealed their tentative interest. This
was, however, an uneven conversion, with Jack Jones of the TGWU and
Hugh Scanlon of the AEU taking the lead. Both supported the Institute
for Workers’ Control, established in 1964 by the Nottingham Labour
activist Ken Coates, whose conferences attracted upwards of 500 people,
although many attendees had sympathies well to Labour’s left. Jones
was the single most influential voice on this matter.101 He emphasised
how participation could not only make ‘life worth living’ on the factory
floor but also help overcome unnecessary ‘misunderstanding, resist-
ance, low morale and suspicion’. Ultimately, Jones aimed to foster a
series of ‘self-governing communities’, within which workers exerted full
control. If apparently idealistic, Jones was hard-headed enough to reject
any form of industrial democracy conducted directly by individual
workers because that threatened the privileged position unions occu-
pied within the workforce.
Not all unions were convinced: the leadership of the Electrical
Trades Union remained firm adherents of the view that unions should
concentrate on improving wages and conditions and leave management
to managers.102 In fact, it is possible that some union leaders who osten-
sibly supported industrial democracy saw it as no more than a means of
increasing their ability to secure a more traditional objective: higher
wages.103
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Jack Jones’ influence
Arguments about the merits of industrial democracy came to a head
with the Wilson government’s Iron and Steel Bill. This outlined Labour’s
plan to renationalise the steel industry but failed to make recommen-
dations for involving workers in management, beyond consultation.
Delegates at the 1965 Labour Party annual conference made their feel-
ings clear and in response the NEC established a working party on
industrial democracy.104 This led to a report debated at the 1967 con-
ference, which formed the basis for an NEC statement endorsed by
conference the following year: many of its recommendations found their
way into Castle’s Industrial Relations Bill of 1969.
Before the debate on steel, the NEC had commissioned an investi-
gation chaired by Mikardo into the port transport industry, which the
government was committed to taking into public hands.105 The object
of Mikardo’s Study Group, which counted Jones as a member, was to
recommend what form state ownership should assume. As both men
were well known critics of consultation, it came as no surprise when
they proposed measures it was claimed would result in ‘the injection of
a new, radical element of industrial democracy’. The report argued that,
for historical reasons, the dock unions – prominent among which was
the TGWU – had unrivalled experience exercising joint authority with
management and it proposed this should be extended to maintain har-
mony in a conflict-prone industry. In particular, the report recommended
that a Group Operating Committee, to which managers would be re-
sponsible, should run each dock. This was described as a ‘breakthrough’
because sitting on the Committee would be representatives elected by
the workforce, who would enjoy an unprecedented influence over disci-
pline, safety, training, welfare and – most radically – wages.
While the Mikardo report justified its proposals in relation to the
unique character of the ports, Jones, for one, believed they should be
applied to other industries and was given the chance to influence that
outcome when he was appointed chair of an NEC working party on
industrial democracy.106 The outward aim of this body was to make work
a more satisfying experience, in the expectation that this would improve
industrial relations. This would, of course, benefit everybody, including
what was said to be an increasing number of employers interested in
giving employees more responsibility. If treating workers as equals rather
than subordinates gave them unprecedented autonomy, it would also
help managers to exploit their ‘untapped talent’.107 In particular, the
creation of mutual trust would help industry adapt to the consequences
of technological change, something that otherwise might generate an
insecure and strike-prone workforce. Thus, one of the purposes of reform
was to reveal the compelling common interest that united both sides of
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industry, by creating individuals ‘with a widening range of social under-
standing, and a responsible and democratic approach to individual and
group problems’.
Most members of Jones’ working party believed there was no limit
to how much managerial responsibility workers might exert. So far as
the Labour leadership was concerned there were some. Responding on
behalf of the NEC to the 1965 steel debate, White reaffirmed her view
that ‘the tradition on which our trade union movement had grown up,
does not lend itself to workers’ control’.108 Reflecting his union’s position
before Scanlon’s election as President, the AEU official Bill Simpson
also feared too much democracy might imperil efficiency, whereas the
former should always be subordinated to this ‘paramount factor’.109
Similarly, the MP Eric Moonman believed the rights claimed by workers
and managers were mutually exclusive and argued ‘[m]anagement must
manage’, albeit supported by committees promoting greater worker
involvement.110
While one of its authors described the 1967 report as revolutionary,
its proposals were nonetheless justified in terms designed to appeal to
the gradualist strain in Labour thinking.111 Hence, it recommended
industrial democracy be extended ‘not by evolving new and complex
(and perhaps alien) structures, but by gradually increasing involvement
in a development of existing machinery … it would encourage a move-
ment towards participation in democratic procedures; a natural
evolution rather than an attempt to conjure democracy out of the air’.
In concrete terms, this meant industrial democracy would proceed
through ‘accredited representative[s] of working people’: the unions.112
So far as Jones was concerned it meant stronger unions, and implied:
giving them the right to be recognised by any employer; granting them
access to confidential company information; increasing compensation
to workers faced with redundancy; and providing better training for
their representatives. Rather than needing separate consultative com-
mittees, industrial democracy would be expressed through the same
channel that dealt with wages. As Simpson noted, this meant consultation
would be linked to that basic union concern, so co-operation over a
whole range of matters could be made dependent on financial reward.113
While no specific form of industrial democracy was prescribed –
although Mikardo’s scheme was cited as worthy of emulation – indica-
tive examples significantly included giving unions responsibility for
distributing overtime and deciding on promotions.
Delegates reaching the rostrum during debates on industrial democ-
racy held at the 1967 and 1968 conferences wanted full workers’ control
of management and saw Jones’ labours as an initial step towards that
end.114 They were mostly sceptical about co-operation and partnership
with management, and criticised measures that did not lead to greater
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union authority at the workplace. Jones appeared to sympathise with
them, calling in 1968 for union representatives to ‘invade the powers of
the bureaucrats in industry’ and limit the ‘dictatorial and unilateral
authority of management’.115 How far conference reflected the views of
the rest of the party is hard to say, as few CLPs debated the matter.
While the 1967 NEC report was supposed to be the basis for party-wide
consultations, Transport House received few comments.116 If measured
in column inches, Tribune’s interest was also limited. In addition, the
1968 debate was conducted over the incessant chatter of delegates, pre-
sumably talking about other matters, and the chair was forced to remind
them of the subject’s importance.117
The impact of Barbara Castle
Jones believed the government should implement the 1968 NEC state-
ment without delay, in the first instance within the public sector.118 Few
advocates of workers’ control were optimistic, for while Ken Coates wel-
comed the Jones report as a step in the right direction, he considered
ministers were ‘driving full speed in the opposite direction’.119 This was
not entirely accurate. Taking their lead from Crosland and Jay, most
ministers opposed radical reform but were nonetheless willing to con-
sider variations of, if not alternatives to, consultation. Moreover, as the
Cabinet’s greatest enthusiast for innovation, Barbara Castle, first as Min-
ister of Transport and then First Minister of State at the DEP, pushed
colleagues towards a serious consideration of industrial democracy.
Like Mikardo, Castle supported Bevan during the 1950s and wanted
to ‘forge ahead’ with worker participation, to which end she regularly
consulted Jones, although he thought she found his ideas too anar-
chistic.120 As Minister of Transport, Castle nonetheless wanted to apply
Mikardo’s recommendations. She made it clear that her ‘overriding
consideration’ was to ‘give the individual dock worker … the feeling
that his interests are being directly safeguarded by the presence of his
representatives … at the meetings … where matters affecting his liveli-
hood are being discussed’. Yet while she wanted to ‘associate workers
with management without handicapping management’, employers’ repre-
sentatives opposed making managers answerable to bodies on which
sat union officials.121 Castle’s Cabinet colleagues were also uncertain.
Presumably because he did not want to antagonise the unions, Gunter
agreed that worker participation should be a ‘central feature’ of the
nationalised docks. However, he felt that it would be unwise to give
employee representatives an influence over wage negotiations and pro-
posed that each dock should merely have a consultative committee,
albeit one with direct access to management. Michael Stewart at the
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Department of Economic Affairs echoed Gunter’s concern that union
officials sitting on Group Operating Committees would be unable to
assume a ‘detached and dispassionate interest’ over wages. Moreover, if
they did acquire that outlook, the unions might then alienate their mem-
bers, leaving the door open to unofficial strikes and far-left influence.122
In light of these comments, Castle decided against making any
specific proposals for industrial democracy. Instead, she drafted some
general principles favourable to increasing participation, in the hope
they would be anodyne enough to pass Cabinet scrutiny but still allow
the unions to use them to justify Mikardo-like experiments once the
ports were nationalised. Yet, when the Ports Bill was finally published
in November 1969, the wording was too vague for the unions. Their
demand for an unequivocal promise that workers would play a mana-
gerial role was not unrelated to their belief that this would help them
prevent the introduction of new labour-saving technologies. It was
because he feared the unions would exploit any managerial function to
prevent such innovation that the then Minister of Transport, Fred
Mulley, refused to make legislation less obscure.123 In the end, the Bill
fell due to Labour’s loss of power.
Although she was forced to make a tactical retreat on the docks,
Castle tried to create a statutory framework for worker representation
on the boards of state-owned industries under Ministry of Transport
control, and was adamant that active union officials should be allowed
to sit on these bodies.124 She believed the established practice of appoint-
ing retired trade unionists with no experience of the industry on whose
board they sat had done nothing to ensure workers were ‘more closely
identified with the policies adopted for the industry’ and so might
‘assume management habits of thought’. If the initial draft of Castle’s
proposals was anything to go by, her civil servants nonetheless feared
the presence of union representatives would create conflicts of interest:
in particular, it might allow them to influence wage negotiations from
both sides of the table.125 This echoed the view of leading board
members and even that of some unionists, for the TUC’s Nationalised
Industries Committee received her proposals with some caution. Once
again forced to rethink, Castle conceded that union representatives
should not be involved in all board activity. When this did not go far
enough for her detractors, rather than make immediate legislative pro-
posals, Castle agreed to sponsor experimental schemes, in the hope
that these would eventually generate support for her objective.126
In April 1968 Castle was moved from the Ministry of Transport. Her
replacement, Richard Marsh, was hostile to any form of worker partici-
pation; indeed, Castle believed he had no ‘feel for Socialist ideas at
all’.127 Marsh was certainly unwilling to allow union officials to sit on
nationalised boards, as he was convinced they would inevitably adhere
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to union policy and so undermine managerial decision-making. This
remained his view even after union officials conceded that full-time
board members might relinquish their union posts while part-timers
could stand aloof when wages were discussed. Even so, while Marsh
thought consultative councils were the best means of promoting partici-
pation, he promised to do what Castle would have done, that is, draft
the forthcoming Transport Bill in such a way as not to preclude experi-
mentation.128 He also commissioned a survey of British Rail employees’
attitudes to industrial democracy, which, after numerous delays, began
in March 1970 and so was concluded only after Labour had lost power.
It is doubtful this would have led to radical action even had Wilson won
re-election, for its conclusions, referred to above, were not encouraging.129
In place of shareholders?
Once installed at the DEP, Castle formulated a White Paper devoted to
improving industrial relations, which she entitled In Place of Strife. Most
union leaders and all the Labour left believed this represented Castle’s
desire to undermine workers’ ability to hold strikes.130 Wilson and his
closest advisers were certainly concerned that, as his economic guru
Thomas Balogh put it, the unions had become ‘an irresponsible group
who had to be dealt with’.131 The Prime Minister consequently looked
on Castle’s proposals for compulsory strike ballots and the imposition
of ‘cooling off ’ periods before strikes could be held as ingenious devices
to prevent unofficial disputes.
Yet, whatever might have been thought, Castle wanted to strengthen
the unions rather than weaken them, and much of In Place of Strife was
preoccupied with that aim.132 In fact, one of her ‘principal objectives’
was to promote industrial democracy. Paragraph 49 was strongly influ-
enced by the NEC’s 1968 statement and endorsed the view that the
best way to develop participation ‘must be through a reform, extension
and strengthening of collective bargaining’ and the creation of a strong
union movement. Castle saw this as fully endorsing the ‘philosophic
rightness’ of allowing employees to influence decision-making.133 The
subsequent Bill consequently was to make it illegal for workers to be
denied union membership or to be subject to discrimination once mem-
bers; it also introduced the notion of ‘unfair dismissal’. Employers were
to be obliged to make available information considered relevant to wage
bargaining. In addition, the Bill proposed regulating the position of
shop stewards, by providing training and facilities to help them better
perform their tasks; it also outlined plans to subsidise the training of
both union officials and members, to enable them to participate more
effectively. Most relevantly, Castle committed the government to undertake
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experiments involving placing worker representatives on the boards of
nationalised industries.134 Castle had only started consulting on what
form these trials might take when Wilson announced the election date.135
One reason why experimentation was to take place initially in the
public sector was that company law effectively prevented workers acquir-
ing a managerial role outside it. Castle called for the law to be reformed.
This the CBI inevitably opposed, as the existing statutes meant directors
could be appointed only by shareholders rather than elected by workers,
while all board members were obliged to accept collective responsibility
and maintain the shareholders’ interest. The Board of Trade, busy with
other matters, echoed that view.136 Yet there was some prospect of
change, for, in 1967, when in charge of the Board, Jay had outlined his
intention to introduce a systematic review of company law. In particular,
he wanted to oversee the ‘comparative rights and obligations of share-
holders, directors, creditors, employees and the community as a whole’.137
The Board in fact aimed to introduce legislation some time after the
election; its proposals regarding company philosophy were informed
by the findings of an NEC study group.138 Quite how radical these would
have been is uncertain. Lord Brown, Minister of State at the Board,
marked out its possible limits by adamantly opposing the creation of
elected worker directors, arguing on the familiar grounds that this would
mean board business being dominated by surrogate wage negotia-
tions.139 Despite that, Labour’s 1970 manifesto promised to reform
company law and extend experiments in industrial democracy to the
private sector.
Conclusion
As with those that follow, the main purpose of this chapter is to high-
light the underlying reasons why the party embraced the policies it did,
rather than to assess their impact. This was just as well, for at the time
of leaving office Wilson’s governments had made only a negligible im-
pression on secondary education and industrial democracy.
The commitment to end segregated education was widely shared
across the party, linking revisionist ministers to Tribune-reading activists;
while the former advocated gradual progress and the latter urged
immediate action, differences were limited to means, not ends. Thus,
in explaining why only one-third of children were being taught in a
comprehensive school by 1970, the Department of Education’s limited
powers should be taken into account. The failure to reform private edu-
cation largely followed from the Cabinet’s reluctance to confront the
numerous practical and political problems raised by the issue at a time
when Labour was already deeply unpopular. That the final official
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report into the issue was not produced until just before the 1970 general
election was clearly a significant additional factor.
In contrast, no progress towards even the most modest forms of
worker participation had been made as Labour ministers emptied their
desks. There were, it is true, a dozen part-time ‘worker directors’ in the
newly nationalised steel industry sitting on advisory regional boards.
However, this initiative owed little to Labour ministers and was, in any
case, widely criticised by advocates of industrial democracy as little more
than glorified consultation.140 Labour’s lack of action was largely due to
the fact that it was such a contentious issue within the party. The left
wanted workers to exert at least co-determination with management;
some even called for full workers’ control. If most ministers (and some
union leaders) were willing to enhance the means by which employees
were consulted, they feared efficiency would be compromised if workers
played a direct managerial role. How far each side of this argument was
truly committed to reconciling workers and managers so that each might
work together to advance the common interest is moot. Even so, largely
due to the efforts of Barbara Castle, before the 1970 campaign the
government was committed to introducing a number of experimental
schemes that would have tested the nature of party members’ intentions.
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Appealing to women
Some months before the 1959 general election, Labour’s keenest women
activists were told by one of their leading lights that they needed to
accommodate ‘a new generation, with new habits, new interests, and
new reactions to the political problems of the day’.1 The result in October
appeared to confirm her analysis, as many observers believed a sig-
nificant cause of Labour’s defeat was its rejection by younger, affluent
female voters.
If the problem appeared acute in the late 1950s, the party had always
found it hard to convince women to vote Labour at the same rate as
men. Historians explain this ‘gender gap’ by suggesting that, as a male-
dominated organisation, Labour’s perception of its overall purpose
meant it did not take women’s discrete interests seriously.2 In contrast,
the Conservatives are considered to have been more willing and able to
focus on matters relating to women’s prevailing home-making role.3 As
outlined in Chapter 3, however, Labour’s 1959 campaign gave domestic
issues some prominence. So far as Gallup was concerned, the gender
gap nearly halved compared with 1955, so that only 5 per cent more
men than women supported the party (see Table 3.1, p. 63). During
the 1960s Transport House endeavoured to make Labour more attract-
ive to young wives and mothers, such that in 1964 Harold Wilson
claimed he would return Labour to power on the back of a ‘women’s
crusade’.4 Paradoxically, the gender gap actually doubled between 1959
and 1964 and stood at 8 per cent in 1966.
Despite official strategy, most male members continued to think their
party’s main purpose remained that of improving the position of male
manual workers. But so did many female activists. Delegates to the 1959
national conference of Labour women had spent little time discussing
consumer issues; instead, speeches were dominated by the spectre of
rising male unemployment.5 If the party’s union connection encouraged
this emphasis, it was also because such women were mostly members of
households whose welfare relied on a husband’s continued employment.
So far as they were concerned, despite the increasing importance of
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domestic consumption and the rising number of wives entering paid
employment, women as a whole remained dependent on male bread-
winners.
This chapter first outlines the place of women in the party at the
start of the 1960s, to locate subsequent events in their proper context.
It focuses on Labour’s response to women’s changing place in society
by looking at how officials promoted a variety of organisational reforms
designed to increase the number of younger female members. The
chapter then discusses Labour’s efforts to come to terms with the per-
ceived need to address gender inequality in the later part of the decade,
especially with regard to equal pay. It does not dispute the predominant
view that Labour was largely run by – and to some extent for – men,
something which was also true of most other civil institutions during
this period, including the Conservative Party. However, it seeks to stress
the often obscured fact that, while much keener to promote equal pay
than the leadership, Labour’s women activists were in other respects
broadly content with the party’s emphases. Indeed, so far as attempts
to increase the party’s appeal to younger working wives and mothers
were concerned, they often proved to be an impediment. Furthermore,
Labour’s women also blamed members of their own sex as much as or
more than men for inequalities feminists would subsequently deem to
be the result of ‘patriarchy’.
Labour’s women
While issued with a different-coloured membership card – which some
thought denoted their second-class status – women could participate in
the party just like men. They also had an additional means of working
within Labour’s ranks, which granted them, should they desire it, a
separate voice. Thus, by 1965, 85 per cent of constituencies had at least
one women’s section. Apart from giving women a distinct platform –
they could send representatives to meetings of the constituency’s general
management committee (GMC) – women’s sections were meant to reflect
their particular interests.6 To encourage the growth of sections, each
region was allotted a women’s organiser, who operated under the direc-
tion of the Chief Women’s Officer (CWO), based in Transport House.
To co-ordinate activities, sections in more than one constituency were
gathered together into constituency committees within urban districts
and federations in counties. These appointed delegates to regional
women’s advisory councils, which, in turn, sent representatives to the
National Labour Women’s Advisory Council (NLWAC), serviced by the
CWO’s department, which also organised the annual national conference
of Labour women. The function of the NLWAC was, as its title implied,
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to advise the National Executive Committee (NEC) on matters of import-
ance to female members. Five members of the NEC were elected by
party conference from a women-only list, as a consequence of which
they owed their places to the unions rather than the support of other
women. While the NEC was under no obligation to heed their lobbying,
women at least had the chance to make their collective voice heard.
According to official figures, in 1960 there were 330,608 female party
members, accounting for 41.8 per cent of the total, a proportion that
hardly varied during the decade (see Table 5.1). In the unlikely event
these figures reflected reality, women were under-represented, a feature
that became much more pronounced higher up the party hierarchy.
Thus, in late 1950s Manchester, only one-quarter of ward secretaries
were women.7 During the 1960s the proportion of female constituency
Labour party (CLP) secretaries and delegates to annual conference
remained steady, at 15–20 per cent. The extent of their lack of presence
varied across the country, although everywhere it was striking. In rural
areas, where Labour had never done well, female secretaries were rare,
but that was also the case in most industrial counties.8 The position was
even worse in the Commons. In 1959 only thirty-six women stood as
parliamentary candidates, a mere 5.8 per cent of the total: the number
elected came to a paltry thirteen. Women Labour MPs continued to be
a tiny minority and while the 1966 landslide saw their number reach
the dizzy height of nineteen (or 5.2 per cent), in 1970 this fell to ten.
During the course of the 1964–70 governments there were never more
than six female junior ministers, while their representation around the
Cabinet table was mostly limited to Barbara Castle, although Judith
Hart joined her in 1968.
Table 5.1 Labour’s official female membership, 1960–70
Official figure Percentage of membership
1960 330,608 41.8
1961 316,054 42.1
1962 322,883 42.1
1963 349,707 42.1
1964 351,206 42.3
1965 341,601 41.8
1966 320,971 41.4
1967 306,437 41.8
1968 299,357 42.7
1969 292,800 43.0
1970 285,901 41.4
Table 2.1 (p. 43) gives total party membership.
Source: Labour Party conference reports, 1960–70.
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Despite this, the 1955 Wilson report on party organisation (see Chapter
2) claimed women supplied the majority of CLP volunteers; and Brixton’s
agent declared in 1956 that, ‘if one of our active lady members has a
baby we begin to get nervous about the ward organisation’.9 Responsi-
bilities were, however, generally allocated on the basis of conventional
gender roles, which led some to complain that women were confined to
catering for, and cleaning up after, male-dominated meetings. That a
significant number of activists were married to each other clearly influ-
enced matters.10 Labour husbands and wives related to one another in
the party as they did at home and domestic relationships largely reflected
established gender norms. Thus, during the 1959 campaign, most women
in Southall placed leaflets into envelopes, while safely seated in party
offices, while their men-folk took to the streets.11 Similarly, during the
1960s, Bristol South women supplied only one-fifth of the CLP’s member-
ship fee collectors.12
By no means were all female activists frustrated by this clearly gendered
division of labour; some appeared to see it as part of their ‘natural’ lot.
For instance, those in Brecon were annoyed after a member of the con-
stituency’s executive committee (EC) complained about a dirty party
room. Their anger was, however, not due to his assumption that their
job was to clean the room, but because they had not been informed
earlier that it required attention.13 There were, nonetheless, some occa-
sions when women members asserted themselves. Most famously, Castle
owed her position as a Blackburn MP after 1945 to them threatening to
stop making tea for CLP meetings unless one of their kind was short-
listed for consideration as a parliamentary candidate.14 More prosaic-
ally, women on Llanelli’s GMC cast their own modest version of the
block vote to maximise female representation on its EC.15 When one
leading female activist was not selected as a candidate for local office in
Swansea, she went so far as to stand as an independent. Owing to a
collective frustration with their ward’s lack of regard for the women’s
section, eleven other female activists supported her campaign.16
If nothing else, the range of issues discussed by at least some sections
was impressive. In Bradford South during 1958, for example, women
debated home safety, local landmarks, ‘problem’ families, welfare, a
member’s Mediterranean cruise and Labour’s new leisure policy.17 In
the same year, those in Clapham talked about local government, rents,
the Soviet Union, the work of magistrates, local elections, delinquent
children and education. To make them more agreeable, as well as dis-
cussions the Clapham meetings featured raffles, performances of short
plays or games of ‘housey-housey’.18 In contrast, other sections were
almost entirely preoccupied with raising money for the CLP, through
jumble sales and summer fetes.19 Whatever they did, sections reflected the
interests of those full-time housewives who generally attended meetings.
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Even so, while in the Grimsby women’s section there were women ‘who
really enjoy being housewives’ and believed a ‘happy home should be
our first aim’, even they did not go as far as Morden members, who
dedicated one gathering to a washing machine demonstration, to which
they brought dirty clothes.20 It is deceptively easy to denigrate the
modesty of these activities. Some nonetheless argued – as did the South
West Region’s women’s organiser – that less ‘politically minded’ women
required sections.21 They gave them the chance to learn about society,
gain an insight into political issues and provided a platform to cam-
paign on matters about which they cared. As one participant recalled,
sections gave those ‘too nervous’ to attend meetings dominated by men
the chance to build confidence so they might eventually become more
directly involved in the wider party.22
Even more than wards and CLPs, women’s sections were predom-
inantly parochial in orientation. At least one-third did not take a copy
of the monthly journal produced by Transport House, Labour Woman,
whose circulation hovered around 10,000 during the 1960s.23 Most failed
to send delegates to their own national conference: it was a rare year
that saw more than 20 per cent represented (see Table 5.2). This might
have been partly due to lack of funds but was probably mainly account-
able to the older age of many Labour women. Since the early 1950s the
party had lost younger female members to paid employment, while
even part-time work reduced the hours previously committed housewives
with children could devote to the cause.24 Thus, by the late 1960s, members
Table 5.2 Women’s section delegates attending the national
conference of Labour women, 1960–70
Number of Number of section Percentage of sections
 sections  delegates at conference sending delegates
1960 – 398 –
1961 1,564 358 22.9
1962 1,580 330 20.1
1963 1,613 461 28.6
1964 1,640 478 29.1
1965 1,660 438 26.4
1966 1,646 300 18.2
1967 1,603 333 20.8
1968 1,541 313 20.3
1969 1,420 286 20.1
1970 1,373 221 16.1
Note: After 1963 each section was entitled to send a delegate; before this, repre-
sentation was based on constituency (i.e. groups of sections).
Source: Reports of the National Conferences of Labour Women, 1960–70.
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of the women’s section in Hammersmith North had an average age of
seventy-two, while those in Oxford were too frail to attend meetings
held in the city centre.25 One regional advisory council was even des-
cribed in 1966 by its former secretary as serving ‘little useful purpose,
political or otherwise except keeping the older Labour women together
occasionally – it’s the Mother’s Union of the Labour Party’.26
Reforming the organisation
By the start of the 1960s, some in Transport House, such as Len Williams,
the National Agent, believed there was no need for women to have their
own ‘political kindergarten’, as they had largely achieved equality.27 For
similar reasons, the 1968 Simpson report on party organisation (see
Chapter 2) recommended that those NEC seats reserved for women
should be redistributed among the unions and constituencies. Like
Williams, Simpson believed Labour women could stand on their own
two feet without special assistance, although delegates to the Labour
women’s conference were less confident.28 Simpson’s proposal was
rejected, possibly because it threatened to enhance the voice of the left
on the NEC rather than because of NLWAC representations.29 In 1961
the CWO’s department was subsumed within that of the National Agent
and while the title of Chief Women’s Organiser remained, as did the
regional women’s organisers, post-holders ceased to act independently
of male officials. Some on the NLWAC were convinced this was due to
a desire to place women under the authority of ‘Men Organisers’.
Reformers nonetheless claimed change would ensure everybody in the
party took raising female membership seriously, but agreed Labour
should still cater for women’s ‘special interests’.30
It was not just men who doubted the efficacy of Labour’s separate
women’s organisation. Some women, usually younger and more educated
than most, had long called for its abolition, if only because members of
the sections lacked what they considered to be an adequate interest in
politics. In the late 1940s, for example, one critic described her north
London section as a ‘cross between a rummage sale and a tea-party’.31
Some middle-class CLPs, such as Bristol West, even thought sections
prevented women’s integration into party life. As neighbouring Bristol
North West’s agent stated, ‘modern woman’ refused to be ‘segregated’
and was not prepared to ‘sit back and be regarded as a useful adjunct to
the Party making tea’. Instead, she wanted ‘to play a full part in the
Movement, a “man’s” part’.32
In 1967 the women’s conference debated a motion that advocated
its own abolition, tabled in the belief that this would allow women to
participate in the party on equal terms with men. Those who drafted
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the motion thought there were no ‘subjects which were particularly suit-
able for women to deal with’: men and women ‘were equally concerned
with all matters because they lived in the same world and their basic
problems were the same’. The overwhelming majority present none-
theless considered the conference remained the only occasion on which
women’s problems could gain a proper hearing. As one put it, Labour
was the ‘most masculine dominated and masculine orientated move-
ment’ she had ever encountered.33 A similar motion was debated the
following year; it was moved by a young delegate who declared that, to
those of her generation, sections appeared to serve ‘no apparent pur-
pose [other] than to bring together like minded people for pleasant, if
rather aimless social occasions’.34 While this view was again rejected,
some continued to imagine that the very existence of women’s sections
perpetuated discrimination, as they gave some men the excuse they
needed to deny women a proper say in the party as a whole.35
Despite these challenges, the prevailing view among those 300 or so
women who attended their national conference during the late 1960s
was that, as one put it, women were ‘equal but different’. They still
required a separate organisation because their ‘unique function’, as the
NLWAC later had it, that of child-bearing, placed them at an inherent
disadvantage. Thus, while Labour was unable to overcome the social
consequences of biology, it should still cater for difference. Conse-
quently, while most women preferred to be treated as individuals rather
than ‘women’, they still needed ‘preferential treatment’.36
Attracting younger women
It was never thought that encouraging younger women into the party
would be easy. They were widely considered ‘too busy to think much
about politics’ and would first have to be persuaded that their interests
were indeed ‘political’, and only then that Labour membership could
advance them.37 Moreover, as one activist noted, those working outside
the home, or looking after their family full-time, wanted to be ‘lifted
out of themselves’ and did not ‘want to read correspondence and discuss
political issues all night’.38 Sections were consequently asked to stream-
line routine business. As Mary Sutherland, Labour’s long-standing
CWO until she retired in 1961, declared, ‘it is more important to double
our membership and double attendances at meetings than to insist that
every member shall discuss items of business’.39 With that object in mind,
women were urged to experiment with more appealing social activities,
such as sherry parties and theatre trips.40
It would have surprised some critics that women’s sections needed
to enhance their social side. In any case, such was the target group’s
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presumed resistance to formal political activity that officials’ emphasis
lay more on encouraging Labour women to pursue ‘informal’ activities
outside the section structure, such as luncheon, dinner and supper clubs,
coffee circles, ‘young mums’ clubs and neighbourhood groups.41 The
overt purpose of these initiatives was to bring Labour women into con-
tact with friends and neighbours so they might enjoy a ‘pleasant social
gathering’. Covertly, however, they were meant to develop into oppor-
tunities for ‘useful political discussion and membership recruitment’.42
Members were warned they might be forced to participate in ‘idle
gossip about this T.V. programme or that’, so they could put Labour’s
case at an appropriate moment.43 With this strategy of permeation in
mind, a Middlesbrough activist went so far as to urge Labour women to
‘get into any organisation, no matter what – they could go and talk
tiddly-winks provided they got on to Labour policy in the end’.44 Young
mothers were pursued with particular zeal. In Bradford members con-
verted a garage so it could house a playgroup and in Bletchley women
ran a playgroup which, after three years, catered for 271 children.
Women in Halesowen were so successful in attracting young mothers
that meetings were overrun by noisy toddlers – it became difficult to
discuss anything, let alone politics.45
Labour women were also urged to take up popular non-partisan issues
to place themselves in a more attractive light; a national effort to raise
money for Freedom from Hunger (devoted to helping developing nations)
in 1963–4 had this as its object, while in Stirling women established a
presence on a new housing estate by collecting for people with dis-
abilities. In Ipswich they organised a retail price survey to demonstrate
Labour’s sympathy for housewives, something undoubtedly behind a
national campaign promoting consumer protection during 1962–3.46
In spite of official exhortation, few sections were keen to encourage
a greater role for young women.47 There were too many, such as the
one in Toxteth, Liverpool, where a dwindling band of the aged few
occasionally noted the reluctance of youngsters to attend their after-
noon get-togethers. Members did not think they could do much about
this, and blamed it on the rising number of married women in paid
work and the spread of television ownership. It is likely they believed
that, if anybody was to blame for Labour’s lack of younger female
members, it was women themselves.48 In truth, many established activists
were too comfortable with their cosy gatherings – sharing gossip about
old acquaintances and listening to the occasional educational talk – to
want to change. Unfortunately, few twenty-somethings found ‘housey-
housey’ an attractive prospect, while many others were, for work or
domestic reasons, simply unable to attend afternoon meetings.
In trying to enthuse sections to recruit younger women, officials
confronted a generational divide that reflected tensions evident on
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numerous working-class housing estates.49 Many Labour women looked
on their less mature, non-party counterparts as in need of instruction
rather than the indulgence of a glass of sherry. Like the archetypal
matriarch in ‘traditional’ proletarian communities, Labour women ex-
pected to be listened to and learnt from.50 At least some lacked sympathy
for the plight of those to whom they were meant to appeal. Women in
Grimsby, for example, were sceptical about whether young mothers
should go out to work and believed that ‘nothing, however good it may
be, is as good as a mother’s care’.51 Young women were also, according
to the MP Lena Jeger, that part of the population ‘most careless of its
rights of franchise and citizenship’ and the ‘laziest of all groups in doing
their duty at the polls’.52
This rift was revealed most clearly during women’s conference
debates on consumer protection. While all speakers favoured increasing
help and advice, this was often presented as giving aid to naïve young
wives, who, as one speaker put it, did not have the ‘guts’ to shut the
door in the face of predatory door-to-door salespeople and ‘tell them
where to get off ’. After hearing various tales of women buying shoddy
goods, another declaimed, ‘what gullible people women were’, and
stated that those buying goods on hire purchase were also ‘playing the
Tory game’. A further speaker wondered ‘what kind of fools and mugs
housewives were’; she considered it impossible to protect some from
their own foolishness.53 One even wondered, possibly thinking of fellow
Labour women as the prototype, ‘what had become of the wise house-
wives of the past, who had known exactly what a shilling meant’. Even
the fact that ‘modern food … was not worth eating’ was partly women’s
own fault, for they bought frozen food because it was quick and easy to
cook.54 That those few youngsters attending conference usually con-
firmed this picture did not help. As one said, she belonged to that
‘deluded generation’ who thought unemployment could never happen
to them and who had ‘bought their washing machines and their tellys,
egged on to live right up to their income’.55
In light of this hostility, some officials came to believe it necessary to
devise a new organisation, just for younger women.56 Raising similar
concerns generated by Tony Benn’s Citizens for Labour (see Chapter 3),
the NEC initially turned down the request of reformers in Buckingham
to allow the Socialist Women’s Circle to affiliate to their CLP. The Circle
was organised by party activists; while its mostly non-partisan members
mainly engaged in its social activities, they helped with electoral work
when required. Despite this, the NEC believed such women should join
sections and become fully integrated into the party.57 The promotion of
women’s councils in the late 1960s marked a dramatic change of tack,
being – contrary to officials’ claims – an attempt to reduce the influence
of elderly stalwarts based in sections.58 These councils were to assume
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the co-ordinating role formerly performed by constituency committees,
federations and advisory councils, bodies that only reflected section
opinion. Councils would represent non-members who belonged to
those ‘informal’ bodies – such as luncheon clubs and neighbourhood
groups – established after 1959. Officials hoped this new ‘outward
looking structure’ would finally enable the party to pursue more non-
partisan ‘community’ activities and finally bridge the gap between
Labour women and those active in less overtly political groups.59
Labour women and feminism
When Maureen Colquhoun entered the Commons in 1974, she claimed
to find no ‘feminist’ women Labour MPs. If several sought to improve
their sisters’ lives, she claimed none wanted to dismantle the ‘patriarchal
society’ – if only because they had not heard of the term.60 That ‘patri-
archy’ had no purchase among Labour’s female MPs should have come
as no surprise to Colquhoun, who had attended women’s conferences
during the 1960s. While activists supported greater equality, few believed
male and female interests were inherently in conflict.61 Hence, reflecting
the majority position, Sutherland rejected the notion of an ‘identity of
the sexes’, on the basis that the genders performed different but com-
plementary roles, with women’s key responsibility lying in the home.62
Some historians have stated that, for much of the post-war period,
there was little evidence of a clear ‘ideology of gender’ among Labour’s
female activists, with the 1950s and 1960s being described as the ‘nadir
of women’s equal rights’ in the party.63 That is going too far, as some at
least believed male prejudice impeded the development of full gender
equality, in Labour’s ranks as much as anywhere else. One delegate to
the women’s conference, for example, said men considered women
capable only of ‘making tea, etc., trotting round streets and sitting in
committee rooms’; a second claimed they only paid ‘lip-service’ to equal
rights; men, another complained, ‘simply did not want women to have
equality’.64 How far sections believed male prejudice prevented women
assuming a prominent role in the party was measured by a survey con-
ducted during 1968 to discover what they thought about women’s
position in public life. Leaders on the NLWAC expressed some alarm at
the ‘reasonableness’ of the outlook revealed and accused sections of
complacency. The survey indicated that, if Labour women were aware
that male bigotry was one cause of women’s modest public profile, most
believed it was largely due to women’s own shortcomings. They also
reportedly neither expected nor even desired a substantial change in
female under-representation; most apparently merely requested men’s
‘respect’.65 In certain CLPs, respect would have been welcome: in at
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least one Yorkshire mining constituency, male members were said to
react to female contributions to debate with ‘amused tolerance’.66
It was a very rare constituency party that thought it necessary actively
to promote women candidates. Largely middle-class Bristol North West
was one of the few. In 1968 its GMC aimed to ‘groom’ women to ensure
every ward was represented by at least one female Labour councillor.67
For the most part, rather than reform the party’s procedures to challenge
the imbalance between men and women, the latter were exhorted to
push themselves forward to beat men at their own game. Doris Fisher,
one of the few women returned to the Commons in 1970, considered
the basic reason for their under-representation was that politics was a
‘tough, rough business where very often feelings are hurt’. Many women
were, she judged, ‘personally sensitive’, so did not wish to enter the
fray: Fisher advised them to ‘adopt a “thick skin”’. Her words echoed
those of a councillor who suggested women needed to acquire the ‘skin
of a rhinoceros’ and ‘show the men they were equally capable of con-
ducting the country’s affairs’.68
Others argued that ‘men were not the ogres women made them out
to be’, and claimed that the ‘biggest enemies of women were women
themselves’, as they were often biased in favour of male candidates. It
was the minister Peggy Herbison who said that because ‘too many women
electors were against having women in politics’, they should accept ‘a
great deal of the responsibility’ for their own under-representation.69
The NLWAC believed women in general ‘disliked female managers,
courted male patronage, rather than male competition, and when
patronized by men accepted it without complaint’.70 Ultimately, one
activist argued, ‘women themselves were responsible for most of the
discrimination against their sex’ because it ‘began in the home where
the small daughter was given the washing up to do while her brother
was handed his fishing rod’.‘Equality for women’, it was said, ‘began in
the hearts of women themselves’.71
Studying discrimination
Despite this voluntaristic emphasis, as the decade drew to a close, some
in the party became more conscious of the structural inequalities that
distinguished the genders. On a superficial level, an increasing number
of CLPs passed resolutions demanding that the ‘archaic custom’ of
differently coloured membership cards be abandoned. East Ham North
had been the first to make this proposal, in 1958, but it was only in
1970 that, despite the loss of a means of assessing how many women
belonged to the party, the NEC agreed to issue a single style of member-
ship card in future.72
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More substantively, in July 1967 the NEC’s Home Policy Sub-
committee formed the Discrimination Against Women Study Group,
charged with the aim of influencing policy.73 In the end, the Group’s
output was so limited its impact was negligible, although its deliber-
ations do illustrate how some of its leading members viewed the subject.
The Group was drawn from the NEC and the Commons, as well as
outside experts, and the importance attached to its deliberations was
signified by the fact that Douglas Houghton was the chair. Houghton
was an important figure, who had just left the Cabinet, who chaired the
Parliamentary Labour Party and, in the wake of George Brown’s final
resignation, who was mooted as a possible deputy leader. More perti-
nently, Houghton had overseen a ministerial review of the social services
and, as he put it, ‘social security is mostly about women’.74
The Group’s remit was ambitious – overly so, as it included a ‘com-
prehensive study of the nature of discrimination against women’, so that
it could recommend policies that would help achieve equal rights.
There was, from the outset, no question that women did suffer ‘down-
right injustice’. Despite this, members rejected the ‘standpoint of
feminism’ and instead proceeded on the basis that ‘a country that desig-
nates any group, class, or sex as second class citizens will in the long
run suffer by denying them a full contribution to society’. While agree-
ing about the reality of discrimination, the Group was divided over how
to overcome it. Members’ initial focus fell on tax, in particular the fact
that wives were assessed as their husbands’ dependants. As early as
January 1968, Houghton suggested couples should be treated separ-
ately, as he considered the existing arrangement ‘derogatory’ to women’s
‘dignity as individuals’. Because some thought this would leave poorer
families worse off, he did not prevail. The former minister Peggy
Herbison even questioned why full-time housewives should be given
the same social security benefits as men, given that they made fewer
contributions, through their absence from paid employment. Women,
she believed, ‘could not expect both to have full social security rights
and to opt out of contributions’, her implication being that housewives
should pay National Insurance. As Herbison told the 1968 national
conference of Labour women, ‘if women wanted equality they had also
to accept the responsibilities of equality’.75 On both subjects the Group
found it hard to reach agreement and the tax question was unresolved
when Wilson announced the date of the 1970 election.
An important by-product of the Group’s work was Participation ’69
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 8), which was a scheme meant to
promote greater membership involvement in policy-making. The first
subject used to test party opinion was women and social security, on
which the Group had just produced an interim report. Members were
asked for their thoughts on this in light of changing family relationships,
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which were said to be encouraging ‘increasing independence and
equality’ for wives, while single mothers apparently accounted for a
rising proportion of those in receipt of supplementary benefit. It was
calculated that the opinions of 2,343 members were represented by the
responses sent to Transport House. While these cannot be assumed to
be representative, they give some indication of thinking in the wider
party. Respondents overwhelmingly believed women should be treated
the same as men when it came to tax, while there was little sense that
unmarried mothers were less ‘deserving’ of benefits than their married
equivalents. Some, however, disliked what they took to be the assump-
tion behind the exercise, which, they believed, was that all women
should be in paid employment. Leyland Trades Council, for example,
stated that it was ‘not conducive to good quality family life’ for mothers
of children under twelve to work outside the home.76
The Study Group had lost its way some time before this broad en-
dorsement of its work. Reflecting its lack of direction, the last gathering
before the 1970 election was presented with a historical analysis of
female emancipation, which concluded that any discussion of women’s
social position should be preceded by an examination of their sexual
relationships. For a body that had been in existence nearly two and half
years, this was a bizarre time to consider first principles. Whether the
Group’s failure to come to firm conclusions about particular subjects
was due to its original remit or a lack of consensus over detailed policy
is not clear. Houghton’s chairing certainly did not help: significantly,
his earlier review of the social services was criticised for its production
of overly detailed papers but lack of compelling general purpose, some-
thing that also characterised the Group’s slight output.77
Labour women and working women
The Wilson governments introduced numerous pieces of legislation
meant to improve women’s lives, most obviously its ‘permissive’ reforms,
which liberalised access to abortion and divorce. On the former issue in
particular, while broadly in favour of reform, the party still faced a
number of ways.78 A delegate to the 1970 women’s conference probably
spoke for the majority when she declared that ‘everyone should be
thankful for a permissive society which threw open the doors and let
out the fear of the unknown and let in the fresh air of commonsense’.
She did not, however, speak for the Burnley delegate, who could not
believe all those present fully supported the 1967 Abortion Act and
whose concern with the supposed abuses to which it gave rise echoed
that of some NLWAC members.79
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So far as an increasing proportion of women were concerned, how-
ever, the most significant measure passed by the Labour administration
was the 1970 Equal Pay Act. A series of articles published in Labour
Woman before the 1959 election took as their theme ‘women and the
second industrial revolution’ and outlined how the automation of pro-
duction might affect them. The author correctly predicted there would
be a rise in the number of jobs in the service industry, but erroneously
believed this would not create a greater demand for female workers.
Instead, she considered it probable that, as men’s real wages rose
through greater productivity, there would be less need for women to
seek work outside the home. This, together with the wider availability
of domestic labour-saving devices, led her to hope women would enjoy
more leisure and so assume a more prominent public role.80 As many
women’s sections were beginning to learn to their cost, women were
already filling the expanding number of job vacancies caused by full
employment. To meet this demand for female labour, some believed,
women would have to be treated – or at least paid – the same as men.
Yet, as late as 1969, Joyce Gould claimed on behalf of the NLWAC that
they remained ‘the slave labour of the 1960’s’ and ‘waited for their
Wilberforce to come and rescue them’.81
Labour women were in at least two minds over female employment.
Some adhered to a belief in the hierarchy of need, so that, in 1959, a
year when unemployment was thought to be on the rise, the women’s
conference debated a resolution demanding that employers made
married female workers redundant before single women.82 At their 1960
conference, Ron Hayward, who would become General Secretary of the
Labour Party in 1969, informed delegates that if Labour had lost the
previous general election because ‘Jack was all right’, Jack was in this
happy state only because ‘Mrs. Jack had a part-time job in order to
maintain her family’s standard of living’. Hayward’s inference was clear:
men should be paid enough so that their wives did not have to work. At
least some women agreed, believing in 1964 that ‘women only worked
because they were desperate for the money’.83 As one NLWAC speaker
noted, ‘the most important thing in the homes of the people was to
have husbands and fathers working’: a working wife was presumably
either a luxury for the affluent or an unpleasant necessity for the poor.84
Women members also doubted whether it was proper for mothers,
especially those with young children, to work. A survey of section think-
ing about the care of children revealed that most considered working
mothers were entitled to expect child care. However, when the matter
was debated, at least one speaker at the women’s conference thought
that, on this matter at least, too much was said about the rights of women,
‘when in fact without hesitation or discussion the rights of the child
should come first’.85 When the 1969 women’s conference called for more
fielding ch 5.P65 10/10/03, 12:34126
Appealing to women 127
nursery schools, one delegate reported that her section believed employers
should not be allowed to employ mothers with children under five, unless
they supplied proper child care facilities. Another speaker went further
and stated that unless a woman was in poverty she should stay at home
during the first five years of her child’s life. She asked:
What was the matter with women today? They did not deserve to be
mothers. If they could not sacrifice five years for their children before
the children went to school they did not know what they were miss-
ing. They were missing the relationship between child and mother.
It was no wonder there were so many child delinquents when that
relationship was missing. Forget about the money … and stay at
home until the children go to school.86
For most, the ideal marriage remained one in which the wife stayed at
home while the husband worked. Moreover, one contributor to Labour
Woman, while bemoaning the ‘double burden’ of the working housewife,
believed that, no matter how willing husbands might be, there remained
domestic tasks ‘which wives must shoulder’.87
The slow progress of equal pay
If some doubted that mothers with young children should join the labour
force, they all believed that gender should not dictate pay: indeed, by
1966 the call for equal pay was described as the ‘hardy annual’ of the
women’s conference.88 Labour had grappled with the issue for many
decades. After the publication of a Royal Commission report on the
subject in 1946, Clement Attlee’s Cabinet declared that, while it was in
favour in principle, the constraints imposed by post-war reconstruction
meant it was impractical.89 In 1953 the party conference reaffirmed
Labour’s belief in the ‘principle of equal pay for equal work’ and com-
mitted a future government to ‘immediately implement’ the policy –
albeit only to government employees, to ‘give a lead to industry
generally’.90 Individual Labour MPs did their best to further the cause
during the years of Conservative rule. In 1954 Houghton introduced a
Private Member’s Bill that sought to achieve equal pay by altering con-
tracts of service. He was supported by MPs from across the party’s left–
right divide, including Barbara Castle. During this period individual
unions and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) also passed resolutions
supportive of the measure.
As a result, Labour’s 1964 manifesto promised to implement women’s
right to ‘equal pay for equal work’, a commitment reaffirmed in 1966.91
Wilson’s ministers were not, however, obliged to introduce equal pay
immediately. At the 1963 party conference, the NEC indicated it would
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merely ‘seek at an appropriate stage in its first term of office to consider
ways and means of implementing’ the policy.92 Ray Gunter, Minister of
Labour between 1964 and 1968, was merely adhering to policy when,
in January 1965, he appointed a working party of civil servants, drawn
from his ministry, the Department of Economic Affairs and the
Treasury, to consider the matter. The subsequent report, presented in
November, was cautious to say the least, in no small measure owing to
the Treasury’s preoccupation with rising labour costs. In the first instance,
the working party recommended equal pay should come through agree-
ment between government, the unions and employers, as it was deemed
important to maintain the tradition of free collective bargaining. It also
cautioned against implementing any measure while economic circum-
stances remained so uncertain. The authors were obviously not keen on
equal pay and repeated many of the misgivings expressed by the earlier
Royal Commission. Thus, they feared it would encourage full-time
female workers to go part-time; that married men with dependants
would be relatively worse off; and – contradicting the first objection –
juvenile delinquency would rise through lack of a mother’s presence in
the home.93
Despite its obvious scepticism, Gunter used the report as the basis
for separate – and leisurely – talks with the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI) and TUC.94 It was not until July 1966 that he convened
a joint meeting with both bodies to agree a policy, something he must
have known was unlikely. The TUC favoured the International Labour
Organisation’s definition of ‘equal pay for work of equal value’, while the
CBI preferred the more restrictive European Economic Community’s
notion of ‘equal pay for the same work’, and neither side had moved
from their original position since meeting the minister.95 If Gunter
appeared in no rush to reach an agreement, the CBI employed blatant
delaying tactics. At their first meeting with the TUC, employers’ repre-
sentatives claimed they had no mandate to agree a policy, as the CBI
had not formally determined its position. The CBI debated the issue
only in 1968 and then claimed it would need another year before it could
arrive at a definite policy. Even Ministry of Labour officials thought
that a ‘stately pace’.96
As a result, by the end of 1967 equal pay was as far away as it had
ever been.97 While Gunter tried to avoid responsibility, Labour women
expressed frustration with his failure to deliver – although the NLWAC
loyally defended the minister by stressing the complexity of the issue
during a time of economic difficulty.98 Gunter was informed of a par-
ticularly striking outburst at a trades union meeting in Newcastle upon
Tyne (at the heart of a region with little known sympathy for feminism),
which occurred during a debate on a resolution that called for the im-
mediate introduction of equal pay:
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The mover of the resolution complained in most bitter terms about
the apparent lack of interest and inertia, from all responsible
quarters. She very forcibly stated that women were not tied to be the
‘law abiding’ section of industry forever and a day, making reference
to the fact, that the Engineering Industry in particular, had a back-
bone of women workers who could bring that industry to its knees.…
Other delegates speaking in support, reflected the rising anger and
impatience of women workers through this ever continuing delay.…
They warned that they will no longer tolerate any longer the role of
industries [sic] second class citizens, or accept being the means of
cheap labour. They … declared, that they were very seriously
thinking of emulating the old Suffragettes, as an indication of their
determination to achieve this objective.99
The impact of Barbara Castle (again)
Wilson sacked Gunter in April 1968 and subsumed his ministry into
what became the Department for Employment and Productivity (DEP),
at the head of which, and enjoying the prestigious title of First Secretary
of State, was Barbara Castle. She initially echoed her predecessor’s
position on equal pay, claiming to favour the principle but stressing the
practical problems regarding implementation. As the measure entailed
a ‘significant increase’ in wages, Castle ruled it out while the country’s
economic problems persisted.100 What seems to have encouraged Castle
to revise this opinion was her responsibility for maintaining the govern-
ment’s incomes policy.101 This meant the DEP was forced to intervene
in numerous complicated pay disputes in which equal pay was at least
tangentially raised. It was this experience, she subsequently claimed,
which ‘fired my determination to force the male chauvinists in the
Treasury to accept the principle of equal pay’ and made her realise
that, despite their rhetoric, the unions did not take the issue seriously.
The most significant of these disputes was the one involving 190
sewing machinists who installed car interior upholstery at the Fords
Dagenham plant.102 In June 1968 these women went on strike believing
they had been cheated by a job evaluation scheme, which they thought
had not fairly graded their work. The scheme had taken months of
tortuous negotiation to compile and involved a national joint council
composed of the five unions with members in the factory. As the women
complained only after the agreement had been signed, most unions
were unwilling to address their concerns, as they feared the scheme
would unravel as a result. The official inquiry into the dispute claimed
the women were unconcerned with differentials between men and
women on the same grade – and so did not call for equal pay. They
were, however, unhappy about how their work as sewing machinists was
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graded in relation to other comparable occupations in the plant. The
union representing most of the women endorsed this interpretation.
Even so, some saw the matter otherwise. The Prime Minister received
an anonymous note claiming to come from Dagenham which stated
that ‘we are fighting a great fight for equal pay for women … we will
force you to give us all equal pay, or strike with our unions’ blessings,
we’re sorry for Fords, sorry for the men out of work, but more sorry for
ourselves’. ‘Give us what we want’, the note demanded, ‘not only us at
Fords [but] all Women everywhere’.103
As the dispute held up vital car production, Castle tried to find a
quick solution by intervening in person. She discovered that a shop
steward had told the women there were two evaluation reports on their
work, one of which (the one which allegedly favoured them) had been
suppressed. This, Castle determined, was untrue and she convinced the
women of it. Even so, to encourage an early return to work, the plant
manager offered to reduce differentials between male and female
workers on the machinists’ grade. Ford had actually mooted this during
negotiations but the unions rejected it because it entailed women under-
taking shift work. As this could be squared with the government’s prices
and incomes legislation and would not force the collapse of the plant
scheme, Castle approved the proposal, the women accepted it and the
dispute ended.
The First Secretary was disappointed by the contribution of union
representatives during the dispute. In her view some militants – par-
ticularly those associated with the engineering union – indulged in
‘deliberate mischief ’. Although they were ostensibly acting in support
of equal pay, they appeared only to want to undermine delicate wage
agreements. Her low view of the unions was confirmed by another dis-
pute, during the autumn of 1968. Engineering employers had agreed
with unions led by Hugh Scanlon that male skilled workers should have
their pay increased to £19 a week, even though Scanlon knew that
women employees – already at the bottom of the industry’s pay scale –
would remain on just £13. Thus differentials between men and women
would increase. Scanlon was denounced by a female member of his own
negotiating team. As a result, he went back to the employers to demand
more for women, only to be told no money was left. With a national
strike in the offing, Castle became involved and persuaded the em-
ployers to announce that, while they were willing to increase their offer
to women workers, this could be done only if they reduced what had
been put on the table for skilled men. Faced with the choice of reducing
or increasing differentials, Scanlon accepted the original offer. Castle
commented that, after this, she knew ‘left to themselves the unions
would never do anything serious about equal pay’: government had to
legislate.
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In June the same year, Castle had wrung an important concession
out of an embattled Chancellor of the Exchequer. Roy Jenkins faced
defeat over an amendment to his Prices and Incomes Bill that had been
tabled by Labour MPs led by Lena Jeger. This stipulated that settle-
ments that included moves towards equal pay should be exempted from
the provisions of the Bill. Jenkins feared this would undermine attempts
to keep down wages, as any union worth its salt would exploit the
loophole. Castle suggested that if he allowed her to announce that the
government would implement statutory equal pay by 1975, the wind
would be taken out of Jeger’s sails without any immediate cost to the
country. Grabbing hold of this lifeline, Jenkins agreed and his Bill was
passed without the offending amendment.
While claiming the unions could not be trusted to win equal pay,
Castle used the threat of industrial militancy to persuade ministerial
sceptics that legislation was necessary. Certainly, DEP civil servants were
unclear how they should present her case. According to one brief,
Castle’s initiative was meant to ‘contain’ union pressure for equal pay,
while another indicated it was simply designed to ‘make progress’ to
equal pay and made no mention of union pressure.104 Even so, when
Castle met the CBI to call an end to the talks initiated by Gunter over
two years before, she waxed lyrical about the ‘mounting pressure’ for
equal pay. It was, she claimed, to ensure that ‘orderly progress’ could
be made towards what Castle identified as an inevitable end that action
was now required.105 When, in July 1969, Jenkins tried wriggle out of
his earlier commitment and prevent the inclusion of equal pay in the
Queen’s Speech, she again cited militancy as an important influence on
legislation. Castle told Cabinet they ‘had run out of delaying excuses …
there would be a move to equal pay anyhow and it was far better that
we should control it and get credit for it’. Giving legislation legal force
only in 1975 was the ‘maximum we could get away with’. More omin-
ously, not to take a lead would mean trouble with the unions and the
party: given the government’s increasingly frosty relations with both,
this argument could no longer be neutralised by the Treasury’s line that
equal pay was too expensive.106
A very quiet revolution
When finally debated in the Commons, equal pay had no enemies who
were prepared to speak. Despite employers’ hostility, the Conservatives
decided not to oppose the measure, their own research having revealed
that the majority of men and women supported it.107 On the Labour
side only Renee Short complained about how long it would take for
equal pay to become a statutory requirement. Apart from that, even she
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was complimentary: the Bill was, Short said, an ‘important landmark in
women’s emancipation’. Perhaps because of this lack of opposition, as
the former minister Fred Lee noted, the Bill went through ‘practically
without a ripple’ in the press. On its third and final reading the
chamber was almost empty.108
If the introduction of equal pay provoked little open hostility, it
generated only a grudging welcome. The NLWAC was ‘not completely
satisfied’ with Castle’s Bill, while the First Secretary was frustrated by
the lifeless nature of the women’s conference debate on the matter, even
though it had just become law. She was more than a little annoyed by
the response of fellow Labour women and tartly commented that it was
‘another example of how our movement is so schooled in protest that it
doesn’t know how to celebrate victory’. This downbeat reaction was
possibly due to the fact that, as Castle’s deputy Harold Walked noted,
the Bill marked only the ‘end of the beginning’ while, as she conceded,
it was a ‘long overdue piece of justice’.109
The final Act certainly left many issues unresolved and Castle was
well aware of its limitations. It did not address women’s unequal access
to certain jobs and particular forms of training; on such matters the
First Secretary admitted women would have to keep on pressing min-
isters.110 With further progress on that front in mind, as the Bill reached
its last stage, Castle asked DEP officials to investigate the possibility of
legislating against discrimination in employment and training. True to
form, her civil servants opposed an early initiative, owing to its apparent
complexity.111 Castle knew some would be disappointed that provision
for equal pensions was also excluded from the legislation. She did her
best, but had backed down in the face of the opposition of the Secretary
of State for Social Security, Richard Crossman. Castle nonetheless kept
options open by including in her Bill powers to deal with the matter
sometime in the future.112 Finally, she had wanted to abolish restrictions
on the hours women could work, but considered the unions would
oppose proposals of that sort. Castle meant to pursue this after equal
pay had become a reality.113
Echoing the voluntaristic emphasis noted earlier, Castle stated that
equal pay legislation would have a profound effect on society only if
women’s attitudes also changed. In particular, more should join a union,
as they ‘had no right to expect the full fruits of the Bill unless they
bestirred themselves to assert their rights and to organise’. She was,
Castle claimed, merely providing them with a legal framework, ‘not a
system of spoonfeeding’, and so they ‘must not leave it all to the
Government’. Even Short believed the Bill would have come sooner
had women workers been more militant; the problem was, she conceded,
that not all women appeared to want equality.114 As the NLWAC noted
in 1968, many preferred ‘a certain level of protection and discrimination,
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to an insecure freedom’, such that opposition to divorce law reform, for
example, was ‘based less on an objection to easier divorce than on a
concern for the social security of the wife divorced against her will’.115
Castle did not think the required change of attitude would come
overnight. In particular, she believed women’s lack of training was due
less to problems of access and more to a ‘fundamental problem of atti-
tudes, including the attitude of women and girls themselves, of parents
and others concerned with their career guidance and employment’.
While something could be done about this through education, and the
DEP itself was trying to change attitudes, ‘we must expect that married
women … will continue to put family and home first and the job second;
and what is more that society will expect this of them’. We have, she
suggested, ‘a long way to go to gain full public acceptance of the economic
and social advantages of a workforce without divisions in responsibility
and skill based on sex’.116
Conclusion
Given the detrimental influence the unions are thought to have had on
Labour’s attempt to appeal to women, it is ironic that the threat of
industrial militancy helped Castle achieve equal pay. The critical role
played by Castle in this process only adds to the paradox, for she had
long avoided identifying with Labour’s female wing, fearing, like fellow
MP Jennie Lee, that would impede her advance in the wider party.117 In
fact, the introduction of equal pay legislation owed little to Labour
women: the NLWAC was consulted only after the Bill was drafted and
then the CWO was given just time enough to respond in a personal
capacity.118 If ineffectual in influencing policy, Labour’s women’s organ-
isation was, as we have seen, no more proficient in boosting female
party membership or support at the ballot box.
This chapter illustrates how far the contradictory impulses set in
train by affluence were reflected in Labour’s ranks. The party’s female
activists, who were mainly taken from an older generation of working-
class housewives, could be severely critical of those young enough to be
their daughters – and sometimes granddaughters. Few were prepared
to change their ways to pander to those they thought should listen to
counsel offered by older and wiser heads. While such activists looked
on husbands and wives as partners, with the latter rightly performing a
mainly nurturing role, they agreed the nature of this relationship
should be more egalitarian and they supported equal pay. That it was
only in the Wilson governments’ final months that this latter matter
was definitively addressed suggests that not everybody in the party –
Ray Gunter and the unions in particular – looked on the subject with
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the same kind of seriousness exhibited by women’s conference dele-
gates. Indeed, the delayed enactment of equal pay was seen as further
evidence of the party’s lack of regard for women’s interests. Yet, as the
concluding chapter suggests, the response of female voters at the 1970
general election indicates that the promise of an equal wage with men
was not as high on most women voters’ lists of priorities as some of the
country’s few feminists wished.
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Integrating black immigrants
When in 1961 the Conservatives introduced a Bill to reduce the number
of black members of the Commonwealth settling in Britain, Hugh
Gaitskell attacked them with impressive moral force.1 Their proposals
contradicted Labour’s adherence to both the free movement of British
subjects within the Commonwealth and, more importantly, its commit-
ment to racial equality. Conventional wisdom has it that after Gaitskell’s
death Labour abandoned his principled position because it alienated
prejudiced white working-class voters. Hence, in 1965 Harold Wilson’s
government further tightened controls and in 1968 it prevented large
numbers of Kenyan Asians entering the country. While two Race Relations
Acts, meant to discourage discrimination based on colour, accompanied
these measures, most authorities consider them palliatives, drafted to
salve Labour’s troubled conscience as ministers adhered to an essentially
racist immigration policy.2
While in 1960 their party formally embraced a universal ‘brother-
hood’, something the 1964–70 governments supposedly betrayed, many
working-class activists nonetheless followed majority white opinion in
their suspicion of black immigrants. For them, restricting black entry
contradicted no principle because, so far as they were concerned, Labour’s
compelling purpose was to defend the material interests of the indigen-
ous (and implicitly white) proletariat – that is, people like themselves.
Given that immigration appeared to threaten workers’ access to housing
and jobs, the obvious solution seemed to be to reduce the numbers of
black people entering the country, especially as (their Commonwealth
status notwithstanding) they did not form part of the ‘British way of
life’. As suggested in Chapter 1, this outlook was informed by a historically
entrenched colour prejudice, for white immigrants far outnumbered
black immigrants, but it would be simplistic to describe it as racist.
Numerous surveys suggested that much white antipathy was con-
ditional; those in the party who took its commitment to brotherhood
seriously dearly hoped that this was true. Thus, a regular columnist in
Socialist Commentary argued it was not immigrants’ colour that antagonised
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many Britons as much as their customs – although the customs of black
immigrants would be more readily obvious as a result of skin colour.3
This implied that most whites could be educated out of their malign
perceptions. However, before whites could be encouraged to look on
blacks in a more positive light, the leadership came to believe govern-
ment had to stem immigration to reassure them that neither their standard
of living nor their established way of life was imperilled. At the same
time, the new settlers needed to be encouraged to accept much of their
hosts’ culture – although quite how much was subject to debate. By the
time Labour entered office in 1964, the leadership therefore considered
that, as famously articulated by the MP Roy Hattersley: ‘Integration
without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefen-
sible’.4 In this way, Wilson and colleagues hoped to square the party’s
adherence to equality with the fact that many of their own members and
potential supporters saw black immigration as a threat.
This chapter assesses Labour’s byzantine response to the issue. Many
members thought the growing presence of black immigrants in Britain’s
towns and cities was problematic. Moreover, the presumed dire electoral
implications of rising numbers of black people encouraged party leaders
to support controls to appease prejudice. However, consistent with
Labour’s commitment to equality, ministers also promoted measures
that challenged white opinion, while some activists and officials enthu-
siastically advanced the policy of integration. Overall, however, black
immigration was an issue Labour was ill prepared to address and one
many wished would disappear as quickly as possible. As one of the party’s
few non-white activists rightly stated, the arrival of thousands of West
Indians, Pakistanis and Indians provoked ‘an all pervasive sense of em-
barrassment’ in its ranks.5
Colour and the Commonwealth
During a 1948 Labour Party annual conference debate on racial dis-
crimination, one delegate asked: if socialism ‘does not mean that
common men can live together decently and live together as brothers,
I ask you what does it mean?’6 Before the 1950s, however, practical
expressions of the party’s commitment to racial equality were largely
confined to support for anti-colonialism, an issue that preoccupied a
minority of activists throughout the post-war period.7 Thus, in 1960 the
National Executive Committee (NEC) supported a boycott of South
African goods to protest against apartheid. Some constituency Labour
parties (CLPs) took this campaign seriously: even in cash-strapped
Glasgow Maryhill activists distributed 4,000 bills, held public meetings
and hired a van to tour the city.8
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The growth of black immigration meant that, during the 1950s,
racial equality became more of a domestic issue and in 1953 activists in
Brixton, an area of early West Indian settlement, established a com-
mittee to combat discrimination.9 Throughout the decade, other CLPs
expressed opposition to colour prejudice, while the NEC’s Commonwealth
Sub-committee supported attempts to make certain manifestations of
prejudice illegal.10 During 1957–8, 94 per cent of ward secretaries in
Manchester opposed discrimination based on colour.11 This commit-
ment was confirmed in 1960, when, as a consequence of Gaitskell’s
updating of the party’s aims, Labour declared its ‘central ideal’ to be
‘the brotherhood of man’; underlined its opposition to ‘discrimination
on grounds of race, colour or creed’; and stated its adherence to the
belief that ‘men should accord to one another equal consideration and
status in recognition of the fundamental dignity of man’.12 So far as
Gaitskell was concerned, racial equality was a principle like no other. As
he told a BBC television interviewer in November 1959:
If you were to say to me, ‘Really we’ve got to accept the colour bar,
because you’ll never get into power if you don’t’, I should say, ‘Well,
in not very polite language, Go to hell … that’s absolutely against
my principles.… But if you say to me ‘I think your argument for
nationalising the machine tool industry is rather weak’, I would say,
‘Well, I’ll discuss that with you’.13
Wilson appeared to be of like mind. Within minutes of telling the 1962
conference that Labour was ‘a moral crusade or it is nothing’, he asserted
that to ‘attack a man because of his race, or because of his colour’ was
‘utterly repugnant to every Socialist’.14
For many, colour differences obscured that which united all human
beings. As the Cabinet minister Judith Hart put it, everybody should
‘recognise and admit their own humanity and decency – which tells
them that a child is a child, a man is a man’, so that ‘whatever his colour
may be, he is one of them, sharing the same fears and the same hopes
for a better society and a better life’.15 While she was on the left, Hart’s
perspective was the same as that of the revisionist Roy Jenkins: when he
was Home Secretary, Jenkins claimed there was ‘no overall rational basis
for resentment’ of black immigration, something he believed originated
in ‘personal inadequacy’, ‘fear and ignorance’.16 While not discounting
the psychological element, others on the left, like the MP Ian Mikardo,
stressed the influence of material deprivation on attitudes. Mikardo
thought most whites objected to black settlement because they had to
compete for scarce resources: once there were enough jobs and houses,
hostility would largely disappear.17 This perspective was also embraced
by more right-wing figures: deputy leader George Brown criticised Con-
servative restrictions for not addressing the ‘real problems’ associated
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with immigration, by which he meant the lack of resources in areas of
black settlement.18
To some, the Commonwealth was the most tangible expression of
Britain’s commitment to racial harmony; Labour’s 1959 manifesto even
claimed Attlee’s creation of the Commonwealth was his ‘supreme
achievement’.19 As the NEC reaffirmed after the 1958 Notting Hill riots,
the Commonwealth was ‘the greatest multi-racial association the world
has ever known’, which enjoyed a ‘unique opportunity to create racial
understanding, confidence, and co-operation’. Thus, as Britain lay at
the heart of the Commonwealth, it was imperative all its citizens be
able to enter the country freely: attempts to restrict movement on a
racial basis would destroy it.20 Indeed, it was partly because he believed
in the progressive possibilities of the Commonwealth that Gaitskell
turned his back on Britain’s entry into the European Economic Com-
munity.21 If Wilson’s later application to join the Community indicated
that, by the end of the 1960s, the leadership no longer thought the
Commonwealth able to play a decisive international role, others con-
sidered it could still exert a useful influence. The NEC’s 1968 Study
Group on Immigration discussed establishing a multilateral policy for
migration within the Commonwealth, based on the needs of member
states. By co-ordinating population flows on a non-discriminatory basis,
they hoped it might yet set an important example to the world.22
‘First contact’
Attlee’s Cabinet did not believe its 1948 Nationality Act would encour-
age black immigration; if they had, ministers may well have had second
thoughts.23 While fearing that large numbers of unskilled black settlers
would disrupt society, they thought those who came to Britain on the
Empire Windrush in 1948 were just straws in the wind. Having considered
controls, ministers dismissed them as unnecessary.
The early 1950s nonetheless saw increasing numbers of blacks arrive
in Britain, particularly London. Labour officials in the capital gave every
impression of wishing the immigrants would go away, while they did
their best to calm white fears. An article in Labour’s London News en-
titled ‘Coloured Folk Prove Law-Abiding’ claimed there were fewer West
Indians than there might superficially appear to be: poor housing meant
they spent much of their time on the streets, giving the impression of
greater numbers. White readers were presumably meant to draw com-
fort from the assertion that most wanted to return home eventually.24
Other than to issue reassuring statements, there did not appear much
else Labour could do. When the London party investigated the ‘problem
of coloured people’ in the middle of the decade, it ran through various
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possible solutions but rejected them all. Controls were considered
‘repugnant’, while dictating immigrants’ place of settlement once they
had arrived in Britain – so as to alleviate pressure on local resources –
was thought discriminatory unless also applied to whites. The only
answer appeared to be the creation of a prosperous West Indies, for
there would then be no reason to emigrate, a viewpoint later endorsed
by the NEC.25
By the late 1950s it was, however, apparent that most immigrants
would not be returning home, as the economic development of the
Commonwealth was at best a long-term project. Attention was conse-
quently increasingly focused on the position of black settlers in Britain’s
cities and during 1957 Labour’s Commonwealth Officer contacted CLPs
in areas with large immigrant populations to assess the situation. His
researches revealed a complex and difficult situation.26 Some parties
noted the hostility of ‘the more backward section’ of the working class,
a category that included some Labour members. A few CLPs, such as
South Paddington, reported their attempts to tackle prejudice by
challenging instances of discrimination in pubs, clubs and dance halls.
Elsewhere, however, immigrants were criticised for finding trouble
where none existed.
By this time, white tenants were inundating parties in the capital
with complaints that black landlords were driving them out of their
homes and replacing them with immigrants who were prepared to live
in overcrowded conditions for higher rents. David Pitt, Labour’s West
Indian-born parliamentary candidate for Hampstead in 1959, believed
critics of black landlords were prejudiced, as they did not attack their
white counterparts with the same vigour.27 While the issue was used to
legitimise a racist viewpoint, even CLPs with exemplary records opposing
prejudice believed most complaints were justified. This is not necess-
arily evidence of their own racism: the secretary of Islington North CLP
herself experienced ‘coloured Landlord trouble’ but claimed that did
not mean she thought badly of all immigrants.28 Yet, no matter how far
prejudice distorted reality, activists were faced with a thorny dilemma.
The secretary of Vauxhall CLP in south London warned that Labour
members could no longer:
blind ourselves to the fact that the present housing conditions, differ-
ence of standards and fear of possible unemployment are bound to
have some effect. It is because we are so anxious to avoid this that we
feel that a more realistic attitude should be adopted to what is un-
doubtedly becoming an increasing problem, and that not only should
sympathy and understanding be extended to black immigrants, but
attention should be paid to the natural reactions of working-class
white people under present circumstances. Failure to realise this may
have the very results which we, as Socialists, are so anxious to avoid.29
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An uncertain principle
Gaitskell’s forceful condemnation of the Commonwealth Immigration
Bill appeared to be enthusiastically supported by the wider party, in
particular by left-inclined CLPs that had hitherto been critical of his
leadership. It has even been suggested that Gaitskell opposed the Con-
servatives with such vigour to restore unity to ranks recently divided
over clause four and nuclear disarmament.30
If Labour’s adherence to unrestricted immigration pleased some, it
did not, however, enjoy universal support. After leaving office in 1951,
the party leadership steered well clear of discussing controls, but more
humble members did raise the issue. The Sheffield MP John Hynd was
one of the more prominent advocates of regulated entry. Assuming the
rural background of most black immigrants meant they were unsuited
to industrial work, he suggested prospective settlers should be advised
about what awaited them in Britain, in the hope that this would dis-
courage most.31 Although they expressed sympathy for the immigrants’
plight, a number of London MPs and councillors still advocated controls,
in order to take account of the anxieties of ‘our own people’ in relation
to housing.32 Economic slowdowns were often the occasion for CLPs to
call for regulation.33 Even in Rawtenstall, Lancashire, where immigra-
tion was insignificant, local trade unionists considered that, during a
time of rising unemployment, it was wrong ‘that these people should be
allowed to come into the country without let or hindrance’. The reply to
this from the local MP and leading left-wing parliamentarian, Anthony
Greenwood, was equivocal at best. Given Britain’s place at the head of
the Commonwealth, he felt restrictions were inappropriate but con-
ceded black immigration was ‘one of the most difficult problems that
we have to face’, given difficulties associated with employment, health
and ‘social relationships’.34
While the NEC reaffirmed Labour’s support for unrestricted entry
after the 1958 riots in London and Nottingham, reactions to the disturb-
ances showed how far members disagreed over the best response. MPs
George Rogers and James Harrison, who respectively represented the
areas concerned, called for controls – along with a variety of other
measures meant to protect the ‘British way of life’.35 Rogers enjoyed his
executive committee’s support, as its members believed racial tension
originated from immigrants aggravating local housing shortages.
Hence, it advocated a ‘wider dispersal of incomers’ to ease the pressure;
failing that, there should be a ‘slowing down of the flow of immi-
grants’.36 The wider North Kensington party was, however, divided and
advocates of unrestricted entry refused to work for Rogers in the 1959
general election.37 Yet support for ‘dispersal’ stretched much further
than North Kensington. If earlier dismissed by the London party, Socialist
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Commentary and Pitt advanced it even while opposing controls.38 In fact,
as late as 1967, the left-inclined Selly Oak general management commit-
tee (GMC) proposed dispersing Birmingham’s immigrant population
across the city as part of its programme to reduce discrimination.39
Behind Gaitskell, therefore, stood a party anything but united against
controls; and while there were many reasons for this difference of
opinion, one in particular stands out. As the 1961 Immigration Bill was
debated in Westminster, two-thirds of GMC delegates in London’s
working-class dockside constituency of Bermondsey came out in support
of restriction. In contrast, activists in the capital’s more middle-class
CLPs, such as South Kensington and Fulham, opposed the measure in
similar proportions.40 This does not necessarily mean proletarian
activists were more likely to be racist, but it does point to the possible
significance of more conditional – material – factors. After Notting Hill,
members of the GMC in well heeled St Marylebone declared they were
prepared to ‘undergo temporary hardship’ to ensure blacks enjoyed
equal access to housing, employment and welfare. It was unclear what
‘hardship’ meant to a party counting Lord and Lady Lucan as activists.41
Moreover, if ensuring racial equality was a question of whites foregoing
material comfort for the benefit of others, less well placed Labour
members believed that imperilled working-class interests. As remarked
by a leading Labour council representative in Deptford, where by the
mid-1960s just under 10 per cent of the population was black, ‘[i]mmi-
gration has dragged us back twenty years … it’s all right to talk about
brotherhood of man, but our first job is to defend the gains we fought
for here’.42 Similarly, the labour movement, Nottingham North MP
James Harrison stated, ‘had fought for years for better conditions for
the working class’ and he was determined not to allow those he asserted
had ‘lower standards of housing and wages’ to undermine them.43 Finally,
George Pargiter, MP for Southall, where Indian settlers accounted for
about 10 per cent of residents in the early 1960s, called for a ban on
immigration – to his constituency at least – and claimed that, in the
first instance, ‘we are entitled to look after our own people’.44
Integration
It was already something of a cliché in London Labour circles when,
after Notting Hill, Pitt declared that the only way to avoid further
tension was the ‘full integration of Negroes into our life’.45 Even so,
although ‘integration’ became national policy in 1962, it remained
uncertain what, in practice, the term implied. In 1965 the immigration
specialist Nicholas Deakin tried to clarify the matter for Socialist
Commentary readers. Integration, he stated, was a reciprocal process in
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which immigrants adapted to the receiving society; the majority, in turn,
should tolerate ‘certain distinct persistent religious and cultural patterns’
and not expect settlers totally to abandon their way of life, as that would
amount to ‘assimilation’.46 Deakin’s definition still left matters open to
dispute, for the balance of any agreement between host and immigrant
was not prescribed. Moreover, when referring to ‘integration’ many
Labour members continued to mean ‘assimilation’ or, at least, as Socialist
Commentary had put it some years before Deakin’s piece, that newcomers
should discard practices that ‘disturb the English community’.47 That
this was a widespread view was confirmed by a 1968 survey of local
representatives in Nottingham, which found that the overwhelming
majority of Labour councillors (like their Conservative counterparts)
thought integration a homogenising process in which immigrants would
fully adhere to the ‘British way of life’.48 It is impossible to be sure how
many believed colour rather than culture defined this way of life. That
it could be conceived of in purely cultural terms was suggested by the
West Indian Pitt’s reference to ‘our life’. Yet even those keen to promote
a positive response to blacks betrayed their obsession with colour. A
London News article intended to promote Pitt’s candidature in Hamp-
stead went so far as to describe him as ‘this whitest of black men’ and a
‘unique combination of red and black’, whose face was difficult to see in
the dark.49
According to its 1962 formulation, Labour believed integration was
a reciprocal process that encompassed: educating whites about the
Commonwealth and the realities of immigration; outlawing discrimin-
ation against blacks in public places; and alleviating competition for
housing in areas of greatest settlement.50 It also emphasised voluntary
initiatives – like Willesden’s International Friendship Council – that
encouraged communication between black and white, and hoped the
latter would accept the former as ‘ordinary neighbours, work-mates and
friends’. If whites were presumed to have things to learn, immigrants
apparently had most to come to terms with, for they should not only be
advised about access to housing and employment but also taught about
the British way of life and urged not to indulge in activities, like holding
noisy parties, that might antagonise white neighbours.
As a member of the NEC, Wilson urged conference delegates in 1962
to take integration seriously. Transport House expected CLPs to play a
vital role by: helping immigrants get on the electoral roll; taking up
cases of discrimination; promoting contact between black and white;
and increasing the number of black members.51 Some had pursued
these activities from the earliest days of immigration, although their
record was not encouraging. In 1953 Brixton CLP expressed its desire
to welcome West Indian settlers by establishing a colour sub-committee,
one of whose members was supposed to be an immigrant. Unfortunately,
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no such person was found and the initiative ran into the ground, so
that as late as 1964 Brixton could claim only twenty black members.52 If
in Brixton Labour appeared to meet with immigrants’ indifference,
elsewhere the problem lay in the party’s own ranks. In Coventry, during
the late 1950s, officials encouraged the participation of Indian residents
in the party. The borough secretary wrote to the President of the Indian
Workers’ Association (IWA), which was already affiliated to the party
locally, to encourage him to send representatives to meetings. When
one subsequently arrived, a white delegate made ‘unfortunate personal
remarks’, for which the secretary apologised and indicated that the dele-
gate had ‘upset us probably infinitely more than yourself ’.53
So few blacks belonged to parties in London in the late 1950s that
Jim Raisin, Labour’s organiser in the capital, made the fairly desperate
proposal that, as West Indian men outnumbered women, CLPs should
encourage the latter to join as a ruse to increase the formers’ participa-
tion.54 After Notting Hill, the party in London devoted more systematic
thought to the subject and suggested CLPs should enrol a small number
of immigrants to liaise with their peers. While conceding this meant
‘recognising that coloured people are “different”’, officials hoped the
policy would be a temporary expedient that would merely hasten the
time when immigrants could enter the party on the same basis as
whites.55 This approach was eventually adopted across the country and
was thought especially helpful in the case of Asian immigrants, who
often had poor English language skills.56 Despite the good intentions,
this tactic had the effect of keeping white activists apart from black
voters and putting black members at some distance from white voters.
This was, however, not always the case: in Dulwich pairs of black and
white activists approached immigrant and non-immigrant alike.57
As the Coventry episode indicates, not all members favoured inte-
gration: that some held a ‘very deep prejudice’ against immigrants was
reluctantly recognised.58 During the early 1960s, the Bradford East CLP
suffered a rapid fall in membership and, while numerous expedients
were employed to reverse the decline, no attempt was made to recruit
from the expanding Pakistani population, which accounted for nearly
12 per cent of the population by 1966. Indeed, when one immigrant
asked to join he was accepted only after the CLP won a community
leader’s assurance that his application would not be the first of many.59
The reasoning behind such hostility was revealed by one account of
attitudes in an unnamed city with a large Asian population. There an
activist recalled that, in the early 1960s, a few Indians had joined the
CLP, but ‘when they started coming to meetings they wanted to talk
about Indian affairs, and a lot of our members walked out … they said
“If they’re coming, we’re going. It’s bad enough living with them next
door, we don’t want them here as well”’. Despite this, members welcomed
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the services of an intermediary, in this case an anglicised Indian doctor,
as he promised to mobilise immigrants without making members suffer
the discomfort of having Indians attend gatherings.60 Thus, what was
meant to be the first step towards integration was employed as a means of
avoiding that very end. A similar situation was evident in the Birming-
ham constituency of Sparkbrook, whose combined West Indian and
Asian population amounted to about 8 per cent of residents by the early
1960s. Despite this, Labour membership was almost wholly white, in
fact largely Irish in origin. While discrimination was not overtly prac-
tised, it was clear immigrants were unwelcome, although during the
1964 campaign intermediaries were used to rally black Labour voters.61
As might be expected, the national picture was uneven. In accord-
ance with Labour policy, in 1965 members in Flint East, north Wales,
took up the case of a man of West Indian descent who had been pre-
vented from buying a house on a new estate because the developer
feared he would deter white clients.62 Activists organised a meeting on
the ‘colour question’, which their agent hoped would ‘help both sides
face the issues realistically’. Such faith in the power of fact was revealing,
as was how the local MP Eirene White described the thwarted house
purchaser. He was, she pointed out, a second-generation West Indian
who had served in the Royal Navy, was married to an English woman
and employed in skilled work. In other words, apart from being black,
he adhered to conventional notions of the ‘British way of life’ and was
just like any other respectable member of the community. Labour’s
willingness to advance his case may also have been due to the fact that
immigration was insignificant in the constituency: together with the
victim’s background, this meant few locals considered their own way of
life under threat.
In London, matters were much more contentious. In response to
Rogers’ support for the deportation of some disreputable blacks, alderman
Nat Marock, leader of Lambeth Borough Council, claimed that the West
Indian population was in fact ‘clean, sober and industrious’. They were
not much different in behaviour to the rest of the community and any
peculiar habits, traditions, ways of eating or cooking were, he asserted,
very much their own business.63 Rogers nonetheless claimed some settlers
were ‘bad types’ and were associated with all-night parties, prostitution
and exploitative landlords: they deserved to be deported.64 If Rogers
claimed to judge immigrants on the basis of behaviour rather than colour,
Marock clearly considered this a fine – even non-existent – distinction.
Similar divisions were exposed during the early 1960s in Southall,
where activists were at odds over how to respond to Indian settlement.
At a disputatious meeting held to discuss the issue, most municipal
representatives complained there were too many immigrants locally.
One even suggested that Indians threatened to ‘colonise’ some areas. If
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most agreed the pressure of numbers on housing was a key issue,
immigrants’ behaviour also seemed critical to some. According to one
representative, their ‘immorality’ was striking, while another thought
religious differences meant it would be impossible to educate them into
‘our way of life’. Others disagreed and claimed religion irrelevant. In
May 1963 John Millwood, of Transport House’s Research Department,
explained Labour policy to a largely irate audience; he presented it in
a manner presumably meant to appease them. The purpose of inte-
gration, he assured the audience, was to ‘fit these coloured people in,
and to [get them] living up to the standards of our way of life’. This was
certainly the view of Southall’s MP: George Pargiter believed Sikhs
should abandon their turbans and dietary laws, for only then might
they be ‘absorbed into our way of life’. He even declared they had to
‘conform to our ways and standards, if they wish[ed] to be treated as
part of the community’.65
The road to restriction
Despite Gaitskell’s support for unrestricted Commonwealth immigra-
tion, controls proved extremely popular with the public. By the time
the Commonwealth Immigration Act received royal assent in 1962, even
the Labour leader recognised the electoral need to embrace some form
of limitation. Moreover, as we have seen, so far as the wider party was
concerned, Gaitskell’s original position was something of an aberration.
Given the state of voter opinion, Labour officials had long thought
that allowing immigration to become a topic of open debate – which in
1961–2 it most certainly was – could only help those wishing to profit
from prejudice. When the Fascist Oswald Mosley proposed standing in
North Kensington in 1959, Raisin believed it best to ignore him.66 If
some activists wanted to affirm their opposition to discrimination, those
in places such as Bradford were less distressed; as one councillor there
suggested, ‘[t]he least said about the issue the better’.67 The extent of
popular bigotry meant many in the party feared that if immigration
became a point of open contention between the parties, Labour could
only lose. Grass-roots Conservatives were, after all, not shy of exploiting
the issue.68 Fenner Brockway believed he nearly lost Eton and Slough in
1959 because opposing canvassers claimed he was responsible for bring-
ing immigrants into the constituency. Some thought Labour in Brixton
suffered a huge swing to their opponents after a Conservative whisper-
ing campaign alleged the local MP, Marcus Lipton, gave immigrants
special help to secure housing.69
Some survey evidence indicates that, in the 1964 general election,
immigration made little impact nationally on voter loyalties, which
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suggests that Labour’s embrace of controls had eliminated it as a con-
tentious issue.70 Local perceptions were rather different. If party policy
had changed, Labour leaders were too embarrassed to draw voters’ atten-
tion to it, a reluctance that frustrated those fighting marginal seats. In
Dulwich, the agent claimed large numbers of long-standing supporters
were considering voting Conservative in the belief that only they advo-
cated limitation.71 The Conservatives certainly thought Labour remained
vulnerable on the issue, especially in the West Midlands.72 Smethwick,
near Birmingham, gave that view credibility, as Patrick Gordon Walker
lost the seat after a swing to the Conservatives of 7.2 per cent – com-
pared with a national movement to Labour of 3.5 per cent. Few doubted
the Conservative candidate, Peter Griffiths, had exploited hostility to
the local Asian population: Wilson was so disgusted by the tenor of his
campaign he described Griffiths as a ‘Parliamentary leper’.73 Many
Labour members shared his anger, but one Tribune correspondent, who
claimed to be an activist from nearby Walsall, defended Griffiths against
charges of racism. Arguing that one could be a socialist and oppose
black immigration, he claimed the Conservative candidate made sense
to those living near immigrants’ ‘smell, noise and filth’.74 As a later
Leeds correspondent asserted of fellow members’ reaction to black
settlers, they did ‘not enjoy having anybody living next door who cannot
be understood and whose prejudices were not theirs’, ‘who themselves
tend to prefer their own kind of people, and are not as serviceable
neighbours as those who lived there before’.75
As the new Prime Minister wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury
after his attack on Griffiths, the ‘backlash’ against immigration, as evi-
denced by Smethwick, was too strong to ignore. Unless ‘dealt with head
on’, Wilson predicted, ‘I am afraid that it will foul our politics … for a
very considerable period of time’. He then outlined the need for legisla-
tion to outlaw racial intolerance and other efforts to promote integration
– but not to restrict immigration.76 In fact, most now believed some
form of further limitation had to be imposed to appease the public.
Wilson hoped that tightening up known means of evading the 1962 Act
would reduce the flow of immigrants without recourse to parliamentary
action.77 His Home Secretary, Sir Frank Soskice, however, argued the
Act still allowed what voters would consider too many to enter Britain
legitimately. Initially looking on dispersal with favour, Soskice none-
theless knew of no legal means to prevent new immigrants living in
areas of established settlement. Thus, appreciating most Cabinet col-
leagues would be ‘understandably very uneasy about my proposals’, he
thought there was no alternative to the ‘extremely invidious’ introduc-
tion of further controls. To soften the blow, Soskice proposed a ‘package
deal’ that combined restriction with legislation to ensure those allowed
to enter the country were treated as ‘first and not second-class citizens’.
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The Cabinet accepted Soskice’s case with little enthusiasm. The Mid-
lands MP Richard Crossman, who believed restriction was the only way
to prevent further situations like that in Smethwick, described the meet-
ing that finalised the details of the Home Secretary’s proposals as ‘desultory
[and] unhappy’.78 Yet, by this point, even Reginald Sorenson, who as an
MP during the 1950s had drafted anti-discrimination legislation and
considered colour prejudice ‘the most inane and scientifically baseless
of all our traditional aversions’, thought the case against more controls
was fuelled by ‘intoxicated idealism’.79 In contrast, H. A. Alavi, a Pakistani
Labour activist, believed that as restriction pandered to racism it would
merely promote its growth.80 Yet even some who argued that Labour
should stand firm in the hope this would eventually overcome white
prejudice accepted the party would lose votes in the short term.81
Promoting integration
In March 1965 Wilson informed the Commons that, while his govern-
ment planned to reduce immigration, it would also take steps to ensure
that once they were in the country new settlers were treated as full
citizens. He proposed legislating to prohibit incitement to racial hatred
but placed most emphasis on encouraging conciliation through a Race
Relations Board.82 Wilson also announced that Maurice Foley, a junior
minister at the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), would promote
activities to advance integration.
Foley based his work on the proposition that Britain was already a
‘multi-racial society’ and, as immigrants and their children had already
established roots, it was ‘no use pretending they will go back’.83 Recog-
nising prejudice was rife, he believed only a small minority of whites
were ‘strongly prejudiced’, while many more were ‘slightly prejudiced’
or ‘simply suspicious of newcomers’, particularly if they competed for
scarce resources. Through government policy the latter group could be
pushed towards deeper hostility or greater acceptance. The problem
was not, however, all one way: Asian immigrants in particular were
‘introvert and cutting themselves off from the community’ and so had
to change their ways.84 Despite the dual nature of the problem, Foley
believed the main emphasis should be the education of immigrants in
‘our standards of hygiene and our social customs’, although he did not
want them to be forced to become ‘ersatz Englishmen’.85 If integration
granted immigrants rights it also gave them responsibilities, although
too often the latter were never explained. Consequently, Foley claimed
it was understandable if people uprooted from ‘rural primitive societies’
tipped rubbish out of bedroom windows because they had not been told
that the council collected refuse every week.
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Foley was a junior minister with a small staff trying to coordinate the
work of powerful ministries and local authorities that were, he com-
plained, largely uninterested in his work.86 He received no support from
the Home Office. Soskice might have devised the ‘package deal’ but
was reluctant to promote integration himself: that was why it became
the DEA’s responsibility. While committed to anti-discrimination legisla-
tion, Soskice wanted it to be of the narrowest possible scope and resisted
pressure from colleagues to look into prejudice in housing, as he con-
sidered that would force government into ‘difficult and controversial
matters’.87 This minimalist approach was not without support: Ray Gunter
at the Ministry of Labour believed legislation would ‘produce more diffi-
culties than it solves’.88 Thus, lacking Home Office backing, Foley could
only urge Gunter’s officials to inform employers ‘that in the sort of
multi-racial society that had come to stay … equality of opportunity in
matters of employment was in the national interest’.89 As a result, the
1965 Race Relations Act was criticised for what it did not do, although,
whatever its limitations, it did constitute the first legal challenge to
white prejudice – and that with Labour’s re-election in the offing.
Once Roy Jenkins became Home Secretary towards the end of 1965,
the tone of government policy became less mealy-mouthed. He ensured
integration became part of the Home Office remit by having Foley moved
from the DEA. Jenkins articulated a definition of integration that was
rather more positive than Foley’s by stressing not just the reality but
also the legitimacy of cultural diversity. He even talked of immigrants’
constructive contribution to British life, something Soskice never did.90
This shift of emphasis at the top was, however, not necessarily registered
at constituency level. In Bedford, for example, where during the later
1960s at least 4 per cent of the population were black, activists remained
divided.91 When one GMC delegate suggested that immigrants did not
receive their fair share of council housing, he was informed that if he
said that in public ‘there would not be one Labour Councillor left’, a
warning met with shouts of agreement. Even so, during a later debate,
some suggested whites should be more tolerant and immigrants might
even be able to teach the majority ‘good habits’. However, others thought
blacks needed to adhere fully to the dominant culture: as one delegate
put it, ‘he didn’t see why we should accept their ways as it was our
country’. Going further than everybody else, one speaker claimed:
we might just as well give the whole damn country to the Blacks as
they would get it in the end anyway. Before long we would have a
Black king on the throne and then it would be God help us! The
poor old white man might just as well emigrate and leave the place
to them … this Black menace had ruined our towns and forced the
whites out of them. The best thing we could do would be to send the
whole damn lot back to where they came from!
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A subsequent discussion revealed some GMC delegates even thought
rising unemployment was mainly due to this ‘black invasion’.
Oblivious to these sentiments, Jenkins wanted to extend the Race
Relations Act. One of his main concerns was to ensure the full integra-
tion of immigrants’ children, who, as Jenkins’ adviser Anthony Lester
informed the 1967 Labour Party conference, ‘will be as English as you
or I, as British as you or I, and the only difference will be the colour of
their skin’.92 Without action to tackle discrimination in employment and
housing, it was feared an alienated second generation would emerge,
one stuck in badly paid jobs and forced to remain in American-style
ghettoes. Civil strife would be the only result.93 By the time legislation
was ready, Jenkins had swapped jobs with the Chancellor, James
Callaghan, someone whom he considered a ‘reactionary’ on immigra-
tion.94 The new Home Secretary certainly thought some of the Bill’s
provisions would be difficult to enforce. Yet, in spite of his reputation,
Callaghan fought hard against colleagues who tried to exclude housing
from the Bill because of their fear of an adverse voter reaction.95
Equality at work
Apart from housing, the 1968 Race Relations Act broke new ground by
subjecting the workplace to anti-discriminatory legislation. Prejudice in
employment was a difficult issue for Labour, as it implicated many of its
union supporters. Foley hoped the unions would promote integration
by selecting immigrants as branch officials; the Birmingham borough
party had also exhorted local unions to ensure black school-leavers
suffered no prejudice in securing work.96 More often than not, however,
trade unionists appeared to be less the solution and more part of the
problem. Foley and others believed this was due to fears that immi-
grants would accept lower wages and so threaten white jobs.97 While
there was no hard evidence to prove immigration reduced labour
costs, Wilson’s economic adviser, Thomas Balogh, counselled the Prime
Minister against controls because he thought it did.98 True or not, during
the 1963 Deptford by-election Labour canvassers told voters that the
Conservative government had encouraged immigration during the
1950s for that very purpose.99
While discrimination at the workplace was widespread, many of the
most prominent examples which first came to light were located in
public transport. This was uncomfortable for activists because those
workforces found guilty of prejudice were all well unionised and often
administered by Labour councils.100 Particularly on the buses, it was
common for employees and managers jointly to restrict or even prohibit
the employment of blacks and occasionally ensure they were paid less
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than white workers. This contradicted Trades Union Congress (TUC)
policy, which in 1955 confirmed its opposition to ‘colour prejudice
wherever it may occur’.101 It is not clear how seriously TUC officials
took that pledge, but individual union leaderships were certainly reluctant
to confront instances in which their local representatives and members
were involved. In confronting racial inequality among workers, activists
then often stood alone. In 1958 Coventry Council’s controlling Labour
Group tried to tackle discrimination on the buses after it received com-
plaints from the IWA and met with the Transport and General Workers’
Union branch concerned. This resulted in an acrimonious encounter,
after which one unionist was described as ‘more national than Socialist’
(i.e. a Nazi) and the branch secretary threatened to withdraw support
for Labour if the Group pushed the matter further.102 Similar party–
union conflicts occurred elsewhere: in Bristol equality among bus
employees was achieved only after a personal intervention by Wilson.103
Although few denied the existence of workplace discrimination, Gunter
led the Ministry of Labour in opposing employment being subject to
legislation.104 The Ministry did not ignore prejudice, as much time was
spent encouraging managers to take on black workers – but officials
believed they could not force the issue.105 Yet they hardly showed much
sympathy to the immigrants’ plight: when Foley asked the Ministry to
explain why many blacks could not find work that matched their quali-
fications, he was told the problem was exaggerated and in most cases
blacks were themselves at fault.106 Gunter also claimed employers were
often only responding to their employees’ prejudices in rejecting black
workers, a view shared by Alice Bacon, one of Jenkins’ junior ministers.107
Indeed, a North Paddington Labour councillor had earlier maintained
he would have employed immigrants in his business but for the objec-
tions of white staff.108
Despite its formal position, along with the Confederation of British
Industry the TUC urged Jenkins not to make employment subject to his
Bill. Fred Hayday of the General and Municipal Workers’ Union believed
legislation would ‘prejudice the integration of immigrants’ by transform-
ing blacks into a ‘special class’. The Building Workers’ George Lowthian
thought it would create ‘a new kind of discrimination’ by effectively guaran-
teeing immigrants employment. The unions feared legislation would
make illegal workplace ‘quotas’, that is, informal agreements between
employees and managers to limit the number of black workers. Leading
unionists claimed quotas fostered integration by educating white workers
about immigrants without threatening their jobs. The Ministry of Labour
endorsed claims that too many blacks in one workplace would lead ex-
perienced whites to leave and generate discontent among those
remaining.109 As A. S. Jouhl of the IWA stated, even his organisation
initially aimed only to achieve a ‘fair proportion of white and other
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labour in factories’, and implied that a quota of a maximum 25 per cent
black workers in any one workplace was acceptable.110 Given the weight
of such opinion and the fact that the logic of arguments in favour of
quotas echoed that of Labour’s immigration policy in general, it was no
surprise that the new Act endorsed the concept of a ‘balance’ between
black and white employees. Even the MP Paul Rose, a critic of the limita-
tions of both the 1965 and 1968 Acts, thought this formula satisfactory –
so long as quotas were operated in good faith.111
Whatever its shortcomings, Labour’s second Race Relations Act was
welcomed by Socialist Commentary for further shifting government policy
from promoting conformity among black immigrants to challenging
white prejudice.112 So far as Jenkins’ advisers were concerned, the need
to face up to Britain’s ‘white problem’ was an important reason for the
Act.113 If, in Callaghan’s hands, the Act was slightly more conservative
than it might have been had Jenkins remained in control, this was because
the new Home Secretary wanted to secure the maximum possible agree-
ment and ensure change was permanent.114 It still provoked the hostility
of a substantial minority of whites: while opinion was split 53:36 per
cent in favour of the general principle of preventing discrimination in
housing and jobs, the balance shifted to 48:44 when the public was
specifically asked whether refusing to employ someone on the grounds
of colour should be made illegal; and became 44:45 when the question
turned to selling or renting accommodation.115
Kenyan Asians
Enoch Powell spent much of his ‘rivers of blood’ speech of April 1968
(see Chapter 1) attacking Callaghan’s proposals to regulate the housing
market and implied they proved blacks were being treated better than
whites. His rhetoric had the impact it did because, at the time, many
expected the imminent arrival of thousands of Kenyan Asians. When
Kenya became independent from Britain in 1963, those of Asian descent
could apply for citizenship of the new country or retain their British
status. Having been exempted from the 1962 Immigration Act, most
plumped for the latter.116 The implications of their choice became clear
during the autumn of 1967, when the Kenyan government’s ‘Africanis-
ation’ policy threatened thousands of ethnic Asians with expropriation
and forced them to flee the country. Jenkins calculated that 1.5 million
holders of British passports around the world were exempted from the
1962 Act and, while he accepted that few would want to settle in Britain,
200,000 East African Asians might be forced to do so. While there were
‘formidable’ legal objections to the imposition of restrictions, Jenkins
feared such an influx would inflame white attitudes. Thus, if immediate
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action was not thought necessary, he asked for a slot in the govern-
ment’s programme should the need arise for him quickly to introduce
legislation to curtail the Asians’ right of entry.117
Fortunately for Jenkins’ reputation as a liberal, when the rate of
immigration from Kenya continued to rise – prompting fevered press
speculation about the final number of immigrants – it fell to Callaghan
to deal with it. His solution was not to deny Kenyan Asians their right
to settle but to create a limit of 1,500 per year on their entry. Callaghan
was, in effect, creating a queue, ostensibly to protect domestic race rela-
tions by ensuring unbearable pressure was not placed on areas of
already high immigrant settlement. The main motive behind the legis-
lation was to prevent a white backlash. Few sitting round the Cabinet
table relished the policy but none put up much opposition. Even critics,
such as the Colonial Secretary, George Thomas, accepted that the flow
of Kenyan immigrants had to be reduced to ‘manageable proportions’
to ensure the success of integration. Thus, so as to close down the ability
of East African Asians to enter the country at will, ministers extended
controls to citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies ‘with no
substantial connection with this country’.118 Ministers hoped this ‘con-
nection’, defined as possession of a parent or grandparent born in
Britain, meant they would appear non-discriminatory, while in practice
they would be limiting only non-white entry.119 Most, however, saw it for
what it was.
When Callaghan presented legislation to the Commons, he faced
severe opposition from Labour MPs. The junior minister David Owen
later recalled how he ‘agonized’ over how to vote, for, while appreciat-
ing the measure was ‘undoubtedly racial in character’, he feared that
without it violence would ensue. Thus, if principle dictated allowing
the Asians free entry, he still supported the government.120 The Home
Office minister in charge of integration at this point, David Ennals, a
former president of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, tried his best to
forestall criticism from locally employed community liaison officers by
claiming ministers shared their ‘anguish’. He asked them to understand
that they had been forced to choose between the harm that would be
done to individuals wanting to come to Britain and the damage black–
white relations would suffer if they were allowed free entry. Had
limitations not been imposed, Ennals argued, greater prejudice and dis-
crimination would have been the result, for too many whites remained
inclined to racism.121 Ennals did not convince many. Resolutions passed
by various community relations councils, funded by Whitehall to im-
prove the position of immigrants, complained that blacks now believed
the government was also racist and so despaired of co-operating with
it.122 Tribune declared the proposals surrendered to racism and asserted
that a government truly determined to counter prejudice would have
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taken a firmer stand.123 Some on the Labour left had a one-eyed view of
matters. Tribune in particular was reluctant to criticise the Kenyan
government, which was after all guilty of forcing thousands to leave the
country of their birth. Indeed, while one contributor attacked Callaghan’s
restrictions as immoral he welcomed ‘Africanisation’ as an attack on
privilege.124
Opinion surveys indicated that almost three-quarters of the public
approved of the government’s measures; two-thirds thought they did
not go far enough.125 This reaction gave some credibility to ministers’
fears about what might have happened had they not restricted entry.
While Tony Benn dismissed Powell’s supporters as ‘white trash’ and
Crossman thought they belonged to the ‘illiterate industrial proletariat’,
Powell posed a real political danger.126 He enjoyed a special resonance
with many workers: after his speech and subsequent sacking from the
Conservative front bench, thousands downed tools to express their sup-
port. His views were even shared by some of the country’s leading trade
unionists.127 Although some instigators of these demonstrations had
Fascist links or already held viscerally racist views, that was not true of
most of those who followed. As Ennals recognised, Powell did not create
such feelings, but his speech made them appear more legitimate.128
Labour was already in a weak electoral position at the time of the
Kenyan Asian controversy, working-class voters having been alienated
by the government’s prices and incomes policies and an economic slow-
down. This was not the best of times to challenge voters’ deepest prejudices
and fears about immigration.129 Thus, in the immediate aftermath of
Powell’s speech, Wilson urged ministers to emphasise bipartisanship
in race relations and to avoid attacking Powell personally.130 In fact
Callaghan went the other way and expressed support for voluntary
repatriation, claiming he had restricted Asian immigration to address
the disquiet expressed by pro-Powell strikers.131
Two weeks after Powell’s speech, Wilson did rebut his claims, in a
speech also delivered in Birmingham. There he strongly identified
Labour as an anti-racist party but reasserted the government’s position
that, if the principle of racial equality was to be maintained, ‘we must
create the practical conditions in which these principles are acceptable
to all our people, including those who day by day live their lives along-
side immigrant communities’.132 Hence, inner-city areas with greatest
black settlement were given aid under the remit of the Urban Pro-
gramme, launched not long after Wilson’s speech. This comprised modest
Treasury pump-priming to local authorities that embarked on approved
projects to help areas of acute deprivation. Yet, because of fears that it
might arouse white antagonism, the Programme was presented as an
attempt to relieve poverty in general rather than to help immigrants in
particular.133
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Conclusion
Like his predecessor at the Home Office, Callaghan hoped the 1968
Race Relations Act would prevent second-generation immigrants be-
coming alienated from mainstream society.134 Despite ensuring the Act
broadly reflected Jenkins’ concerns, however, Callaghan had a different
understanding of how that end might be achieved, one probably closer
to the views of most Labour members and voters. During the spring of
1968 the Cabinet established a Ministerial Committee on Immigration
and Assimilation, the title of which undoubtedly indicated how some
believed blacks born in Britain should relate to its ‘way of life’.135 As the
Kenyan Asian crisis reached a climax, the Committee discussed a Home
Office paper that reviewed the established policy of promoting a form
of integration that did not compromise immigrants’ ‘cultural diversity’.
Although the paper was written under his name, Callaghan questioned
its assumptions and asked how far diversity should be permitted to
develop; he noted that allowing Sikhs to wear beards and turbans at
work aroused white resentment. The Home Secretary was especially
concerned with what he termed the ‘ineradicability of colour’, for, un-
like previous immigrant groups, even second-generation West Indians,
Pakistanis and Indians ‘could not be concealed’ and thereby raised prob-
lems ‘of an entirely new kind’. According to Crossman, only a minority
on the Committee wanted ‘the coloured communities to remain foreign’,
that is, to retain their cultural distinctiveness. The rest, led by Callaghan,
sought their ‘full integration or assimilation’, so that they would effect-
ively become ‘little Englishmen’ – presumably ministers hoped that they
would then provoke less hostility.
If, under Callaghan’s lead, government policy appeared to take a
step back, elsewhere the party gave evidence of a greater sensitivity to
the issue of colour. In 1957 the Cardiff party had claimed there was ‘no
marked evidence of discrimination’ in the city, a highly unlikely state-
ment given the existence of the mainly black district of Tiger Bay.
Eleven years later, the same organisation dismissed the ‘strong myth’
that Cardiff was immune to racial problems and embraced the need to
educate against prejudice in schools and combat discrimination at
work.136 By the late 1960s greater efforts were also being made to recruit
black residents into the party. In Norwood, south London, for example,
activists invited potential West Indian recruits to their homes to try to
overcome doubts they might have about Labour. Having recruited 50
new black members, one ward in the constituency held a meeting every
other month in the home of a West Indian member, to encourage the
attendance of other immigrants.137 Tribune also challenged the assump-
tion that black immigrants would destroy the country’s settled way of
life; and if Britain became more ‘cosmopolitan’ as a result, that was a
prospect some Tribune MPs appeared to welcome.138
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The greater attention to and sympathy with issues relating to colour
were, however, unevenly developed. In 1956 Leeds West CLP marked
Charles Pannell’s first five years in the Commons by holding an evening
of entertainment during which one of the turns involved songs
delivered by lady members dressed as ‘nigger minstrels’.139 Just over a
decade later, contributors to Tribune condemned The Black and White
Minstrel Show (watched on BBC television every week by millions) as a
disgrace for portraying black people as second-class citizens.140 David
Ennals, the minister in charge of integration, claimed, however, that,
having seen the programme, he could find no trace of prejudice in it.141
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Instilling ‘responsibility’ in the young
If only for reasons of self-preservation, Labour was obliged to draw
some young people into the party so they could eventually replace its
elderly stalwarts.1 Electoral logic also dictated that Labour had to ensure
the support of at least a respectable proportion of what was an expand-
ing number of voters. Consequently, the 1955 Wilson report on party
organisation (see Chapter 2) expressed particular concern about the
consequences of Labour’s inability to interest youngsters in the party.2
Many members were, however, uncertain about the purpose, manner
and even merit of making a special appeal to the young. The 1960s
began with commentators asserting that most young adults were materi-
ally satisfied and so inclined to Conservatism, but the decade ended
with the impression that many young people had become alienated
from society and embraced far-left causes. This shift in perceptions did
not exactly help clarify thinking.
Those who have analysed Labour’s attempt to win over the young
tend to blame the party’s apparent refusal to take their concerns
seriously for its failure to do so.3 They consider Labour’s prescriptive
notions of how the young should think and act inhibited its efforts. In
particular, at the start of the decade the party’s ‘residual puritanism’ is
supposed to have prevented it evoking a positive response among
purportedly hedonistic proletarians.4 At the end of the 1960s, many
believed the government’s political caution had estranged middle-class
students.5 This chapter questions the exclusively ‘supply-side’ explan-
ation of Labour’s failure evident in such accounts. In fact, the party’s
various attempts to evoke a positive response among the young were
usually based on a desire to engage with what was generally thought to
be their interests. Before the 1959 general election, Labour established
a Youth Commission, composed of progressive celebrities of the day
like the footballer Jimmy Hill, which drafted proposals to meet the
changing needs of the young. If this was principally meant to create
favourable publicity, the creation of the Young Socialists in 1960 and
the government’s reduction of the voting age were more substantive
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initiatives. If neither made the party any more attractive to late adolescents
and those in their twenties, it is unclear how far this was due to their
flawed character or to the particular – and contradictory – inclinations
of the young themselves. Both initiatives were certainly underpinned
by the party’s desire to instil ‘responsibility’ in the young, by which was
meant their acceptance of Labour’s own political assumptions. However,
it is also true that most young people had long disparaged political
activity of whatever kind; and those few who followed the path of bud-
ding revolutionaries, such as Tariq Ali, were implacably hostile to social
democratic parties like Labour, whatever such parties said or did.
Labour’s perception of youth
Towards the end of Clement Attlee’s period in office, some of the party’s
leading younger members claimed Labour’s ‘most urgent’ domestic
problem was its deteriorating relationship with the country’s youth.
Most were judged ‘unpolitical’ and so biased ‘towards the existing order
… and therefore towards conservatism’.6 The reason for this was, a
speaker at the 1948 Labour Party conference claimed, their lack of a
memory of inter-war conditions. This meant, according to a later dele-
gate, that to them ‘the dole queue is not a reality but a historical fact’ –
and facts did convince as much as experience.7 As already noted, many
activists’ personal familiarity with the inter-war years was critical to their
appreciation of Labour’s merits. When a Young Socialist told the 1964
national conference of Labour women that her generation ‘did not want
to hear about what went on in the thirties, they wanted to know what
could be done now’, she was rebuffed by a mature delegate from the
North East, who stated, ‘it was because of their experience in the thirties
that many people had joined the Labour Party and fought so hard – a
matter which ought not to be forgotten’.8
If the young lacked the necessary memory, their supposedly unthink-
ing acceptance of full employment further distinguished them from
activists. Hence, by the time of the 1959 Labour Party conference, it
was a commonplace that, as one speaker put it, ‘whether you like it or
not’, young people:
have ‘never had it so good.’ Back in the thirties when we were young
and fighting to get a job, at any hours, at any pay, we had something
to strive and fight for. Today they get it easy: good wages, regular
hours.… They have never had it so good, my friends, and it is not a
damn bit of good telling them what we had to do in the twenties and
thirties: they will either not believe it or tell you it is a dead duck.9
According to Vauxhall’s agent, the widespread availability of well re-
munerated unskilled work had other implications that further detached
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adolescents from their parents’ generation. In particular, the former
were no longer ‘subjected to discipline’ at work, as they could easily
find alternative employment, while the family had ceased to ensure
conformity, because mothers were increasingly taking up part-time work
outside the home.10
It was widely believed that, so far as working-class youngsters were
concerned, the consequence of these changes was their weakening attach-
ment to Labour; so dire was the problem, members in London reported
that even their own children voted Conservative in 1959.11 Affluence
was thought to have affected younger members of the middle class in a
rather different way. In 1955 the former Cabinet minister Hugh Dalton
met with the MP Kenneth Younger and during their conversation
Dalton spoke of their greater interest in ‘Africans, Indians, etc’. Younger
replied that, ‘having done away with gross poverty’ at home, the under-
developed world was where their ‘emotions now went’.12
Because of such changes in the outlook of some young people, a few
activists believed greater regard should be shown to them. In 1962, the
secretary of Brixton’s Stockwell ward declared there was ‘the BIG
QUESTION for us to try and answer’:
How can we get the young people of today interested in politics.
One part of the answer I think is for us to get interested in them, not
keep on reliving the past, but to look forward to the future.… Let us
listen to them and their ideas … but at the same time point out
where they are wrong and why without getting impatient with them
because remember if we can encourage them to join the Party, as
they get older they will be doing the same as we are trying to do
today and that is to keep the party ALIVE.13
As Robert Sheldon, the defeated candidate for Manchester Withington,
indicated to Labour’s post-1959 election conference, the ‘old methods’
were no longer enough. He reported the establishment of a coffee-
house – an innovation also favoured by the non-aligned Marxist New
Left – in the centre of Manchester. The aim was to create an amenable
venue for young people of vaguely left-wing sympathies to discuss the
issues of the day, as the first step towards Labour membership.14 In
charge of the coffee-house was Paul Rose, who was later elected MP for
Manchester Blackley in 1964 at the unusually young age of twenty-nine.
He saw it as a means of sidestepping the party’s unattractive wards and
those older activists who, he claimed, resented ‘the supposed in-
gratitude of the younger generation’ and objected to ‘the sense of fun,
the healthy iconoclasm and apparent self-confidence of the modern
teenager’.15 Rose, however, believed Labour had to do more than offer
the young a chance to chat over a coffee. It needed to demonstrate its
relevance by asserting that:
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the world of football, cinema, skiffle, hiking, art and the Hallé
Orchestra, is our world. The ‘social hedgehogs’ on the left who see
no place for these things in the struggle for a better life are ill-
equipped to represent youth.… There is no place for socialist
‘squares’ in the age of Humphrey Lyttleton, Aldermaston marches
and Manchester United.16
This was something many were unwilling to do: they looked on what
the MP Horace King described as ‘cheap capitalist culture’ as one of
the means by which youngsters were corrupted.17 As one 1956 pamphlet
aimed at young people stated, spending money on clothes, going to
football matches or having a drink were a ‘kind of dope’ that ‘only keep
you from thinking’.18 Indeed, in the mid-1960s Tribune’s television critic
identified a common assumption on the left that ‘all pop music is trivial,
decadent and in some undefined way – dangerous’.19
Even when trying to relate to the young’s concerns, Labour often
simply reiterated their need to adhere to its approach to politics. In
time for the 1959 election, Transport House published 250,000 copies
of Hi!, a broadsheet aimed at young workers, and employed in its
production the popular writer Keith Waterhouse, to convince them of
the importance of politics to their lives. Waterhouse claimed he came
to appreciate that point after breaking his wrist, for the National Health
Service was founded by ‘those somewhat ridiculous, slightly pompous,
earnest, plodding figures we call politicians’. Thus, Waterhouse
asserted, ‘politics is something that happens to everybody’.20 On such
occasions, especially when trying to communicate in what it imagined
was the idiom of the young, Labour only reinforced its worthy image.
As part of a regular ‘Teenage Beat’ column, the East Ham South Citizen
stated that, in contrast to the Conservatives’ ‘old, dreary world of money-
grabbing’, Labour offered youth a ‘clean, wholesome world’.21
Labour’s problems became more acute later in the 1960s with the
emergence of the ‘counter-culture’. If young affluent workers passively
rejected Labour, middle-class students at this time apparently took a
more conscious leave of the party and society in general. Even the left-
leaning Judith Hart, when Minister for Social Security, complained of
the growing number of those refusing to take paid employment. This
was, she claimed, ‘causing me a very great deal of concern’, as there
were many, often from middle-class families, who ‘say they are writers
or disc jockeys – they pick themselves all sorts of esoteric occupations –
and seem to think it quite right that they spend a considerable time
without work’.22
The junior minister Shirley Williams thought the violent student
protests that broke out across the West during 1968 meant irrational
students threatened Labour’s reformist strategy, based at it was on the
application of reason.23 Others, such as Doris Young, who chaired the
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1970 women’s conference, thought the young had something more
positive to contribute. Yet, while praising the rising generation for its
‘more direct, more impatient and more positive attitude to war and
social equality’, she feared this might lead them to abandon conven-
tional politics. Young was also unsure whether their ‘new protesting
spirit’ was the modern expression of Labour’s own fight against social
injustice or just ‘materialistic and self-seeking’. Whatever its nature, she
believed the party should acquire a ‘deeper understanding and appreci-
ation’ of the young.24 The revisionist MP John Mackintosh was similarly
unclear what the generation gap represented. He thought those who
joined Oxfam or War on Want shared his values, as they believed in
steady ‘progress’. However, he looked on the ‘flower people and the
freak outs’ with despair because they rejected gradual improvement and
established politics. If he did not condemn their values, Mackintosh
admitted he could not understand them.25
Finally, and in complete contrast, were those, like the revisionist
Cabinet minister Anthony Crosland, who questioned the reality of a
significant generation gap, believing the concept was associated with a
‘self-abusing attitude towards youth as a class’. If it did exist, he did not
think it very wide, for various surveys suggested that, a few disgruntled
students apart, the great majority of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds
held political opinions very similar to those of their parents.26 Crosland’s
colleague Richard Marsh was even more peremptory, feeling he could
dismiss the violent demonstrations of 1968 because, as students ‘just
liked making trouble’, their protests amounted to no more than ‘intel-
lectual masturbation’.27
The purpose of youth organisation
In 1935, the Labour League of Youth (LOY) claimed a membership of
25,000; it also enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy, having its own confer-
ence, an elected national committee and representation on the National
Executive Committee (NEC). However, after falling victim to Commu-
nist ‘entryism’, in which members of that party masqueraded as Labour
loyalists to promote their own programme, expulsions followed and the
LOY was brought under strict NEC control. The LOY never recovered
its inter-war position and by 1955 was moribund, at which point the
NEC wound it up as a national body, although 200 or so constituency
youth branches remained.
To ensure youth recruitment was still taken seriously, the NEC’s
Organisation Sub-committee formed a Youth Sub-committee and called
on constituency Labour parties (CLPs) to appoint youth officers. This
had little impact, even though for much of the 1960s nearly two-thirds
fielding ch 7.P65 10/10/03, 12:36169
170 Fielding
of CLPs claimed to have filled such a post (see Table 7.1). Many activists
looked on youth organisation with considerable scepticism, partly due
to memories of Communist infiltration, but mainly because they felt it
would waste their limited time and money. Most local parties simply
lacked suitable accommodation and adequate resources, and so could
not compete with the better-placed Young Conservatives, let alone com-
mercial leisure pursuits. In addition, those few young people who could
be recruited were often associated with problems such as damaging
property or misusing funds.28 In addition, the majority of activists were
themselves parents or even grandparents and did not sympathise with
the preoccupations of youth. Such local gerontocracies were often irritated
Table 7.1 Labour’s youth and student organisations: numbers of
branches, members and officers, 1955–70
Youth University students
Branchesa Membersb CLP Clubsc Membersb
youth officers
1955  237 – – 40 –
1956  301  – 56 40 –
1957  275 – 147 – –
1958  268 – 159 – –
1959 262 – 173 – –
1960  572 – 258 50 3,000
1961 721 – 344 – 5,000
1962  772 22,000 448 69 5,500
1963  769  – 459 83 5,644
1964  722 – 473 92 6,695
1965  605  – 386 99 7,000
1966 571 12,000 351 100 7,000
1967  576 – 401 – –
1968  533 – 402 – –
1969  386 – 348 – –
1970  457  6,000 346 – –
aNumber of constituency youth branches, 1955–9, and branches of the Young
Socialists, 1960 on.
bEstimated numbers – available for selected years only.
cAfter 1966 the National Executive Committee terminated its relationship with the
National Association of Labour Student Organisations.
Source: Labour Party annual conference reports, 1955–70; Labour Party Archive,
National Executive Committee Youth Sub-committee minutes, 17 September 1962,
Summary of branch report forms, NAD/94/9/62, 22 June 1966, Report on organis-
ation and activities, NC, 4 June 1966, and 7 July 1970, Summary of report forms,
NC/10/JUN/70.
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when young members played records on party premises and sometimes
viewed their presence in the street as requiring police intervention.29
Even those who saw merit in supporting the organisation of youth
disagreed over what form it should take: in particular, as early as 1946
there was what was described as the ‘old problem of social versus
political activities’.30 This in turn was underpinned by the hoary question
of whether Labour should aim to build an elite or a mass youth move-
ment. Officially, Transport House wanted local branches to satisfy
political and recreational interests, so they might generate both a small
group of future activists and a greater number of firm Labour voters.31
The problem, however, was that the few youngsters who took party
activity at all seriously wanted to take it in an elitist – and overtly
political – direction while the majority favoured social activities. Officers
of the Bethnal Green LOY even disbanded their own branch in disgust
at how little interest fellow members showed in political events.32
Those supporting the idea of a youth wing were at least united in
the belief that its overall purpose should be, as George Brinham (chair
of the Youth Sub-committee) confirmed, to ‘train’ the young ‘to perform
their civic responsibilities’.33 Youth sections were described as ‘chiefly
for the purpose of developing the character and experience of their
members to fit them for service in the Party’.34 A corollary was that the
young should subordinate themselves to their elders and betters: NEC
member Percy Knight told the LOY they were ‘enjoying the machine
created by the pioneers’, men such as himself, and it was their respon-
sibility to leave it as they found it.35 As Reg Underhill stated when
Labour’s Chief Youth Officer, if a branch did not see its ‘real purpose to
be that of strengthening the Labour Party’, it was ‘pointless’.36
While some thought the young would learn the Labour way simply
by doing what they were told, others considered they required auton-
omy to develop a sense of ‘responsibility’. Given Communist infiltration
and the post-war threat of Trotskyist entryism, the NEC was reluctant
to concede too much freedom. Indeed, some of those who argued for
greater independence were actually entryists, who believed it would
allow them to manipulate the organisation better.37 Nonetheless, most
who campaigned for greater freedom did so from legitimate conviction,
although they conceded that, if they were given a conference free of
NEC control, young members would pass extremely radical resolutions.
However, such ‘a platform for ideas, a channel for grievances, would
increase the responsibility of the younger members’ because ‘the only
way to train for responsibility is to give opportunity for exercising
responsibility’.38 As the MP Richard Marsh (who was not at all left-wing)
stated in 1959, a worthwhile youth movement would ‘pass resolutions
of no confidence in everybody on the platform, tell us what is wrong
with the leadership of the Party and inform us how we can have the
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Socialist revolution in the next 24 hours’. He was confident such angry
young members would nonetheless conform in the end.39
The Young Socialists
The NEC decided to rescue Labour’s youth movement from the limbo
into which it had fallen and in April 1959 formed a working party to
recommend action. This reported just after the party’s performance at
the general election had apparently illustrated its lack of appeal to
younger voters.40 Members gathered information from an eclectic range
of sources, including other European social democratic parties and
Stuart Hall of the New Left. In an indication of how resistant it feared
the young had become to Labour, the committee thought that if the
new body too closely identified with the party it would not attract many
recruits. Members therefore favoured sponsoring an organisation with
no direct ties to Labour but that was nonetheless committed to its
‘progressive ideals’. This option was, however, abandoned, largely on
grounds of cost, as it would have required a substantial professional
staff. The revived movement – known as the Young Socialists (YS) and
launched at the start of 1960 – had to operate from Transport House
and be supervised by officials already overburdened with other respon-
sibilities.
The working party believed that if the YS was to attract more young
people than the LOY, it had to undertake social much more than political
activities. While literature designed to appeal to prospective members
indicated that one reason to join was the chance to express political
views, most stress was put on the assertion that members knew how to
have a good time. Companionship, especially with those of the opposite
sex, was mentioned, as was the chance to join in team sports and a
variety of other groups, including ‘let’s-just-sit-in-the-sun groups’.41
According to a series of internal surveys, the YS initially enjoyed
some limited popular success but it quickly fell to levels that would have
embarrassed the post-war LOY.42 While YS membership stood at about
22,000 two years after its formation, by 1966 numbers had declined to
12,000 and by 1970 there were only 6,000. The number of local YS
branches also fell, from a peak of nearly 800 in 1962 to under 400 by
1969 (see Table 7.1). Most members were men: in 1962, 62 per cent of
branches reported having a majority of males while the 1970 survey
suggested females accounted for only one-third of the total, appreciably
less than in the adult party. According to an academic investigation in
the early 1960s, like their Conservative and Liberal equivalents, most
Young Socialists were the children of party supporters. Yet the YS
appealed disproportionately to the offspring of middle-class Labour
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partisans, as members were equally divided between those whose parents
were employed in manual and professional occupations.43 Indeed, the
organiser for the Northern Home Counties Region noted in 1967 that
the YS had ‘completely failed to bring any manual-type of workers to
the fore’.44 This failure was probably due to two main factors. First, few
working-class youngsters questioned the status quo to the extent that
political activity of any type appeared a sensible pastime.45 Secondly,
even had many young workers been so inclined, given the desultory
state of Labour’s machine in proletarian districts, few would have had
the opportunity of joining a section. In the organisational black hole
that was Glasgow, for example, it is unlikely that at any one time there
were ever many more than fifty Young Socialists.46
In any case, right from the start, as one YS member from Surrey
complained, most of those attracted to the movement belonged to the
‘local left intelligentsia’, who were unwilling to attract those not already
immersed in political debate. Those most active in the YS were charac-
terised as opposed to music being played at meetings, disgusted at the
very mention of television and generally bearing a ‘hatred of anything
for the masses’.47 As YS activists in Twickenham put it in 1967, theirs
should be a mainly political movement: it ‘would be worse than useless
to have a mass membership based primarily on social activities’, because
the party needed to combat apathy, not accommodate it.48 To make
things worse, commitment often went hand in hand with equally un-
popular cultural aspirations: YS members in Bristol South East were
forced to listen to classical records supplied by their secretary, who hoped
to ‘entertain and/or educate’ them.49 Such efforts were rarely appreciated
and officials did their best to curb the zeal of their young improvers.
The St Ives YS had a relatively healthy membership of twenty-nine,
sixteen of whom normally attended its weekly meetings. However, its
secretary – a grammar school sixth-former headed for Oxbridge –
worried its gatherings were purely social, so held a discussion meeting,
to which only five turned up. While the South West Region’s organiser
sympathised with this young man’s ambition, he made it clear that the
first duty of the YS was to build a large membership – and that meant
putting on social activities.50
The consequences of entryism
Despite arguments in favour of giving youngsters the freedom to
become ‘responsible’, the YS was kept under firm NEC scrutiny through
Bessie Braddock’s chairing of the Youth Sub-committee, a woman
described by Tony Benn as ‘brutal and tactless and as out of touch as
anyone could be’ when it came to the young.51 The YS was granted an
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annual conference with the right to discuss policy and elect a national
committee, but Braddock’s main concern was to prevent it falling into
entryist hands. This did not, however, mean that officials demanded
unquestioning loyalty: some claimed to welcome criticism, so long as it
was the product of the ‘honest opinions of loyal young Party members’.52
Despite Braddock, the YS was soon infiltrated by a variety of Trotsky-
ist groups, pre-eminently Young Guard and Keep Left. They demanded
greater autonomy for the YS, and in particular full editorial control of
its journal, New Advance. These tactics were popular with many non-
Trotskyists who wanted to be free of adult interference and helped left-
ists win representation at regional and national level, which, along with
a noisy presence at conference, they used to promote their policies.
Proscriptions, suspensions and expulsions as well as the disbanding of
local YS branches followed, as the NEC tried to stem the tide. In 1965
it assumed even greater control and had to rename the YS the Labour
Party Young Socialists (LPYS), owing to the appropriation of the former
title by the Socialist Labour League. Many legitimate LPYS members
complained that, after this, the atmosphere was infused with ‘disillusion
and disgust’: without the return of some autonomy it was predicted that
Labour’s youth membership would continue to decline.53 For a time, at
least, the LPYS appeared clear of entryism, if only because most Trotsky-
ists temporarily convinced themselves Labour was no longer worth
taking over. This allowed the NEC to relax its grip and in 1968 the
LPYS national committee was given control of Left, its renamed journal.
The collapse of membership nonetheless continued apace.
One reason why entryists gained such a prominent position within
the YS was that few others took its political role seriously. According to
Labour’s own surveys, no more than half its members attended section
gatherings. Moreover, although every constituency section was part of
an area federation that was meant to co-ordinate activity, if the Bristol
area federation was typical, only a tiny handful attended federation
meetings.54 In addition, at the peak of its popularity, in 1961, only half
of branches sent delegates to the YS conference, a proportion that fell
during the decade.55 Journals supposed to appeal to a YS audience also
failed to generate readers: in 1961 New Advance reached its zenith when
monthly circulation totalled 9,500; Left only ever enjoyed a maximum
circulation of 6,000. In fact, the position was worse than the figures
indicate, as many copies were bought by trade unions and CLPs to sub-
sidise production costs.56
Only partly because of its Trotskyist cuckoos, YS members attending
conferences quickly gained a reputation for far-leftism, although prob-
ably few rivalled the member who, when asked what item of news from
1963 made them really happy, replied: ‘The death of Hugh Gaitskell’.57
At its inaugural conference, only Gaitskell’s resignation was demanded,
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albeit by two-thirds of delegates, while a motion calling for the national-
isation of six major industries and the biggest 500 companies was
carried almost unanimously.58
Entryism was especially developed in London: the region’s 1963
youth conference was described by the capital’s youth officer as ‘mainly
a battle between Young Guard and Keep Left, with the bona fide Young
Socialist element wondering what the H— was going on’.59 While assidu-
ous in gaining national posts – six out of the eleven members of the YS
national committee elected in 1964 were subsequently expelled –
Trotskyists also enjoyed a significant local presence in the metropolis.
During the mid-1960s, Hackney’s YS was run for the benefit of entryists,
whose main concern was to prevent it being taken over by other far-left
factions. There, meetings would dispute arcane matters such as whether
the Soviet Union was a ‘degenerate workers’ state’ or ‘state capitalist’.
Not surprisingly, they were no more successful at recruiting working-
class youngsters than were sections led by those embracing more main-
stream views.60
In 1964, the National Agent, Sara Barker, blamed the spread of
Trotskyism on older members’ reluctance to supervise sections properly.61
Whether through indolence or deliberate liberalism, some did let their
youngsters run free. While not the victim of entryism, when the NEC
investigated Putney in 1963, it discovered the YS was out of control. Of
its sixty-one members, less than half were party members. It also pub-
lished a journal, for which substantial sums were owed to the general
management committee (GMC); according to investigators, this journal
contained only articles that were critical of party policy and promoted
views incompatible with Labour membership.62
Gaitskell loyalists briefly tried to counter leftist influence but nation-
ally, at least, their efforts came to little. Locally, however, there were
occasional instances in which Young Socialists challenged their older –
and more radical – counterparts, often over unilateralism, an issue that
saw the YS in Bristol South East and Stockport support the parlia-
mentary leadership and oppose their GMCs.63 Indeed, at the 1966 YS
Eastern Region conference, one-third of delegates walked out when the
left-wing MP and vocal critic of the Wilson government Stan Newens
addressed the meeting.64
Other problems
Labour’s attempt to establish a popular youth movement faced other
problems, more mundane but no less intractable than entryism, pre-
eminent among which was a high turnover of members. In Stroud, the
constituency agent noted the existence of a two-year cycle in the life of
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a section, which began when it was formed by like-minded contem-
poraries studying for their ‘A’ levels and ended as they left the area to
go to university or find work.65 Sections were consequently formed and
reformed at a rapid rate; for example, during 1964 the South West
Region reported an overall decline of four sections to forty-five, but ten
of these had been established in the previous twelve months.66
Some felt this instability was due to the inexperience of Young
Socialists. The NEC had fixed the upper age limit at twenty-five years,
compared with thirty for the Young Conservatives and thirty-five for the
supposedly Young Liberals. Some called for those in their late twenties
to be allowed to remain, as they feared that in their absence the YS
would be ‘a kind of tight trousered rock-club’.67 Officials argued against
raising the limit because it would prevent teenagers from gaining know-
how, as older members would inevitably dominate proceedings.68 Some
also believed that maintaining the age limit at twenty-five would keep
out the ‘more experienced disruptionists’ in the Trotskyist left, although
others thought a higher limit would prevent ‘green’ members from being
‘easy prey to outside influence’.69
Possibly because of the lack of more mature influences, there were
many instances of youthful excess. In Warwick, the agent corroborated
damaging local press reports that YS members had scratched ‘ban-the-
bomb’ and other slogans on walls and furniture in their meeting place.70
Other sections were a constant source of concern, such as the one
established in Salford West during 1963 but suspended by the executive
committee (EC) soon after the 1964 general election. Youngsters fell
foul of that local party owing to their allegedly noisy meetings, dis-
orderly conduct, ‘illegal literature’ and unpaid bills, as well as the belief
that meetings were ‘nothing more than an evening for dancing’. During
the campaign there were reports that ‘hand bills were thrown all over
the streets and youths were running round and shouting and ranting in
a Riotous Manner’. At the meeting that suspended the organisation,
twenty YS members, practically its entire complement, refused to leave
the room and became abusive when asked to do so.71 It was to avoid
such problems that the South West Region’s youth organiser discouraged
one applicant joining the YS after the boy’s own father had highlighted
his ‘restlessness and irresponsibility’.72
Even when they adhered to the prescribed form of activity, some YS
members behaved in what can only be described as a puerile manner,
one that unconsciously parodied the adult party’s often pompous
proceedings. The minutes for Bedford’s youth section recorded the
following exchange during July 1968:
The secretary was asked if he had informed Mr Bayliss about the
meeting. When he answered to the negative Mr Luft called him a
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Steaming Great Nellie. After considerable discussion Mr Luft
reduced this to Steaming Little Nellie. Mr Harding still would not
accept this and asked for the statement to be withdrawn. Mr Luft
refused. Mr Harding threatened to resign but Mr Luft still refused.
After the chairman pleading [sic] with Mr Luft he withdrew the
remark verbally. We then went on to ordinary business.73
By no means was all YS activity so troublesome or juvenile. The
section in the south London constituency of Merton and Morden was
something of a success, at least for a few years in the early 1960s, and
gives an insight into the assumptions of those few non-Trotskyists who
took youth organisation seriously.74 Members picketed shops selling
South African goods; supported Oxfam; and were keen unilateralists.
Visits were proposed to the Farnborough air show, London airport, the
Daily Herald printing works, the House of Commons, the Royal Mint, a
Cadbury’s factory, the Mermaid theatre, a planetarium and Sadler’s
Wells theatre. Talks by outside speakers tackled an eclectic range of
subjects, including spiritualism (which involved a demonstration by a
clairvoyant), humanism, road safety and the probation service. Members
also participated in folk singing, rambling and listening to pop records.
Numbers were small, however – speakers sometimes had an audience
of only six. Moreover, members’ lack of commitment to everyday party
work was illustrated when the section executive held a ‘surprise evening’
to entice more than the usual number to attend a gathering. The
‘surprise’, it turned out, was a night of canvassing, a ruse that aroused
much resentment among those who had turned up expecting some-
thing rather more exciting.
The student revolt
If members’ attitude to maintaining formal links with the young was at
best unresolved, they were even more diffident about university students –
not least because, according to one observer, most regarded ‘student
politics as merely a youthful game’ in which participants were still ‘groping
their way’ to socialism.75 In 1947 the NEC supported the formation of
the National Association of Labour Student Organisations (NALSO)
only after intensive lobbying from established university Labour clubs.
The NEC resisted student proposals to build a closer relationship and
restricted itself to giving NALSO financial support on the condition
that its officers, and those of its affiliates, belonged to the party.76
While NALSO boosted the political careers of a few individuals, such
as Roy Hattersley, the extent to which it helped the party is moot. Even
a generous estimate suggests no more – and probably far fewer – than
fielding ch 7.P65 10/10/03, 12:36177
178 Fielding
5 per cent of students ever belonged to a Labour club, which by 1965
meant about 7,000 (see Table 7.1).77 By the mid-1960s these clubs were
swamped by far-left students, who voted at NALSO’s 1966 conference
to free officers from the obligation of Labour membership. In response,
the NEC terminated its relationship, although links with clubs still loyal
to Transport House were maintained. The key issue behind this estrange-
ment was Wilson’s reluctance to criticise the escalating US intervention
in South Vietnam. The Vietnam War both lent credibility to revolution-
aries like Tariq Ali, who was prominent in the campaign to oppose it,
and afforded at least some coherence to their otherwise disparate
critique of the status quo. Student disgust at Labour’s failure to con-
demn US actions also led to numerous encounters between ministers
and protestors on campus: at best the former were mocked or pointedly
disregarded by their tormentors; at worst a variety of objects were hurled
in their general direction.78 Labour politicians were unused to such be-
haviour. The party’s candidate in the 1967 Cambridge by-election even
welcomed the absence of undergraduates at one of his meetings because
‘they make such a row’.79
Unlike affluent working-class teenagers, student radicals at least had
an overt political perspective, albeit one articulated in a form many
found disturbing. Some leading members of the Labour Party reflected
on the questions posed by the student revolt of the late 1960s, thinking
it indicative of a widespread discontent with authority. Even so, along
with the thirty-three-year-old MP Paul Rose, the Cabinet Minister
Richard Crossman remained bemused, sensing an insuperable barrier
between those up to their mid-twenties and others just a few years older.80
Hart spoke of her ‘immense approval’ of the greater involvement of
students in universities, colleges and sixth forms in the administration
of their affairs. While student participation shocked some, their par-
ticipation in curriculum development and teaching she believed ‘must
surely be right’.81 Not surprisingly, given the number of young uni-
versity staff sitting on it, Bristol West’s GMC discussed student power
with some sympathy, one speaker indicating that the very purpose of
higher education should be radically re-examined.82 Even venerable
figures like the newly elevated peer Reginald Sorenson considered the
student rebellion to be ‘stimulated by a vital search for finer values’.
Sorenson nonetheless wanted them to articulate their case with a
greater sense of ‘responsibility’, which meant working through the exist-
ing political system.83 The writer of an editorial for the Socialist
Commentary was particularly disturbed by the reluctance of ‘practical
idealists’ to identify with the party.84 The author believed they would
once have joined Labour and helped it reform the established order,
but their alienation from parliamentary democracy was such that they
now looked on violent methods with favour. While the editorial
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considered Labour’s basic social democratic outlook as relevant as ever,
its writer believed the party still needed to address some of the issues
students raised, in particular the remoteness of decision-making and
the pointlessness of much political activity.
The students’ lack of ‘responsibility’ upset Cabinet ministers, and led
Wilson and colleagues to view their protests as primarily a law and order
issue. Crossman feared democracy was coming to an end, and con-
cluded: ‘we should have no hesitation in dealing with these people who
were destroying free speech’. This approach depressed the likes of Benn
and Barbara Castle, although even the latter referred to the existence
of ‘thugs’ among a majority who expressed genuine grievances.85 This
reaction did not derive just from generational differences. Labour loyal-
ists at King’s College, London, stated the party differed from student
revolutionaries, as it believed in reform from within, not destruction
from without. To students still committed to Labour’s way of thinking,
1968 was a disastrous year, in which ‘frustrations exploded into violence
and irresponsible language’ and challenged the legitimacy of existing
political structures.86
Even the most apparently conservative of voices, the Home Secretary,
James Callaghan, took student opinions seriously. Callaghan was clearly
irritated by the extremes of the protest movement, and he described
Ali as a ‘spoilt, rich, playboy’.87 When faced with the prospect of a
violent anti-Vietnam War march through London in October 1968, to
follow up the Gosvenor Square riot earlier in the year, he still sought to
balance the need to thwart the ‘hooligans’ intent on violence and the
need to protect the right to demonstrate in peace.88 Callaghan later
allowed the controversial German student leader Rudi Dutschke into
the country and arranged a meeting, during which he tried to persuade
Dutschke of the merits of the reformist politics practised by Labour.89
Events at the London School of Economics (LSE) during the early
part of 1969 seemed to bring student problems to a head. The director
of the LSE, Walter Adams, was a former Rhodesian official whose links
with apartheid did him no favours; nor did his refusal to reform the
LSE’s system of governance, which denied students a voice. After a
series of disruptions, Adams took the unprecedented step of tempor-
arily closing down the institution. Edward Short, the Secretary of State
for Education, was assured that only a small minority of LSE students
wanted to end academic freedom and establish a revolutionary base.
Thus he considered deporting those American students said to be at
the heart of the problem and thought about dismissing up to 300
students.90 Short was particularly worried about the ‘great impatience’
with students evident among party members and the public at large,
and was ‘deeply concerned’ about the possibility of a right-wing ‘anti-
student anti-intellectual backlash’. He did not, however, endorse LSE
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officials unreservedly and – unlike some hard-line administrators – saw
merit in students winning representation on decision-making bodies.91
To that end, he wanted an inquiry into how the LSE should modernise
its constitution after matters had calmed down.92
When he spoke in a Commons debate on the universities in January
1969, Short nonetheless wanted to make a ‘hard hitting attack’ that
would verbally ‘clobber’ those causing trouble at the LSE. He did this
with Wilson’s full backing, for the Prime Minister ‘was getting a bit fed
up with this troublesome minority’ and had also noted the public’s
annoyance with those upon whom large amounts of their taxes were
spent.93 If he was consequently cast as an authoritarian, Short noted
that the ‘chaos and violence of student protest, rightly understood and
rightly used, could raise the whole quality of our democracy’. ‘Schools
and universities must’, he asserted, ‘get young people to take the respon-
sibilities of citizenship by abandoning authoritarianism and involving
them in government and decision-making’.94
The student protests put ministers in an uncomfortable position, one
many believed was analogous to that experienced by 1920s Weimar social
democrats, caught between reactionary defenders of the status quo and
revolutionaries intent on tearing the system down. As the Labour chair of
the LSE students’ union pointed out, while the authorities had been pro-
vocative, the existence of ‘dedicated American agitators’ was undoubted.
In proposing that both sides negotiate a settlement, Labour found itself
preaching reason to two extremes uninterested in compromise.95
Tribune and the revolutionaries
Although Wilson’s Cabinet was unwilling openly to criticise US actions
in Vietnam, the same was not true of the Labour left, who, on the face
of it, were in a good position to appeal to student radicals. Tribune
welcomed the Parisian May events as ‘the greatest achievement of any
west European labour movement since the war’ and criticised Short’s
intervention in the LSE dispute as indicative of a ‘plain, old-fashioned
fear of the unknown’.96 In the wider party, while Chelsea’s left-inclined
GMC described Wilson’s administration as ‘semi-socialist’, it thought
students only a ‘little irresponsible’ in their methods. Like the revisionist
Socialist Commentary, the GMC believed the students’ desire to be more
directly involved in decision-making should be emulated rather than
condemned.97 Bedford GMC even passed a resolution in support of the
Sorbonne students, although the secretary was unable to pass on news
of this vote, as he did not have their address.98
By the time of Labour’s 1966 re-election there was, moreover, a sense
that if it was to exert real pressure on the leadership, the Tribune Group
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of MPs should look beyond the Commons. David Kerr noted the ‘wide-
spread evangelical mood which today finds expression through CND
or OXFAM or Voluntary Service Organisation’, wherein lay ‘an un-
tapped well of Socialism’. To access this latent support, Kerr believed
MPs should focus on policies that promised to bridge the gap between
the West and less developed nations.99 Tribune correspondent Illtyd
Harrington even thought the ‘gentle anarchism’ evident at a ‘happen-
ing love-in’ held in London’s Roundhouse was at least preferable to the
‘commercially stimulated viscous antagonism of Mods and Rockers’ of
a few years earlier. If the young had moved away from conventional
politics, he stated, it was still possible to enthuse them with new ventures
like community work. If this suggested that some at least were open to
the concerns preoccupying young radicals, most remained convinced
the young were estranged from Labour for a familiar reason: the govern-
ment’s failure to transform society through greater state control of the
economy.100 If their analysis was antiquated, so was the proposed solu-
tion. In June 1968 an array of union leaders and dissident MPs launched
the Socialist Charter, which aimed to strengthen their perspective within
the party, establish links with those outside and so encourage Wilson to
‘return to [the] socialist principles’ from which he had departed after
1964.101 As some commented at the time, the Charter bore the hall-
marks of the earlier Keep Left, Bevanite and Victory for Socialism
campaigns – which was not surprising, as the personnel were much the
same.102
Even those who believed the political situation in the late 1960s was
drastically different to that of the recent past did not figure they should
change their tactics. Towards the end of 1968, Eric Heffer told a gather-
ing of Tribune MPs that the new-found influence of the revolutionary
left meant the ‘whole tone and flavour of the protest movement has
changed’. In particular, they should not think the Vietnam Solidarity
Campaign (VSC) comparable to the old Campaign for Nuclear Disarma-
ment (CND).103 Most of those who formed CND were long-standing
left-liberal figures; they saw their purpose as influencing Labour policy,
a disposition reinforced by the presence of prominent members of the
Labour left on unilateralist demonstrations. This culminated in the 1960
Labour conference voting for a unilateral policy, although that proved
a short-lived triumph as Gaitskell won the support of delegates at the
1961 conference to reverse the decision.104 Heffer recognised that the
young revolutionaries did not want to influence Labour to achieve their
ends – as one of their aims was to destroy the party. He nonetheless
proposed meeting with VSC leaders to encourage them to put their
energies into changing, not attacking, Labour. While even some left-
wing MPs believed their party was finished as a radical force, most
believed socialism could come only through a Labour government, so it
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was pointless trying to replace it with an ideologically purer alternative.
Not all Tribune MPs believed they should engage with the radicals. For
example, like many in the Cabinet, Sid Bidwell thought the VSC needed
to be told in no uncertain terms that it was ‘idiotic to advocate violence’;
others feared their clashes with authority would only create a right-wing
backlash. Hence, while Michael Foot supported establishing links with
the VSC he also proposed going out to the universities and ‘putting the
view that young people should come inside the Party’.105
Tribune subsequently gave a platform to New Left figures, like John
Saville, who had some influence over young radicals, in the hope of
opening a dialogue. In January 1969 Foot and Heffer even participated
in what was grandiloquently described as the ‘debate of the decade’
with Bob Rowthorne and Tariq Ali of the revolutionary bi-monthly Black
Dwarf. During the course of an evening in which debate gave way to the
acrimonious assertion of mutually contradictory positions, Foot tried to
persuade his detractors that Labour was not an enemy of socialism.
Echoing the analogies of his more mainstream parliamentary colleagues,
Foot warned that this sort of outlook had led to Fascism in Germany.
There was, he argued, merit in seeing Labour as ‘one of the arenas’ in
which socialism could be advanced, as it remained possible the party
would be finally transformed into an organisation fully committed to
radical change. Citing the CND marches of the late 1950s, Foot claimed
extra-parliamentary action had its place but needed to be directed to-
wards achieving change within parliament and through Labour.106 In
its essentials, his argument was no different to the one advanced by the
likes of Callaghan and it persuaded few (if any) revolutionaries, who
saw CND as less a prototypical example of extra-parliamentary action
and more a pathetic failure.107 Ali, in particular, continued to view the
Labour left as a well meaning but ineffectual force wholly incapable of
transforming the party into a truly anti-capitalist body.108
Enfranchising the young
During 1967 and 1968 the Cabinet minister Lord Longford surveyed
those services national and local government provided for young people
to see how they might be improved. Longford subsequently resigned,
in protest at the post-devaluation delay to raising the school-leaving
age from fifteen to sixteen. Longford’s idiosyncratic approach in any
case meant his investigations were unlikely to generate a coherent set
of proposals. A brief report was nonetheless produced after he left
government, its main points being that youth services should be the
responsibility of a senior Cabinet minister and a public inquiry be estab-
lished with the aim of producing a ‘new charter for young people’.109
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Longford’s investigations were one of a number of initiatives under-
taken by the government to ensure ministers at least appeared to take
the interests of the young seriously. As one civil servant noted, although
it was ‘amorphous and diffuse’, the report on the peer’s researches indi-
cated that, at a time when the young population is ‘growing, is armed
with much financial power and is very assertive’, more serious attention
had to be given to their needs.110 To further signify that, Wilson made
Judith Hart responsible for tackling ‘all problems of youth’ when he
promoted her to Paymaster General in 1968.111 Hart tried to make sense
of Longford’s work, although she found it ‘very disappointing’.112 She
at least brought to her task a positive disposition, even if it bordered on
the patronising – she declared at one point that all young people were
‘absolutely marvellous’. Hart optimistically believed generational con-
flict was largely a problem of ‘communication’ and thought her task was
to open a ‘channel’ between the young and authority. As she considered
that a good place to start in her endeavours would be to consult the
eminently respectable members of the British Youth Council, it is no
wonder Hart achieved little.113 Her senior officials approached the
subject with great reserve: one, taking his cue from surveys that sug-
gested nearly 80 per cent of students were ‘satisfied with life’, rejected
the very existence of a ‘youth problem’. Hart, finally, was also con-
fronted by the Education Department, which thought it had primary
responsibility for youth-related matters. It is no wonder that when Peter
Shore succeeded Hart as Paymaster General he prudently refused to
accept the youth brief.114
The most significant piece of legislation to affect young people intro-
duced during 1964–70 had nothing to do with Hart: it was the reduction
of the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen. This originated in Labour’s
desire to remain relevant to the affluent society but was passed in the
hope of domesticating the student revolt. Lowering the voting age was
not unprecedented, as in the wake of the First World War anybody serv-
ing in uniform was allowed to exercise the franchise. A 1944 Speaker’s
conference had, however, rejected permanently reducing the voting age
to eighteen and, when two Communist MPs revived the proposal four
years later, Chuter Ede, Attlee’s Home Secretary, demurred.
By the late 1950s Labour opinion was more open to reform. The
1959 Youth Commission supported lowering the voting age, on the
basis that it was possible to be married with children and living in a
home of one’s home by eighteen. Increasing the representation of young
people, the Commission asserted, also meant democracy would benefit
from their ‘vigour and impatience’ while – possibly more importantly –
they should acquire a greater sense of responsibility.115 Labour’s 1959
manifesto nonetheless remained shy of the matter, and stated only that
a Gaitskell government would consider lowering the voting age after
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consulting with other parties. The party’s election defeat gave the issue
more impetus; for example, the revisionist Douglas Jay thought Labour’s
support for votes at eighteen would help identify it as ‘modern’. Even
so, Labour leaders did not wish to take up the matter during the run-
up to the 1964 election, so that when the YS national committee wanted
a commitment placed in the manifesto, the NEC refused.116
Once in power, Labour established the Latey Commission to con-
sider reducing the legal age of majority, which also stood at twenty-one.
In addition, ministers invoked a Speaker’s conference to look into
various matters, including the voting age. Neither body had reported
by the time Labour stood for re-election, but the party’s submission to
the latter made its position absolutely clear. It echoed the Youth Com-
mission’s conclusion that lowering the voting age to eighteen would be
‘just and logical’, something underlined in the 1966 manifesto.117
Latey published his findings in the summer of 1967. He recom-
mended that the age of majority should fall to eighteen, and this was a
popular proposal; the Lord Chancellor consequently recommended that
Cabinet accept his report and proceed to legislation.118 In discussion,
Michael Stewart noted that, if ministers accepted Latey’s proposals, ‘it
would be difficult to resist the conclusion that the voting age should be
similarly reduced’, a view echoed by others round the Cabinet table.
Not everybody agreed; some even questioned Latey’s own proposals,
although in the end Cabinet accepted them.119 In any case, ministers
could not alter the voting age until the Speaker’s conference had con-
cluded its business and precedent suggested that, as it reflected opinion
at Westminster, they had to accept its recommendations.120 When the
conference voted decisively to reduce the voting age – but only to twenty –
ministers were therefore faced with a dilemma.
Cabinet discussed the matter in May 1968 – an interesting month to
debate votes for students.121 Ministers were divided, as there was no
compelling evidence of a public demand for change: even many of
those due to be enfranchised did not appear over-keen. A Gallup poll
taken in 1967 showed that 30 per cent of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds
opposed lowering the voting age, although 56 per cent did support
it.122 It was the Cabinet’s youngest member, Richard Marsh, who took
the strongest position against change, arguing ministers ‘must have
gone absolutely mad’ if they thought ‘the working class wanted students
to be enfranchised’. Marsh’s position was echoed by the Welsh and Scot-
tish Secretaries, who worried that reducing the voting age would help
the nationalists. Others suggested the revolutionary left would also
benefit. Stewart nonetheless adhered to his earlier view that the young
had literally ‘grown into’ the legal rights conceded by Latey and it was
therefore only logical they should be granted their political equivalent.
Indeed, said one minister, ‘to accept that they were capable of responsible
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political behaviour should do much to correct the growing sense of
social alienation which undoubtedly lay at the root of some of the more
extreme manifestations of youthful insubordination which had recently
attracted public attention’. Some hoped reduction ‘would widen the
field for political pressures to be put on the student population’. So
intense was the disagreement that the Prime Minister was forced to
defer a final decision to a later meeting. By then, clear evidence had
been produced that the public supported votes for eighteen-year-olds.
Some now claimed events in Paris meant it was even more important to
‘give young people an increased sense of responsibility’.
In finally agreeing to support reduction to eighteen the Cabinet took
something of an electoral leap in the dark, one – as the likes of Marsh
suggested – not universally supported in the party. The veteran MP
George Strauss was certainly an opponent, as he feared the measure
would ‘inject into elections an immature, unstable and irresponsible
element’.123 Labour’s Assistant National Agent Reg Underhill thought
the new voters constituted an unknown factor, given that large numbers
would probably abstain at elections.124 The Chief Whip reported that only
two-thirds of MPs favoured reduction: he had hoped the issue could have
been made subject to a free vote but such was MPs’ antipathy that he pro-
posed placing it under a ‘firm’ two-line whip.125 Accordingly, legislation
was passed in time for eighteen-year-olds to vote in the 1970 election.
Conclusion
By the time Labour sought re-election in 1970 the student revolt had
died down. Comparisons with Weimar Germany were no longer aired
and Crossman could give vent to his relief that such an ‘infantile’ move-
ment, one ‘imbecile in its anarchism and bogus leftism’, had apparently
bitten the dust.126 This did not mean the ‘youth problem’ had dis-
appeared. In 1970, Labour’s candidate for Kingston stated that the
young still needed to be made to see that they were ‘enjoying a false
freedom, namely the freedom of doing what they like’. He went on to
state that:
Instead of youth’s exploitation and perversion by entrepreneurs and
the mass media what they require is firm but loving guidance. They
need to be subjected to positive direction, to learn the value of self-
discipline, to be shown the heights which a human spirit can reach,
to be taught to appreciate the excellence of our heritage, the oppor-
tunities of service to the community.127
With only 6,000 members, the LPYS was in no position to exert an
influence. Some nonetheless hoped that, by extending the franchise,
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Labour had, in the words of a broadsheet aimed at new voters, enabled
them to take their ‘full place in politics’. As Les Huckfield, at twenty-
seven years old the party’s youngest MP, wrote: youngsters currently
formed ‘the most articulate, idealistic and educated generation the world
has ever had’, one hitherto ‘forced to express itself in the language of
protest, on the streets’. By lowering the voting age, Huckfield con-
cluded, Labour had ‘brought them into the legislative process’.128
It is questionable how many wanted to be incorporated into the
political system. The record of the LPYS and earlier LOY suggested a
small and declining minority wanted to adhere to Labour’s own model
of participation. As outlined at the start of the chapter, the party’s
failure to establish a viable youth wing has been blamed on its own lack
of consideration for the interests of young people. The chapter went
on to outline how members addressed the need to evoke a more positive
response and the assumptions that underpinned their perceptions of
the problem. The party broadly wanted to induce the young into what
was considered appropriate political conduct. While some viewed the
young’s concerns as worthy of serious consideration, Labour’s general
approach implied they required its guidance before they could become
political actors in their own right. The extent to which this outlook was
embedded in ideology as much as generational experience should have
come as little surprise to readers of earlier chapters.
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Engaging with participation
Most contemporaries dismissed Labour’s attempts to accommodate
demands for government to promote greater popular access to decision-
making. Those on the New Left presumed the Cabinet opposed greater
involvement in the political process; such critics adhered to Ralph
Miliband’s contention that the leadership was devoted to the parlia-
mentary system and implacably hostile to those who challenged the
constitutional status quo.1 Censure was not, however, restricted to the
far left. The backbench MP John Mackintosh was one of an increasing
number of younger revisionists who were unhappy with their govern-
ment’s apparent lack of interest in redistributing power from Whitehall.
As one of that number, David Marquand, later claimed, they questioned
the assumption ‘that outcome was all and process irrelevant’, and began
to consider that social democracy should be about political as much as
economic and social equality.2 Thus, Mackintosh believed ministers were
captive to a Fabian tradition committed to the ‘conviction that well-
educated well-disposed people’ working in London were ‘more likely to
be right and impartial than the more remote and backward inhabitants
of the provinces’.3
Harold Wilson was definitely conservative when it came to consti-
tutional matters.4 Owing to their conception of electoral politics, most
of Labour’s leaders saw the party’s main purpose as improving voters’
material conditions. The number of individuals involved in deciding
how to achieve this outcome and the means by which they did so were
considered second-order matters. Thus, in 1964 and 1966, consideration
of how to enhance popular influence on decision-making was brief,
vague and placed towards the end of the party’s manifestos. What is
more, proposals to reform government were framed by the need to
enhance its ability to further economic growth. Yet, if increasing efficiency
rather than democracy was to the fore, there was still talk of ‘humanis-
ing’ government and establishing a ‘true partnership‘ between people
and parliament.5 By the end of the decade, these thoughts had been
expanded and given greater salience. The National Executive Committee
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(NEC) issued two strategic statements – Progress and Change (1968) and
Agenda for a Generation (1969) – that emphasised the need to make the
country’s institutions more accountable. The NEC recognised that ‘man
will not live by [economic] growth alone’ and accepted that post-war expan-
sion had been achieved at the cost of creating an over-centralised state.
Warning that there was no easy solution to this problem, the NEC none-
theless called for a ‘fresh look at our concept of representative democracy’.6
This was not just a question of rhetoric. By the time they left office,
ministers had introduced numerous reforms and fostered an impressive
collection of reports and Royal Commissions, part of whose purpose
was to augment the individual’s influence over those decisions that most
affected their lives. Within Westminster, Select Committees and a Parlia-
mentary Commissioner had been introduced to help MPs challenge the
executive. There had also been an abortive attempt to reform the House
of Lords. In addition, ministers had commissioned the Redcliffe-Maud
and Wheatley reports into local government; the former mooted the
creation of regional councils. The government also passed the 1968
Town and Country Planning Act and subsequently issued the Skeffington
report, which gave the public an unprecedented say in planning. Finally,
the Cabinet approved the formation of the Crowther-Hunt Commission
and charged it with putting the constitution under the microscope, with
a particular eye on exploring the merits of devolving power to Scotland,
Wales and the English regions.
This chapter assesses the party’s response to demands for greater
participation – bearing in mind the uncertainties over both the nature
of what it meant exactly and how many wanted to be involved – by first
examining Labour’s historical attitude to the subject. It then outlines
how ministers responded to its emergence as a live issue during the late
1960s, and in particular highlights Judith Hart’s thinking, as she was
the minister briefly in charge of the matter. The chapter then looks at
those areas where increasing participation was at least discussed, such
as planning, devolution, and community development. The chapter
finally turns to the matter of participation within the Labour Party itself.
Labour, the individual and the state
From the start, Labour sought to use the existing parliamentary system
to achieve what it could for its constituents. Yet, while the party had an
instrumental view of politics, not all its members were devotees of par-
liament. Labour’s history in fact reveals a fitful interest in constitutional
reform and direct forms of representation.7 Thus, before 1914 the party
was host to debates about the merits of referenda, proportional represen-
tation, abolition of the Lords and Home Rule for Wales and Scotland.
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Some hoped to promote political participation because they thought it
inherent to the building of socialism. They lost out, however, to the
Fabian view, that it was safer for an elite to manipulate the existing
system towards progressive ends. The likes of Ramsay MacDonald feared
allowing the masses to do more than just vote for the party they wished
to hold office would, in the short run, hamper reform. They judged the
public’s opinions to be unpredictable and often reactionary.8
Even so, during the 1920s Labour remained committed to improving
the efficiency of the parliamentary system and MacDonald’s 1929–31
government tried to introduce a form of proportional representation
(the alternative vote) for general elections.9 Although Labour briefly
advocated abolishing the Lords, during the 1930s, the leadership main-
tained its broad acceptance of the political order. In relation to the
alternatives then offered by Communism and Fascism, Westminster did
not appear too bad. In addition, Labour became an enthusiast for the
state ownership of much of the economy and subjecting what remained
in private hands to centralised planning. This would entail a massive
increase in the power of government. However, there was little sense
that new forms of accountability or involvement were required. While
they were not oblivious to the possibility that the state might encroach
on individual liberties, Labour thinkers generally believed that, as the
future member of Wilson’s Cabinet Douglas Jay famously wrote, in
certain instances, ‘the gentleman in Whitehall really does know better
what is good for the people than the people know themselves’.10
The Second World War confirmed Labour’s faith in extending the
state while maintaining the existing political system: the ease with which
the post-war Attlee government implemented its programme further
reinforced that view.11 Even the doyen of the Labour left, Aneurin Bevan,
praised the unwritten nature of the British constitution because it
allowed legislators to define the limits of their own authority.12 Others
on the left accepted the parliamentary order with less enthusiasm. While
Hugh Jenkins, who would become an MP in 1964, doubted that ballot
box democracy would bring about socialism, he admitted he did not
know of any better system.13 In contrast, in 1968 Michael Foot echoed
Bevan’s outlook when he indicated that, so far as the left was concerned,
the real problem was not the character of parliament but the failure of
Labour ministers to place a greater share of the economy under its
supervision through nationalisation.14
Attlee’s ministers believed the enlightened few could achieve pro-
gressive ends through their manipulation of an enhanced state machine
operating within the established political system. Not all of them,
however, thought this would be sufficient to transform society fully: to
achieve that, the people had to become more involved. As the supposed
arch-pragmatist Herbert Morrison declared in 1948:
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Ballot box democracy, where people go and vote – if they can be
bothered and persuaded and shoved around to go and vote – every
few years and do nothing in between, is out of date. We must have
an active, living democracy in our country and we must whip up our
citizens to their responsibilities.
This vision, however, essentially assumed ‘responsible’ citizens would
join Labour and conform to the party’s version of socialism.15 In this
regard, at least, left and right were united: left-inclined bodies such as
Victory for Socialism took it for granted that socialism could occur only
through the party, rather than through the actions of agencies indepen-
dent of it.16
Be that as it may, revisionist thinking helped ensure that, after the
mid-1950s, Labour at least nodded towards pluralism, although this
reflected long-standing concerns about the dangers posed by unaccount-
able public bureaucracies.17 The 1956 policy document Personal Freedom
claimed that while Labour believed certain forms of individualism
harmed the collective interest, it did not seek to create ‘an all-powerful
State or excessive centralisation’. Instead, it believed ‘many important
decisions and activities should be left to voluntary and local effort’.
Given the expansion of welfare provision, contact with any number of
public authorities had, however, become commonplace. Labour declared
its determination that these should never ‘degenerate into irresponsible
bureaucracies’. Yet the proposed remedies were superficial, which was
probably inevitable given the assertion that Britain enjoyed ‘the most
efficient, incorruptible and “non-political” Civil Service in the world’.18
Not everybody thought this went far enough: MP Fred Willey, in
particular, believed more needed to be done to promote ‘responsible
participation’ and ensure the state ‘continues to serve the individual’,
rather than the reverse.19
Labour therefore entered the 1960s armed with a particular vision
of ‘participation’. Members were confident that a centralised state run
through Westminster would allow the party to achieve greater growth
and a better redistribution of wealth. Some, however, were concerned
that not enough citizens were active within the polity and that the state
might be too domineering. Hope more than experience suggested that
fully functioning local Labour parties in conjunction with a ‘modernised’
form of government would solve this problem.
Attitudes to participation
Some in the leadership certainly considered that demands for greater
participation should not be taken too seriously. One of Wilson’s
favoured conversational themes at the time of the 1966 election was
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that the public was ‘bored’ with politics and wanted him to be their
‘doctor who looked after the difficulties so that it could go on playing
tennis’.20 Wilson’s first Chief Whip, Edward Short, concurred, and con-
sidered most voters were ‘just ordinary, decent folks whose first thought
about every government is how it will affect them and their families’:
they were not ‘high-minded citizens’ with broad horizons.21 This senti-
ment was not confined to the leadership: it was a union delegate to the
1970 Labour Party conference who thought it ‘a lot of bunkum’ that
anyone was denied the right to participate, as people could easily join
their union and constituency Labour party.22
Others, if sceptical, were not wholly dismissive. Anthony Crosland
considered ‘participation’ a ‘hideously abused word’ and believed only
a small minority of the population wanted to influence decision-making –
and most of these, being middle class, were hostile to Labour. The rest,
he claimed:
prefer to lead a full family life and cultivate their gardens. And a
good thing too. For if we believe in socialism as a means of increasing
personal freedom and the range of choice, we do not necessarily
want a busy bustling society in which everyone is politically active,
and fussing around in an interfering and responsible manner, and
herding us all into participating groups. The threat to privacy and
freedom would be intolerable.
Despite this, Crosland hoped his 1970 White Paper on local govern-
ment reorganisation would encourage manual workers to become more
active in local affairs.23
If Crosland was more positive about participation than he initially
appeared, even those looking on the subject with more obvious sym-
pathy agreed that only a few wanted to be active. Nor did they imagine
that accommodating demands for participation required established
authorities to transform themselves fundamentally. Mackintosh, for
example, thought that most people simply wanted recourse to a ‘clear
system of accountability’ and was confident that if authorities were more
open in their procedures, although they might still irritate, they would
at least not alienate.24 On the other hand, while Labour’s 1969 Agenda
for a Generation advocated individuals’ ‘right to be consulted about, and
to influence, particular decisions which affect their daily lives’, it also
claimed that some decisions would still have to be taken centrally and
free from local influence.25 There were, therefore, thought to be many
practical limits to participation: those of popular interest, technical
knowledge and ability, as well as the need to ensure decision-making
was not unduly delayed and efficiency compromised.26 This meant that
most Labour reformers focused on the immediate and local rather than
national matters.
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While many of his colleagues also expressed their views on partici-
pation, it was the Minister for Technology, Tony Benn, who made the
issue his own, through a series of speeches that laid the foundation for
his post-1970 role as leader of the Labour left.27 In the early 1960s,
Benn helped establish an early example of participation, the New Bristol
Group. This body sought to mobilise citizens from diverse political
backgrounds interested in promoting public debates about a variety of
local issues.28 Significantly, however, it was in 1968, the year of Parisian
student unrest and massive Labour unpopularity, that Benn systematic-
ally considered the challenge posed by new demands for participation.
Benn started from the proposition that the electorate was better
educated and more self-confident than ever. This fostered a ‘political
individualism’ that could not be fully accommodated by conventional
political organisations and so gave rise to pressure groups that
challenged the parties’ legitimacy.29 People, he believed, were no longer
‘prepared to have policy handed down from on high’; instead, they
sought ‘a greater say and greater voice’ than allowed by the parlia-
mentary system. The perception was that people were being ‘kicked
around’ by those in authority and this alienation gave rise to Welsh and
Scottish nationalism, student radicalism and union militancy. Yet such
forces were hostile to government only because they had been denied
expression within it: most just wanted to ‘participate constructively’ and
win ‘responsibility’.
Benn’s proposals were, all things considered, fairly modest. First,
ministers needed to recognise the electorate’s intelligence and so foster
a ‘higher level of argument’. Politicians should tell the truth and present
the full complexity of the choices to be made. Election campaigns, in
addition, had to stop being ‘vast marketing operations, with the voters
cast in the role of consumers looking for bargain offers that give the
most for the least’ and instead should be the occasion for ‘solemn
choices’. Moreover, while the parties still had to give leadership, they
needed to involve voters in decision-making. As he explained to the
Prime Minister, he should not be ‘Dr Wilson’ but become a teacher who
encouraged the people to achieve things themselves.
Benn secondly proposed that Labour should find new ways of
allowing voters to influence policy-making. For example, he invited his
Bristol constituents to write to him about selected issues so he could
assess opinion – although he refused to be bound by the results. More
ambitiously, Benn looked forward to the time when people could press
a button in their homes and participate in referenda on matters of prin-
ciple. Thirdly, he wanted voters to enjoy easier access to information
and to that end supported moves to televise the Commons. Fourthly,
greater access to television airtime should be given to voluntary bodies,
like consumer groups, so they could present their views to a wider
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audience. Finally, Benn supported ceding power to the regions: before
the Troubles, he believed Northern Ireland proved that the devolution
of industrial policy could be economically advantageous, because local
politicians better knew how to deploy resources than Whitehall.
Benn’s intervention generated a largely negative response within the
party. Some MPs resented his ‘thinking out loud’, while Wilson claimed
he compromised collective responsibility by appearing to criticise
government policy. Others, like Michael Stewart, claimed their Cabinet
colleague had just ‘dressed up a lot of old ideas as if they were new’,
while Judith Hart thought Benn’s proposals ‘too safe and dull’. Still
more ministers, like John Stonehouse, looked on his notions as irrespon-
sible and deprecated ‘the current vogue of attacking institutions as though
they were mainly to blame for the maladies that we suffer’. Yet, in their
irritation, critics failed to notice that Benn’s proposals were meant to
help Labour ‘lead back into the system of peaceful political change’
those forces that he supposed were now operating outside it. In other
words, he wanted to alter the established political system in a variety of
modest ways in order to domesticate the supposed threat posed by strikers,
students, nationalists and the like.
Trendy Judith’s Green Paper
Benn did not have ministerial responsibility to promote participation.
As one of her leading officials resentfully put it, the Prime Minister had
‘publicly saddled’ Judith Hart with that job when she was promoted to
Paymaster General in October 1968.30 Hart’s task was met with cynicism
by the right-wing press, with the Daily Mail referring to her as ‘“trendy”
Judith’.31 Apart from journalistic scorn, she faced other disadvantages.
In particular, with mounting by-election and municipal losses, 1968 was
not the best of times for a Labour minister to show faith in the people’s
judgement. As Hart stated before her elevation, a Labour government
was ‘by its nature, a two-way process’, in which ‘we demand ideals and
sense of purpose both from ourselves and from the community’. Given
that, she believed ministers were ‘entitled to a little more of both from
the people than we are getting at this moment’.32 Hart also faced scepti-
cism in her own department, where one senior official observed that
ministers should look on participation as they would on virtue: ‘they
must always be in favour of it, and maximise it, provided the price is
not too high!’33
Despite all that, Hart set about drafting some proposals.34 Reformers
were, she claimed, presented with ‘the most exciting opportunity open
to us for 20 years to inject whatever new patterns and institutions we
believe best to meet individual and community needs into a democratic
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system suffering, perhaps, from a little hardening of the arteries’. Echo-
ing the Seebohm report on social services, Hart believed the post-war
welfare state had created a new situation. At one time, income had
determined the quality of an individual’s health care and education,
but the expansion of welfare provision meant this was now determined
by government. Unfortunately, public institutions had ‘failed to satisfy
many of the people for whom they existed’ and were ‘totally inadequate’
in their ‘provision for user-participation’. Thus, pressure groups had
grown up to represent consumers, who were better educated, free of
the threat of poverty and willing to focus their energies on achieving
‘direct involvement’. Rather conveniently, the Paymaster stated that, as
parliament was reforming itself, she would focus on the ‘peripheral area
of our democratic structure’, by which she meant ‘town halls, education
committees, nationalised industries, [and] local offices of government
bodies’. What Hart termed the ‘built-in unresponsiveness of outdated
and inadequate institutions’ had to be overcome and new patterns dis-
covered, ‘which not merely permit but invite and encourage effective
participation’.
Informed by this analysis, Hart wrote a Green Paper during the
spring of 1969.35 Like many others in the party, she believed few craved
more involvement in decision-making but thought a larger number
wanted to participate in working out the implications of agreed policies
for their own communities. To that end, Hart proposed creating neigh-
bourhood councils that would operate below established councils. These
would also be smaller than the local councils proposed by Redcliffe-
Maud’s investigation of local government (referred to below), as they
would fit into areas smaller than existing municipal wards. They would:
enjoy the right to be consulted by council officials, who could be called
to attend meetings; have access to relevant information; and be able to
nominate representatives to public bodies.
Hart’s draft contained many grey areas, but in particular the exact
nature of the relationship between a neighbourhood council and higher
bodies was not spelt out. Moreover, while she wanted neighbourhood
councils to represent an ‘organic community’, defining such an entity
proved hard. Hart nonetheless passed her document to the Prime
Minister for comment, with a mind to publishing a final version in the
autumn. Wilson, however, had already told Hart the time was not ripe
for concrete proposals and he was ‘noticeably unenthusiastic’ about her
work.36 In fact, the Prime Minister was unimpressed by his Paymaster’s
overall performance – he described her as ‘just a prattling woman who
had done absolutely nothing’.37 For her pains, Hart was moved to the
Ministry of Overseas Development in October 1969 and the Green
Paper was not heard of again.
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Participation in planning
One criticism of the demand for more participation was that it was too
vague. Hart believed Labour’s proposals to enhance the public’s ability
to influence planning showed that participation ‘can have a practical
application in at least one important field’.38 The 1968 Town and
Country Planning Act gave the public the chance to make represen-
tations that authorities had to take into account at a much earlier stage
than hitherto. With no little hyperbole, this stipulation was described
by Arthur Skeffington, a junior minister at the Ministry of Housing and
Local Government, as ‘a new Magna Carta in planning’.39
The Committee on Public Participation in Planning, chaired by
Skeffington, was established to determine how authorities should facilitate
expression of the public’s new voice and published its recommendations
in July 1969. While Skeffington underlined how important it was that
the public enjoyed adequate means of influencing planning, he still
believed responsible authorities should retain the final say. His pro-
posals were aimed at directing the people’s talents into ‘constructive
channels’, so that planning could be ‘collaborative and friendly’ and
allow people and planners to realise they were on the same side.40
Skeffington’s proposals nonetheless proved contentious, in particular
those relating to the creation of community forums and the appoint-
ment of community development officers. The object of the former was
to gather together local voluntary associations to help them present
their views; the role of the latter was to mobilise the opinions of indi-
viduals belonging to no formal organisation – which in practice meant
helping working-class residents make a case.
The Skeffington report was written in such a way as to win over
authorities sceptical of the need for greater participation.41 Despite this,
many remained opposed and, while not all were against the forums,
they were almost universally hostile to development officers. The
London Boroughs Association, for example, believed the latter were
superfluous, thinking ‘the individual’s right not to comment should be
accepted’, while the Urban District Council Association argued that ‘if
it is to be genuine and of real value’, participation ‘must be voluntary
and not induced’.42 In contrast, most voluntary organisations welcomed
the report: the National Federation of Women’s Institutes considered
Skeffington had created ‘opportunities for intelligent and constructive
comment [that] would help and overcome public apathy’.43 Hart was
especially enthusiastic about development officers and wanted their
function extended, so they could promote community development ‘as
an active and positive function’.44
Ministers found it difficult to take account of such contradictory com-
ments when constructing a circular to be issued to planning authorities.
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Officials were still grappling with the task when Labour lost power. They
had, however, prepared a draft that ceded most ground to Skeffington’s
critics, as neither forums nor development officers were made obligatory.
Authorities were instead expected to take steps to ensure they consulted
a cross-section of the public about any proposal; how this was to be
achieved was left to them.45 This was undoubtedly a step back from
what had been promised: if the 1968 Act still represented a new Magna
Carta, King John had regained many of his powers.
Responding to nationalism
Some Labour members reacted to the post-1966 by-election successes
of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru by suggesting the
party should embrace legislative devolution. Given that the likes of Keir
Hardie had supported Home Rule, advocates claimed they were just
‘reaffirming’ a ‘basic Labour policy’ that had been temporarily cast
aside.46 A few argued that limited self-government was consistent with
democratic socialism, as it would promote participation in decision-
making and develop responsibility.47 Others, however, looked on any
measure that threatened to break up the United Kingdom as, at best,
eccentric. Even Benn (albeit in 1967) argued that, as satellites could
circumnavigate the earth in ninety minutes, it was ‘a little odd to press
for further disintegration of government’.48
Appeasing nationalist sentiment was, moreover, viewed with suspicion,
for nationalism was considered an irrational and ultimately violent force,
the very antithesis of enlightened democratic socialism. Thus, in 1959
activists in the Labour–Liberal marginal seat of Merioneth were most
exercised not by their closest rival but by Plaid’s ‘wild dreams’.49 After
1966, Labour’s rhetoric became more vituperative but undoubtedly
reflected genuine concern. Arthur Woodburn, Attlee’s Secretary of State
for Scotland, pronounced the SNP guilty of ‘race hatred’ and, drawing
parallels with the Nazis, asserted that if nationalists achieved their end,
they would spark a civil war.50 When extremists set off bombs in Wales,
one regional official considered this vindicated similar fears, and des-
cribed such acts as the inevitable result of Plaid’s purportedly hysterical
language.51 There was, in addition, the suspicion that once the British
labour movement was fragmented into national units, it would be seri-
ously weakened. As the party’s Scottish Council put it in 1969, Labour’s
‘strength lies in unity; a unity which transcends the narrow limits of
prejudice and nationalism, and reaches out towards a Democratic Socialist
Commonwealth’.52
The essential basis for Labour’s case in favour of the Union was
economic. For example, the centralised policies pursued by the Attlee
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government were credited with rescuing Scotland and Wales from mass
unemployment. Many outside England saw salvation in the further con-
centration of economic power in the hands of the British state and then
enhancing their influence within the Whitehall machine that ran it.
Certainly, before 1966, economic criteria were the only ones that
appeared to exert any force. Thus, during the 1950s, the Welsh Regional
Council of Labour rejected calls for a separate parliament but supported
the case for a Secretary of State on the grounds that while the former
would harm prosperity in the principality, the latter would have the
opposite effect.53 Similar considerations led Labour’s Scottish Council
to reject a devolved legislature. Forced to clarify its position in 1958, it
asserted that while centralisation had not eliminated all Scotland’s prob-
lems, those that remained would ‘best be solved by socialist planning
on a United Kingdom scale’. Citing the view of the Scottish TUC
(STUC), it argued that ‘economic security remains the primary factor
for the Scottish people’ and that could be achieved only if they remained
fully integrated within the British economy and properly represented
at Westminster.54
Given this frame of reference, it was not surprising that many saw
nationalist success as a reflection of how the government’s economic
policies were hurting voters. The cuts in spending and insistence on
wage restraint after July 1966 were widely resented across the United
Kingdom, which saw unemployment rise, particularly in industrial
Wales and Scotland. In England, it was argued, disaffected voters turned
to the Conservatives, but elsewhere they used the nationalists to vent
their feelings. Given the supposedly negative nature of SNP and Plaid
support, once the government’s policies began to work it would, as one
minister put it, ‘evaporate’. It was therefore unnecessary to address the
issue of constitutional change; indeed, given that it would only encourage
nationalists, such a course was dangerous.55
Others were not so confident that nationalist support would dis-
appear – but agreed its rise reflected problems general to the United
Kingdom. In arguing for Scottish legislative devolution during the late
1950s, Mackintosh proceeded from the assumption that all Britons
wanted to control the expanded post-war state bureaucracy. His solution
was to create a number of elected sub-parliaments, to bring government
closer to the people; these would enjoy responsibility for most internal
issues, leaving Westminster to deal with economic planning, defence
and foreign policy. Labour’s 1967 Hamilton by-election defeat was due,
he believed, to the fact that this feeling of ‘remoteness’ from govern-
ment had not yet been addressed.56
Some did think the rise of nationalism said something specific about
the situation in Wales and Scotland. Even so, while they did not make
the connection, much of their analysis was applicable to other parts of
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industrial Britain, where Labour also enjoyed a virtual monopoly of
elected office. Gwilym Prys Davies, the party’s candidate in the 1966
Carmarthen by-election, believed Labour representatives had alienated
the young – presumed to be a core nationalist constituency – because
they had become the ‘new conservatives’. Labour in Wales, he stated,
was merely committed to maintaining the status quo.57 Adopting a
slightly different tack, James Griffiths, Welsh Secretary of State during
1964–6, came to a similar conclusion. He believed rising unemploy-
ment had created a sense of helplessness among established Labour
voters, although Griffiths also accepted that the party no longer repre-
sented the kind of idealistic cause to which he supposed the young were
attracted. Thus, like Prys Davies, Griffiths thought Labour needed to
embrace a ‘constructive alternative’ to independence or was ‘doomed
to disappear’ in the principality.58 In Scotland as much as in Wales, one
of Labour’s most intractable problems was that it had held on to power
in many local authorities for a number of generations: the party’s
municipal record was hardly unblemished, while accustomed electoral
success bred complacency and a frail organisation – most especially in
Glasgow.59
While some were exercised by how to respond to nationalism, it
would be wrong to imagine Labour’s predicament appeared acute to
everybody. During the later 1950s, it was unsurprising that Edinburgh
Fabians did not think devolution or independence important enough
to devote even one of their many speaker meetings to.60 More un-
expectedly, Edinburgh South’s general management committee (GMC)
entirely disregarded the question of Scottish government throughout
the 1960s. The one time constitutional change figured on its agenda
was when members asked Edinburgh City Party to counter SNP propa-
ganda.61 More generally, immediately before the Hamilton by-election
only one resolution on Scottish government was submitted to the 1967
Scottish party conference. In contrast, in 1968 ten such resolutions –
albeit out of seventy-two – were submitted. Of these, however, only two
favoured a devolved legislature, while a further two simply wanted
nationalist arguments refuted. The remainder just called for greater
administrative devolution, such as holding meetings of the Grand Com-
mittee in Edinburgh and moving more civil servants north of the
border. As they submitted only one resolution on the topic in 1969,
presumably most members’ interest had by then been exhausted.62
Measured in terms of resolutions submitted to their conference, Welsh
activists were more concerned with rising unemployment; in com-
parison, Cardiff ’s relationship with Westminster was insignificant.63
This lack of interest suited the Scottish Council executive, which was
reluctant to amend the approach outlined in 1958.64 The Hamilton
reverse forced the hierarchy to promise to consider the question ‘anew’,
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although this resulted in a simple reiteration of policy. After the un-
precedented – if still limited – interest shown at the 1968 Scottish party
conference, support for further administrative devolution was mooted
and the matter was placed in the hands of a sub-committee. If this was
not a delaying tactic it looked like one, for members took eighteen
months to decide that any type of elected legislature was unwise. As a
concession to new thinking, however, they supported local government
reform and called for the powers of the Scottish Office to be enhanced.
Even these modest proposals appeared dangerous to many Scots MPs.65
Those advocating a new relationship with Westminster despaired of
such thinking. Mackintosh was no friend of nationalism and had long
argued that an elected assembly for Scotland would be a bulwark against
it. Such an arrangement, he argued, would be efficient and meet the
democratic needs of the people, while Scots MPs could still play a full
part in debating national economic issues. Regionalism would also be a
fillip to Labour’s wider ambitions, for voters would never support a
radical reduction of inequality if they believed government was run by
a remote bureaucracy which did not have their interests at heart.66 The
end of the 1960s saw the revisionist Mackintosh joined by others drawn
from the party’s left, like the MP Alex Eadie and future MP Jim Sillars,
who took a firm line against independence but who nonetheless
endorsed the establishment of regional authorities.67 Yet even advocates
of a devolved Scottish parliament accepted that prosperity depended
on ‘socialist planning for the whole of Britain’.68 Activists in Edinburgh
even justified a parliament on the grounds that it would rebuild public
‘respect’ for government, and suggested devolution was a ‘natural’
evolution of existing arrangements.69 Despite their moderation, these
voices nonetheless remained on the periphery of the Scottish debate.
In Wales matters were more dynamic, if only because the principality
lacked the same degree of autonomy long enjoyed by Scotland. Labour
entered the 1959 campaign committed to creating a Welsh Office, and
made good this promise in 1964. The Secretary of State for Wales, how-
ever, enjoyed fewer powers than the Scottish counterpart, something
that rankled with many, who continued to push for additional powers
short of devolution. In particular, they called for the Welsh Economic
Council to assume more responsibility and even for it to be directly
elected, a view endorsed by Cledwyn Hughes, Secretary of State during
1966–8.70 While its recommendations were watered down, the study
group established by the Welsh party to investigate the machinery of
government favoured creating an elected parliament that would share
responsibility for economic planning with Westminster.71 The appoint-
ment of George Thomas as Secretary of State in 1968 indicated that
Downing Street did not welcome such thinking. Instead of dallying with
constitutional matters, Thomas focused his attention on ensuring the
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success of the investiture of the Queen’s eldest son as Prince of Wales in
July 1969. This blatant example of an ‘invented tradition’ was devised
with at least two eyes on mobilising unionist opinion within the prin-
cipality: indicating the weakness of nationalism in Wales, it proved to
be a great success.
A federal United Kingdom?
As Lord President of the Council, Richard Crossman was responsible
for co-ordinating the government’s response to nationalism.72 Crossman
believed that, in the short term, administrative devolution should be
accelerated. He did not, however, think this would solve the fun-
damental problem exposed by Labour’s electoral reverses, for, echoing
the views of those like Mackintosh, he believed the main cause was the
failure of established political institutions to relate to new popular
demands for greater self-government. If this was more obvious in Wales
and Scotland, it was evident in England, too, and called for a radical
solution, which, Crossman believed, was the creation of a federal United
Kingdom, with power dispersed to elected regional assemblies. Before
moving to this end, however, he felt it wise to wait for the publication of
the Redcliffe-Maud and Wheatley commissions on local government in
England and Scotland, respectively. These tackled related issues and
Crossman feared that if ministers pressed on without the benefit of their
insights, they would be accused of trying to placate nationalism through
unprincipled expedients.
Unfortunately for the Lord President, the Redcliffe-Maud and
Wheatley reports were not published until the summer of 1969 and his
Cabinet colleagues were keen to apply an immediate palliative to dampen
down nationalism. To that end, the Home Secretary, James Callaghan,
a man with little interest in constitutional matters, together with the
Secretaries of State for Wales and Scotland, pushed for the immediate
announcement of a constitutional commission.73 The establishment of
this body, with an extensive – some might think deliberately over-
ambitious – remit, under the chairmanship of Lord Crowther-Hunt would,
Callaghan claimed, allow the government to ‘establish the facts’.74 If
the commission delayed the moment when decisions needed to be taken,
it nonetheless gave the impression ministers had taken heed of public
opinion.
While federalism did not excite many of Crossman’s colleagues, it
enjoyed some support among English Labour activists. Advocates
included T. Dan Smith, former leader of Newcastle City Council and of
the Labour Party’s Northern Region. Encouraged by the experience
of regional economic planning councils established under the aegis of
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the Department of Economic Affairs, leading lights in the North East
considered elected regional government ‘essential’. Using economic
arguments in a way contrary to that employed in Scotland, they claimed
that if their region was to overcome its many problems, it needed greater
responsibility for planning. Although they still believed central govern-
ment should retain overall control of planning, they argued that its
detailed application could be the job of assemblies accountable to the
voters. Autonomy, of course, had its limits and it was thought taxation
should not be levied at the regional level – if only because it would
leave the troubled North East even poorer.75 Indicative of divisions few
in the national leadership wanted to expose, members in the affluent
West Midlands also wanted an elected regional council – but one armed
with the power to levy income tax.76
Federalism, however, faced formidable opposition outside the Cabi-
net, in the form of most trade unions. They believed devolution would
undermine disadvantaged regions, as it would expose the extent to which
Westminster redistributed wealth from the better-off areas to the poorest.
Thus, while it might increase democracy, federalism would exacerbate
Britain’s uneven economic development.77
Despite everything, Labour’s formal attitude to devolution did not
much change during 1964–70. There was support for measures, such
as the 1967 Welsh Language Act, that accommodated cultural difference.
However, many in Wales feared a devolved parliament with legislative
powers would undermine the ability of Welsh MPs to influence White-
hall and so harm the national interest.78 In Scotland, the issue moved
an even shorter distance: echoing the views of the party’s Scottish Council,
the chair of Edinburgh West CLP claimed that only one factor would
revive Labour’s fortunes north of the border: economic recovery.79
Reforming local government
The slow progress of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission on the Reform of
Local Government in England, as well as of other investigations into the
situation in Wales and Scotland, was one legitimate reason why ministers
were unwilling to allow discussion of federalism to develop too quickly.
The commission was known to be considering regional government,
although it was taking its time: it sat for over three years and its report
was not published until June 1969. The commission was Wilson’s response
to concern about the relevance of local government, for when Attlee
nationalised utilities such as gas and water, then created a National
Health Service, he stole many of the municipal authorities’ respon-
sibilities. It is no wonder that, by the mid-1960s, most local contests
provoked the participation of little more than one-third of the electorate.
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Introducing the Redcliffe-Maud report, the Prime Minister rightly
described it as recommending the ‘most far-reaching reorganisation of
local government the country has ever seen’. Wilson particularly wel-
comed its proposals to rationalise a confusing array of bodies, something
he hoped would create more effective authorities. He also correctly pre-
dicted that some of the report’s proposals would be contentious, although
he did not say this would be especially true in his own party.80 While the
Commission raised the possibility of regional government and suggested
new means by which people might participate at the grass roots, Redcliffe-
Maud was seen as further centralising power and as being interested in
efficient rather than democratic administration.81
The report’s main recommendation was to create three tiers of admin-
istrative responsibility. It proposed that England (excluding London)
should have its current 1,200 elected bodies replaced by just sixty-one,
all but three of which would have exclusive responsibility for services.
Given their size, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool were granted
metropolitan status, which meant they would share service provision
with a number of smaller councils. These sixty-one bodies were each to
appoint some of their members – and co-opt a smaller number of outside
experts – to eight provincial councils. Wheatley made similar proposals
for regional government in Scotland. Building on the Department of
Economic Affairs’ regional economic planning councils, their main role
was to lie in economic planning and development. Below these two
layers, Redcliffe-Maud suggested a third, composed of local councils of
various sizes with limited and mostly undefined responsibilities.
Labour was divided over the report. Wilson was attracted to the cre-
ation of newer, fewer and (he presumed) more efficient local authorities.
However, George Thomson, whom the Prime Minister charged with
assessing party opinion, detected a ‘depressingly conservative response’
among councillors and activists. Not only did they fear for their own
prospects as a result of the boundary changes required by reform, but
they had also become attached to administrative units with venerable
traditions, and opposed their abolition. Crosland similarly noted that
the proposed reduction of councillors – numbers were set to drop from
32,000 to 7,000 – caused ‘dismay’ within the ranks. Given their influ-
ence in CLPs, Thomson warned the Prime Minister that he needed to
take full account of councillors’ views when drafting legislation. Trans-
port House was consequently persuaded to arrange a series of regional
conferences designed to win over critics.82
Such was the concern in Bristol West, its GMC devoted two meetings
to the subject, which confirmed Labour activists’ largely critical response
to Redcliffe-Maud. The future MP Michael Cocks feared rural areas
would enjoy undue weight in the provincial councils and so loosen
Labour’s already precarious grip on local government in the South West.
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He also believed the report ‘had an air of Civil Service thinking about
it’, inasmuch as it gave too much power to chief executives and appointed
members, as opposed to elected representatives. Some called for mun-
icipal authorities to be reshaped to allow people to participate actively,
believing it was better to have more democracy even if was at the cost of
efficiency. Paradoxically, however, Cocks did not want Whitehall to give
up too much power to the provincial councils, as he feared the quality
of services would then vary across the country – an understandable fear
for a Labour activist in a region where the Conservatives were likely to
dominate. In the end, the GMC agreed to support a motion that rejected
the report on the grounds that it would concentrate power in too few
hands.83
Labour’s 1969 conference revealed that many activists believed the
report sacrificed democracy ‘on the altar of efficiency’. If applied, they
feared a worsening of the ‘apathy and feeling of cynicism felt by many
people, the feeling of remoteness that the elector has to even his town
or civic hall’. The provincial councils would be undemocratic, the
unitary authorities too big and local councils toothless.84 Those 1,000
members who attended Labour’s eight regional conferences held on
the subject during October generally supported that view. Given the
earlier discussion on devolution, it will be no surprise that their over-
whelming view was that provincial councils should be directly elected.
Especially from the North and the West Midlands came the call to be
granted legislative powers. Members were also sceptical about the
proposed local councils and regarded them as functionless sounding
boards for local opinion. If they were to be more than that, their powers
needed to be defined and enhanced.85
As the minister responsible for local government, and latterly partici-
pation, Crosland had his own doubts about Redcliffe-Maud. His White
Paper, published in February 1970, reflected some of those misgivings.86
In particular, Crosland appeared only too happy to wait for the
Crowther-Hunt Commission to report before pronouncing on provin-
cial councils. Possibly influenced by Hart’s abortive Green Paper, he
nonetheless made some concrete proposals with regard to local councils,
suggesting they should be created throughout all unitary areas –
although in metropolitan districts these should come into being only if
demanded by residents. Although he was unwilling to give them re-
sponsibility for providing services, Crosland ensured they could play a
part in their administration. More generally, he presented the White
Paper as giving authorities greater freedom from central government.
While they would have to conform to certain national policies – such as
the introduction of comprehensive education – they would be free of
detailed supervision in a variety of areas and enjoy unprecedented
financial autonomy.87
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The Community Development Programme
While usually thought of as a flawed experiment in welfare provision,
the Community Development Programme (CDP) also indicated how far
ministers were willing to recast the relationship between individual and
state.88 It was not a Labour scheme but originated in the work of the
Home Office Children’s Department and was largely the initiative of
Derek Morrell, an official described by Crossman as ‘of quite unusual
administrative drive combined with a mystical imagination’.89 Yet the
fact that the CDP saw the light of day showed how far the government –
even conservative figures like James Callaghan – was willing to sponsor
innovation.
The essential aim of the CDP was to discover new ways of meeting
the needs of those apparently suffering from ‘multiple deprivation’ and
so dependent on the welfare state. It was thought such groups remained
trapped in poverty partly because welfare agencies had failed to co-
ordinate their efforts, so the CDP relied on an inter-service team,
including local and national bodies. Most innovative, however, was its
stress on the need to involve the poor in guiding the project and ensur-
ing welfare providers actually met their needs.90 As Crossman put it,
the CDP would help the poor ‘stand more on their own in the future by
their own efforts, without having to rely so much on external support’,
as it would encourage ‘mutual help and voluntary effort’ within local
communities.91 Thus, while an example of state intervention, its pur-
pose was to empower the poor and help them ‘exercise more control
over their lives’.92
Callaghan launched the scheme in January 1969. It was meant to
embrace twelve pilot areas, each of which would enjoy a generous
degree of autonomy from Whitehall, to allow them to reflect residents’
self-defined interests. In the spring, four councils were invited to
participate, the object being to have another four up and running by
October 1970. However, by the time Labour left office only two projects –
Liverpool and Coventry – were properly established and it was not until
Wilson was back in power in 1974 that the target number of projects
was met.93 One reason for delay was the reluctance of most local authori-
ties, for, while mostly funded from a £20 million budget, each project
still required some municipal expenditure. Local officials were also
afraid of giving away too much control; Coventry’s Director of Edu-
cation, for example, predicted ‘permanent instability’ if too much store
was put in residents’ opinions. Finally, consultations with council
officials, local agency representatives and, especially, residents had to
be protracted to ensure each side fully co-operated.94 In particular,
determining who represented the ‘community’ proved problematic. In
Liverpool, the influential Catholic Church-dominated Scotland Road
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Residents Association claimed to speak for locals, but officials doubted
that.95 In Coventry’s Hillfields district there were three neighbourhood
organisations but the CDP director thought co-opting them would smack
of a nominal form of ‘community’ involvement. However, he appreci-
ated that picking those he considered best suited to the task was also
unsatisfactory.96
The election of a Conservative government in June 1970 did not help
the development of the CDP and resulted in the project being shifted
from its original administrative home. This compounded problems asso-
ciated with high levels of personnel turnover and unwieldy steering
groups that appeared to find decision-making traumatic. Moreover, from
the outset, the principle on which the CDP was based had been criti-
cised by those influenced by ‘radical’ sociology. Even the academic
charged with co-ordinating CDP research believed the assumption that
the poor could be helped to improve their position within the existing
system was a ‘shibboleth of liberal society in decline’.97 Others praised
its aims but considered that, without any conflict between deprived com-
munities and the state, the poor would never achieve improvement.
Despite the intention to help the poor help themselves, these detractors
considered it was based on a patronising ‘missionary approach’.98 Many
social workers employed by the projects adhered to these views and
refashioned – or Callaghan believed misused – them to suit their own
agendas. If such attempts to radicalise the poor failed to improve their
lives, they nonetheless gave CDP employees a base from which they
could transform inner-city CLPs during the 1970s.99 Thus, two years
after all twelve projects had been finally established, the CDP was closed
down and dubbed a dismal failure, even by progressive Labour figures
such as the Home Office minister Alex Lyon.100
A participatory party?
Despite the assumptions of many in the party, it was uncertain how far
CLPs were the best means of fostering wider political participation.
Most working-class members exhibited what some considered a ‘natural
quietism’, in that they rarely challenged even representatives who went
against their wishes. Others believed there was so little evidence of
members making any impact on government policy that party democ-
racy was a myth.101 Activists were certainly frustrated by Wilson’s refusal
to take heed of conference; as one noted in 1969, CLPs contained those
‘who work like hell for the Labour Party to keep it financially sound
[but] … who frankly are ignored on so many occasions when the ques-
tion of policy has to be discussed’.102 At least some ministers believed
this the proper state of affairs. Short, for one, believed the NEC – and
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presumably the party as a whole – should confine itself to acting as the
government’s ‘cheerleader’. Wilson’s own conception of consulting
members was limited to attending meetings, where he would listen to
activists’ complaints, then sign autographs.103
If the party’s internal procedures were problematic, by the end of
the decade an increasing number were concerned that many CLPs were
‘claustrophobic and inward-looking’ and so unable to give voice to local
residents.104 They needed, it was said, to involve themselves more closely
in community action and help build ‘a more effective grass roots social
democracy’. Members should become involved in every aspect of society,
‘right down to the ordinary, everyday things of ordinary people’s every-
day lives’. MP and NEC member Tom Bradley stated that local parties
should support tenants’ associations, so that residents could appreciate
that Labour would ‘fight with them, not just for higher wages and better
conditions, but for a cleaner, more civilised environment and for a say
in how hospitals, schools and factories are run’. Some were more inter-
ested than others in exploring these possibilities. Labour-controlled
Sheffield Council was one of the few to form a committee on which sat
members of the Housing Committee and tenants’ groups, which had
the power to recommend action.105
Transport House had always appreciated that a healthy organisation
required an informed and enthusiastic membership. In the late 1960s,
officials sought new means to overcome members’ ignorance of policy
and alienation from policy-making.106 Even old hands such as the
regional organiser Jim Raisin believed Labour required a ‘genuinely
democratic structure’.107 With that in mind, in 1969 the Home Policy
Sub-committee recommended a scheme, referred to as Participation ’69,
that involved circulating a background document to local organisations
along with a questionnaire to be submitted to the NEC. According to
one critical observer, this was ‘the first new approach to party democ-
racy since 1918’.108 Even so, if its main purpose was to give members a
more direct say in policy-making, officials hoped it would also enlighten
them as to the difficult decisions faced by ministers and so create a
greater degree of empathy for their leaders.109
The first topic selected for discussion was women and social security.
Armed with members’ responses, the NEC proposed to brief MPs in
time for a forthcoming Commons debate on the issue. A discussion
document and questionnaire were duly despatched to 2,000 local parties,
women’s sections, Young Socialist branches and affiliated unions, who
were all urged to debate the subject. The response was rather dis-
appointing. Only 198 questionnaires were returned by the deadline,
although over 250 were eventually submitted; it was calculated that
2,343 individuals had taken part in discussions. The NEC nonetheless
considered this a helpful first step in a procedure it wanted to become
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an established feature of policy-making. Discussion of the second topic –
economic equality – was, however, disrupted by the 1970 election cam-
paign and the documents were never circulated to members.110
Conclusion
Labour’s 1970 manifesto devoted five pages to policies designed to make
Britain an ‘active democracy’ and announced how seriously the party
took the need to ‘infuse a democratic element into the increasingly
complex institutions which dominate our lives’.111 While it is usually
unwise to place much credence in the contents of a manifesto, it would
be churlish to dismiss this as constituting no more than a rhetorical
shift. Although Labour’s response to demands for greater participation
was more ambivalent and limited than some wanted, its engagement
was much more positive than often supposed.
It would still be fair to stress how far the party had not moved and
the extent to which any shift in position was the result of ministers’
desire to appease apparently powerful electoral forces. Thus, despite
Labour ministers’ ‘pious words’, by 1970 Mackintosh considered Britain
remained one of the most centralised of industrial societies.112 Labour’s
was an open-ended legacy, one consisting of a generous number of Royal
Commissions, reports, experimental projects and White Papers, but com-
paratively little substantive change. At least some of this was deliberate:
for many ministers, investigating the ‘facts’ was preferable to tackling
tricky issues head on. The likes of Wilson were largely uninterested in
changing the process, being preoccupied with manipulating the existing
mechanics of decision-making. Even so, the Prime Minister still gave
colleagues limited scope to develop ideas that echoed radical opinion
outside government.
Change in this matter, above all others, was protracted – possibly
inevitably so – and Labour in office had taken but a few faltering steps
by June 1970. As Judith Hart warned in relation to the Skeffington
report, even after some reform the people ‘will continue to show the
irrationality and ingratitude which is their right as citizens’. Moreover,
‘for a long time all that will be possible to demonstrate as a result of the
whole effort will be a little more understanding and give and take here
and there’. However, at least there might be ‘a willingness on the part
of the authorities to take the public into their confidence rather more
fully and at an earlier stage than hitherto’.113 As Hart was an enthusiast
for innovation, it is no wonder that many others, inherently sceptical
about the need for change, preferred to cling to the familiar ways of
doing politics rather than take such a leap into the dark.
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Conclusion. The 1970 general election
Labour lost the 1970 general election, ending what was then only the
second time the party had held office backed by a comfortable Commons
majority. Unlike Clement Attlee’s 1945–51 administration, however,
Wilson’s had few positive achievements to its name. The consensus
among the government’s innumerable critics on the left was that this
was a failure of will more than circumstance. As Ralph Miliband wrote,
the government ‘could have had all the support it required from trade
unionists, had it been seen to be genuinely engaged in the creation of
a society marked by greater social justice’. The point was, however, that
the likes of Wilson were uninterested in promoting equality because they
were preoccupied with maintaining the status quo.1
Regarding the concerns highlighted in this work, the government’s
detractors similarly claimed that, had they wanted to, ministers could
have: promoted comprehensive education with greater enthusiasm;
pursued a more radical version of industrial democracy; introduced
equal pay for women far sooner; taken a firmer line against racism;
been more accommodating to the concerns of youth; and promoted
popular participation with less suspicion. While such matters did not
all directly determine Labour’s electoral fate, the party’s failure to
secure re-election suggests that it had not adequately come to terms
with at least some of the cultural changes fostered by the ‘Golden Age’.
The picture was, however, not universally bleak. With that proposition
it mind, this final chapter reviews how the party approached the 1970
campaign, assesses the result and accounts for Labour’s response, one
that set it down a path that led to the wilderness years of the 1980s.
‘Selsdon man’
Despite the economic problems of the previous three years, Labour
members saw in 1970 with some optimism. In January, Wilson went on
the offensive after the Conservative shadow Cabinet held a weekend
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conference at the Selsdon Park Hotel. This gathering was meant to
imbue the Conservative’s post-1966 policy review with some coherence,
but the media created the impression that it marked a dramatic depar-
ture from post-war policy. Certainly, Edward Heath, the party’s leader
since 1965, wanted to introduce more economic competition, cut taxes,
reform industrial relations through legislation, tackle ‘law and order’
and tighten immigration controls. Yet Heath did not seek fundamentally
to alter the direction of policy set down in the 1940s and he remained
committed to full employment.2
It nonetheless suited Wilson’s purpose to stress the extent to which
the Conservatives wanted to change tack. He sought to create an enemy
that posed such a threat to the existing order he could rally Labour’s
most disenchanted supporters back to the cause. In following this defens-
ive strategy, the Labour leader nonetheless marked out a genuine, if
crudely drawn, distinction between the parties over the appropriate use
of the state to secure collectively desirable ends. Wilson invented ‘Selsdon
man’ to personify Heath’s supposed new Conservatism, which, he alleged,
had turned its back on the more consensual approach of Harold
Macmillan. The Prime Minister declared Selsdon man was consumed
by the ‘atavistic desire to reverse the course of 25 years of social revolu-
tion’ by proposing a ‘wanton, calculated return to greater inequality’ that
substituted a ‘free for all in place of the welfare state’. He apparently
wanted to ‘replace the compassionate society with the ruthless, pushing
society’, ‘reject the society that has been created since the war, a civilised
society in which the community, working through Government and
Parliament, provides for the needs of the community, on the basis that
everyone counts’.3
Wilson’s Cabinet colleagues, Judith Hart among others, echoed his
message, stressing the contrast between the parties. Grass-roots Conser-
vatives were, she alleged, selecting ‘rampaging Powellite near-fascists’
as parliamentary candidates and so posed a ‘threat to all our civilised
social values’.4 Even before the Selsdon Park meeting, ministers, includ-
ing the normally temperate Edward Short, warned of the dangers of a
‘massive lurch in society towards reaction’. While such a lurch was claimed
to be embodied by Enoch Powell, it was also said to be generally evident
in the defence of elitism, authoritarianism and racism, and in demands
for capital and corporal punishment, the ending of the welfare state
and a return to ‘traditional’ values in education.5 As the chair of the
spring 1970 national conference of Labour women told delegates, the
choice before voters was clear: ‘to keep in forward gear with Labour –
or to go into reverse with the Tories’.6
On the eve of Roy Jenkins’ April Budget, Wilson secretly decided to
hold the general election in June, in the hope he would to steal a march
on the Conservatives, as they were preparing for an October poll. During
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the following weeks, events seemed to confirm Wilson’s decision.
Opinion polls gave Labour a lead for the first time in years; the party’s
by-election performances became less grim; and it made a satisfactory
showing in the local elections. Most economic indicators were also
positive: in particular, the balance of trade remained in the black. As is
common with Prime Ministers, Wilson implicated leading party figures
in his decision, just in case anything went wrong. Few expected it would.
When Wilson went to ask the Queen to dissolve parliament, the vast
majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party was keen for a June contest.
Tony Benn was not alone in imagining Labour had secured a remark-
ably complete recovery in its fortunes; he described other Cabinet
members as ‘euphoric’.7
The Prime Minister’s decision was made with little reference to the
state of the party in the country, although at the end of April he did tip
off the National Agent as to his intentions.8 While by the spring it was
thought members’ morale had greatly improved since the previous
autumn, many activists – especially trade unionists still resentful of wage
controls and In Place of Strife – remained to be won back. A joint meeting
in May of the Cabinet and National Executive Committee (NEC) was
consequently warned by officials that, if a contest was held too early, it
would be ‘very much a “Do it Yourself campaign”’. Transport House
wanted an autumn poll, to allow for the return of more activists and to
give local parties time to relay their organisational foundations.9 In line
with the party’s focus in 1964 and 1966, Wilson was confident he could
deliver victory in 1970 by projecting an attractive personal image through
the voters’ television screens.
A revived organisation?
Labour’s experience in the marginal constituency of Halifax typified
that endured in many other parts of the country.10 Immediately after
winning the seat in 1966 the constituency Labour party (CLP) suffered
a dramatic decline, so that, as early as the spring of 1967, it was short
of both members and money. Activists became increasingly disenchanted:
price rises, Common Market entry negotiations, devaluation of the
pound and prescription charges were all criticised at meetings of the
general management committee (GMC). A resolution demanding that
ministers ‘cease their numerous deviations from socialist policy’, in order
to ‘preserve the fast dwindling solidarity within the Socialist party’, was
defeated only through the chair’s casting vote. By early 1968, members
who remained on the books retreated into inactivity: meetings became
inquorate; it proved impossible to find enough candidates to contest
all wards in the local elections; and in the autumn the agent resigned to
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seek a constituency that could pay his salary. Loyalist speeches from the
constituency MP, Edith Summerskill, which stressed Labour’s support
for the social services, cut little ice. Despite a few initiatives, such as a
new bingo scheme to raise revenue and the introduction of coffee even-
ings to reach potential recruits, the party was falling apart. The CLP
had even ceased to function as a social institution: in 1969 the annual
flower show was cancelled.
If this experience was common enough, Halifax was unique in being
able to rely on the expertise of Sara Barker, Labour’s former National
Agent, who settled in the town after her time at Transport House came
to an end. When in January 1970 she offered her services, the GMC
responded ’with acclamation’. Barker’s survey of the CLP showed how
dire the situation was: only four out of fifteen ward sections were function-
ing, and there were just ninety-eight paid-up members. The party would
recover, she informed the GMC, only with the ‘hearty co-operation of
every Labour worker’, and she concluded her address ‘with an eloquent
appeal for Socialist loyalty, for personal involvement in the life and service’
of the party. Barker’s efforts in the town revealed the possibilities but
also limits to this venerable Labour voluntarism. During the spring, Barker
conducted a remarkably energetic revival campaign. Through circulars,
personal letters and home visits, existing ward organisations were urged
to contact ex-members; where wards had disintegrated, Barker cajoled
activists to re-establish them. As a result, by the time Wilson called the
election on 18 May, the number of functioning ward sections had doubled
and membership stood at 230. Yet the CLP was still judged to have
‘literally no organisation to enable it to fight an election’. The position
elsewhere was, if anything, even worse. The elderly activists of South
East Bristol were taken so unawares by the election that they did not
have enough envelopes in which to put their candidate’s address.11
Once Wilson announced the election date, most gaps in the party’s
ranks were filled either by new faces or by activists who had left the fold
after 1966. In London, at least, organisation and morale were thought
comparable to those in 1964: as a senior organiser in the capital noted,
it was ‘the happiest election I have experienced and the enthusiasm
was tremendous’. Some even optimistically imagined Wilson might have
won if Labour had not peaked too soon.12
Wilson’s personal campaign, the focus of the national party’s efforts,
was informed by his desire to appear confident and responsible:
‘presidential’ was the often-used term.13 Inspired by the Queen’s then
novel practice of mingling with crowds, Wilson indulged in numerous
‘walk-abouts’, after which the Prime Minister visited local party offices
to enthuse activists, which in practice meant delivering brief, banal
speeches to tame audiences. There was, however, a bit more to Labour’s
campaign than smiles and sunshine. Wilson’s basic proposition was that
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his government had been economically ‘responsible’, even at the risk of
losing electoral support. Yet, as he informed those watching his last
television broadcast of the campaign, economic strength was not an end
in itself. ‘The socialism I believe in’, he stated, ‘means above all using
all our resources for making Britain a better place to live in and for a
Labour government this means sharing prosperity in a way which is fair
and just’. Thus poverty had to be rooted out and bad housing eradicated,
while the social services, health provision and educational resources all
had to be strengthened. ‘It means, above all’, he concluded, ‘accepting
that individual misfortune is not just a private concern but a community
concern, that we are all members one of another’.14
Workers
Immediately before the poll, Wilson believed his stress on Selsdon man
had decisively turned the tide against Heath.15 Defeat therefore came
as a massive shock and numerous short-term influences were blamed,
in particular the publication of a bad set of trade figures. The England
football team’s three–two reverse at the hands of West Germany in the
World Cup was even thought significant. To be fair, leading Conser-
vatives were also unsure quite how they managed to beat Wilson.16
More substantively, the result was noteworthy in three respects. First,
while representing a great recovery from Labour’s nadir of 1967–8, at
43 per cent the party’s share of votes cast was its lowest since before
1945. Secondly, at 4.7 per cent, the swing to the Conservatives was the
largest post-war shift of support between the two parties. Finally, turnout
fell to a post-1945 low of 71.4 per cent, from 75.8 per cent in 1966 –
and a full 12 per cent less than in 1950. While there were a variety of
possible causes for the last, contemporary analysts thought that, Selsdon
man notwithstanding, many voters felt Labour and the Conservatives
were just too similar to make voting necessary.17
As the weeks passed, an increasing number in the party were struck
by the fact that a significant proportion of abstainers came from the
‘traditional’ working class, those whose support Labour had once taken
for granted. The NEC elliptically conceded that Labour had ‘failed to
stir the enthusiasm, beliefs and interests of the voters’ and lost ‘that
natural link through which people see in the Labour Party the expression
of their own aspirations’.18 Members of the Scottish Council were rather
more direct; they believed Labour’s campaign, with its focus on person-
ality, had been the primary cause of a ‘quiet and lifeless election’. They
argued Labour should have presented itself as a ‘fighting enthusiastic
radical force’, on the basis that this would have aroused working-class
voters.19 The implication for left-leaning activists was clear: as Salford
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East’s executive committee concluded, Labour lost because Wilson had
failed to carry out left-inspired and pro-union conference decisions.
Voters saw little difference between the parties because Labour had not
properly represented the workers’ interests.20
Much party analysis read like a mirror image of that produced after
1959: Labour had apparently lost ‘traditional’ supporters while retain-
ing much of its hold on ‘younger couples in the newer housing areas’
established in 1964 and 1966.21 The impression from marginal constitu-
encies such as Bristol North West was that, after 1966, Labour’s problems
were mainly located in areas in which council estates predominated,
whereas matters were less troubling where private housing was com-
mon.22 Experienced regional organisers like Jim Raisin even believed
Labour’s best hope was to cultivate those who first voted for the party
in 1966, to compensate for the decline in working-class support.23 Less
impressionistic evidence from National Opinion Poll surveys suggests
(see Table 9.1) that in 1970 Labour was indeed better represented
among the middle class than in 1964, but enjoyed less support from
unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers.
While one leading Labour woman blamed defeat on ‘working class
folly’, in that normally loyal voters had been ‘bemused and beguiled
into voting Conservative’, more humble female activists, albeit hardly
left-wing ones, thought workers had abandoned the party because they
‘had not been fairly dealt with’ by the government.24 This latter per-
spective prevailed at the party’s conference in the autumn of 1970.25
Especially in light of Heath’s proposed industrial relations legislation,
delegates argued that Labour should fall in line behind the unions and
oppose what was described as the new Prime Minister’s ‘own special
Table 9.1 The composition of the Labour vote, 1964–70
Category 1964 1966 1970 Difference,
1964–70
All 44.8 48.7 43.8 –1.0
AB (upper and professional
middle class) 8.9 15.5 10.4 +1.5
C1 (lower middle class) 24.8 29.9 30.5 +5.7
C2 (skilled manual working class) 54.4 58.5 55.4 +1.0
DE (semi/unskilled working class) 59.1 65.2 57.3 –1.8
Men 48.3 52.4 47.3 –1.0
Women 41.7 45.4 40.6 –1.1
Source: D. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1964 (1965), p. 296;
D. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1966 (1966), p. 264; and D. Butler
and M. Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General Election of 1970 (1971), p. 342.
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brand of maidenly lower middle class warfare’. Jack Jones was but the
most eloquent exponent of the view that all the people’s interests were
best served by the actions of shopfloor militants free from government
meddling. The union movement was, he declared, the ‘shield and
defender of workers everywhere’. Jones’ speech brought NEC member
and MP Walter Padley, no radical, to tears because Padley thought it
summed up ‘what it was all about – the class war’.26
In complete contrast, the revisionist John Mackintosh considered the
conference ‘a curious, muddled, rather sad affair’, as defeat had en-
couraged ‘a return to the womb, a retreat into primitive attitudes on
the part of a large section of the Party’, behind an unqualified defence
of the unions.27 If Mackintosh criticised the left for its conservatism,
new thinking was hardly evident among the party’s leading revisionists.
Once the shock of defeat had passed, Tony Crosland produced a Fabian
pamphlet, described as ‘a coherent statement of democratic socialism
for the 1970s’.28 Yet Crosland merely concluded that The Future of
Socialism remained relevant, meaning a ‘clear reaffirmation of ideals’
was all that was required. He simply reiterated his belief that growth
was ‘an essential condition of any significant allocation of resources’,
without which Labour could not promote equality. Consequently, a future
Labour government would have to reject those Treasury orthodoxies
that had thwarted the pursuit of growth during 1964–70. It would also
have to apply an incomes policy, which meant overcoming union oppo-
sition. Very much as he had done immediately after 1959, Crosland
stated that Labour should not be afraid of the latter course, for it was a
‘broad-based, national people’s party; [so] it must not be deterred from
finding national solutions to national problems’.
Other revisionists, less restrained by leadership position, called for
Labour to loosen its ties with the unions in particular and the working
class in general. Even before defeat, Christopher Mayhew, who had
resigned as one of Wilson’s ministers, noted that many workers were
deeply conservative on subjects such as black immigration, abortion and
capital punishment, much more so than the middle class. Moreover,
while Labour aimed to create a classless society, the unions upon whom
it relied organised themselves exclusively on the basis of class, and so
emphasised conflict over reconciliation.29 In private Crosland, Roy
Jenkins and Denis Healey, Labour’s three most significant revisionists,
echoed such thoughts, which had also been aired after 1959. They
agreed it was necessary to ‘minimise the Party role of the trades unions’
and appeared to think they could rely on the CLPs to achieve that end,
as activists were moving away from the left.30 This betrayed a profound
ignorance of grass-roots opinion, something that would not have mattered
so much in the past, when Hugh Gaitskell could rely on the union block
vote to neutralise leftist sentiment. However, having alienated the unions
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while in government and still managing to lose office, after 1970 the
revisionists no longer controlled the levers of power in the party. In
frustration Mayhew joined the Liberals in 1974; he was but the first of
many to take leave of Labour.
Women
In February 1970, the ex-Cabinet minister Fred Lee wrote to Wilson to
say that equal pay was a ‘subject which properly put, can be political
dynamite in bringing in the women’s vote’.31 According to survey evi-
dence, however, in June women abandoned Labour at about the same
rate as men, and that from a much lower base. The main reason for this
shift was widely believed to be inflation, an issue the Conservatives
exploited with alacrity: Heath had even declared the contest a ‘shopping
basket election’. Labour women certainly thought his promise to deal
with rising prices ‘at a stroke’ played an important part in determining
female affiliations.32
Labour’s reaction to its failure with women was mixed. For their sup-
posed susceptibility to Conservative propaganda, Lena Jeger criticised
housewives for being ‘politically less mature’ than their husbands.33
Barbara Castle, however, suggested Labour itself was largely to blame,
if even working-class women believed that the party was too concerned
to increase male wages to be bothered with keeping prices down.34
In any case, not all women responded to Labour’s period in office in
the same way. Data generated by the British Election Study suggest that
between 1966 and 1970, compared to their male counterparts, women
in the working class, as well as those under twenty-five and over sixty-
four years of age, moved strongly against Labour (see Tables 9.2 and
9.3). However, women aged between twenty-five and sixty-four and those
in the intermediate class moved relatively closer to the party. In crude
terms, Labour did worst with young and old working-class women but
better among white-collar, middle-aged women. It is possible to suggest
why: the former group contained most full-time housewives – those in
their twenties or thirties with children to care for and others over sixty
drawing their pensions – while the latter included most of those in full-
or part-time employment. Hence, if not quite ‘dynamite’, Labour’s
announcement regarding equal pay helped it retain the loyalties of women
in work, while those whose main concern was with consumption were
less impressed. Overall, however, prices rather than wages – that is, the
domestic sphere rather than the workplace – continued to dominate
most women’s horizons.
Defeat only increased enthusiasm at Transport House for organis-
ational change. From seventy-one in 1970, the number of women’s councils
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more than doubled a year later, by then being described as ‘the main
unit of women’s organisation’.35 This proved a severe emotional wrench
for some stalwarts. At the last meeting of Flintshire and Denbighshire’s
advisory council, due to be replaced by a women’s council, members
spoke of nearly three decades of attendance and declared ‘they would
miss it very much’, for the advisory council had been ‘so dear to their
hearts’. The long-standing secretary recorded that, as she wrote those
minutes, ‘I am not ashamed to say that I am wiping my tears away,
Table 9.2 Women and Labour voting, by social class and age, 1964–70
Category 1964 1966 1970 Difference,
1964–70
Social class
Professional 17.2 19.8 23.4 +6.2
Intermediate 24.3 25.4 32.9 +8.6
Working class 63.4 68.1 53.2 –10.2
Age
Under 25 57.2 64.2 51.9 –5.3
25–44 50.3 52.4 44.8 –5.5
45–64 42.2 48.2 43.5 +1.3
Above 64 44.5 50.3 29.3 –15.2
Source: I. Crewe, A. Fox and N. Day, The British Electorate 1963–1992 (Cambridge,
1995), Table 1.14.
Table 9.3 Men and Labour voting, by social class and age, 1964–70
Category 1964 1966 1970 Difference,
1964–70
Social class
Professional 17.1 20.0 25.3 +8.2
Intermediate 26.2 34.3 32.3 +6.1
Working class 65.0 70.1 60.7 –4.3
Age
Under 25 45.5 50.3 52.3 +6.8
25–44 50.0 60.5 48.8 –1.2
45–64 46.2 51.4 45.8 –0.4
Above 64 45.6 49.2 44.4 –1.2
Source: I. Crewe, A. Fox and N. Day, The British Electorate 1963–1992 (Cambridge,
1995), Table 1.14.
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thinking of happy years spent together, with these delegates’.36 Despite
the exit of such stalwarts from the scene, the new bodies failed to create
many bridges to wider society but, as the 1970s progressed, did become
the site for much more radical political activities.37
There is some evidence that Labour women were becoming slightly
less tolerant of their accustomed place in the party, something which
was brought to a head by the small number of female candidates selected
to contest the 1970 election. The 1970 women’s conference even dis-
cussed a resolution that called on the NEC to ensure future short-lists
contained at least one woman. This was, however, remitted at the request
of the National Labour Women’s Advisory Council (NLWAC), which
nonetheless promised to put the matter to the NEC, although delegates
were warned CLPs would resent such a stipulation.38 The NLWAC also
established a sub-committee to look into the subject, but in the end it
merely called on the NEC to ask CLPs to give greater consideration to
the need to promote higher numbers of women candidates. This the
NEC duly did, but few were optimistic that the exhortation would pro-
duce results and the emphasis remained on the need for a ‘change of
attitude’ rather than structural reform.39 It would take two decades before
Labour forced CLPs to alter their selection procedures.
Black immigrants
Looking to the future, the young Neil Kinnock, candidate for a safe seat
in 1970, told a pre-election gathering of Glamorgan Labour women that
race relations would become as important to his generation as un-
employment was in the 1930s.40 It would have been surprising if many
of Kinnock’s audience wanted this prediction to come true for, just as
they had been at the start of the 1960s, most Labour members – like the
majority of their white compatriots – wanted the issue to disappear, by
black immigrants becoming fully assimilated into the ‘British way of life’.
While some party members exhibited a greater sensitivity to the issue
than hitherto, Labour remained an imperfect means of promoting black
integration; for example, only one non-white delegate attended the
party’s 1968 annual conference.41 Moreover, at the start of the 1970s
activists in places such as Nelson in Lancashire and Handsworth in
Birmingham continued to treat immigrants as different to whites, and
still relied on intermediaries to reach the former.42 This suited white
activists, as it won them black votes while maintaining the established
character of their organisations; it also bolstered the prestige of those
who liaised between Labour and their own communities. Few, however,
now saw it as a way of advancing integration: it was instead employed
as its substitute.
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As the election approached, James Callaghan considered producing
a White Paper to redefine British nationality so as to restrict immigra-
tion further. More for practical than principled reasons he abandoned
the idea, only for Heath’s government to take it up.43 It would have
been unusual for a Labour Home Secretary to take the initiative on this
matter: the government had twice restricted black immigration but only
because party leaders feared the state of public opinion meant they had
no alternative. Partly because of Wilson’s tightening of immigration, it
was less salient in 1970 than in 1964. Yet, if Conservative and Labour
leaderships managed to prevent most of their candidates referring to
immigration on the hustings, this did not mean voters ignored it. A
subsequent academic survey suggested that Enoch Powell’s regular inter-
ventions after 1968 so encouraged the public to imagine Conservative
policy was closer to their prejudices than was Labour that Heath won
an extra 6.7 per cent of votes cast.44 Fearing that very outcome, Wilson
wanted to pay no attention to Powell, as he assumed any rebuttals would
concentrate minds on a subject from which, given the state of opinion,
Labour could only lose. He was therefore extremely annoyed when Benn
reacted to Powell raising immigration during the campaign by publicly
comparing his views to those the Nazis held about the Jews. While Benn
thought the issue too important to ignore, his speech nonetheless
brought little light to the subject.45
Labour selected only one black parliamentary candidate in 1970,
that being David Pitt, who first stood for the party in 1959. This time
he contested the fairly safe seat of Clapham rather than, as previously,
the Conservative bastion of Hampstead. Pitt, however, suffered a massive
swing to the Conservatives, of 10.8 per cent, one far greater than experi-
enced in comparable constituencies, and so failed to retain the seat for
Labour. As an indication either that the party had done too little to
promote integration or of the ingrained nature of white prejudice, a
significant number of the party’s accustomed supporters clearly felt un-
able to vote for a black candidate.46
The young
Some in the party believed Labour had created a problem for itself
when the government enfranchised eighteen-year-olds. Although the
young might have been broadly sympathetic to progressive ends, it was
not clear how many would vote: at best, they were an unknown quantity.
As it transpired, in 1970 Labour won the support of just over half of
voters under twenty-five; this was higher, if not dramatically so, than
support registered among some older cohorts (see Tables 9.2 and 9.3).
The extent to which this influenced the overall result must remain
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unknown, especially as fewer than two-thirds of potential new electors
were registered to vote.47
Labour members’ mistrust of the young, especially students, survived
the events of 1968; it had, after all, long pre-dated them. Yet, as the
party’s National Youth Officer pleaded, activists should not write off
students because of their far-left activities – if only because there were
too many to ignore.48 Since cutting its links with the National Associ-
ation of Labour Student Organisations (NALSO), the NEC had not seen
the need for another means of mobilising their support. To meet good
this lack, Students for a Labour Victory (SLV) was established in 1970 –
although that was largely the brainchild of Jack Straw, President of the
Leeds Students Union, and Hugh Anderson, President of the Cambridge
Union. They persuaded a reluctant NEC of the advantages of backing
this nominally independent body.49
It was hoped that SLV would appeal to students’ apparent desire to
see ideals put before self-interest and, while noting that in that regard
Labour had fallen short – especially over immigration and Vietnam – it
was said to have some achievements to its credit. Moreover, given the
Conservative alternative, Labour was presented as students’ only hope
of ever seeing their ideals put into practice.50 Although it was disbanded
shortly after Wilson lost office, SLV led to the establishment of the National
Organisation of Labour Students in 1971 as a permanent successor to
NALSO, although it is doubtful whether this new body made more of
an impact than its predecessor.
Labour remained stumped by the conundrum posed by the young
in general. Bristol South East’s aged agent, Herbert Rogers, was but one
activist who, after 1970, made the familiar assertion that ‘Something
must be done to educate and organise the young voter’, as it was ‘useless
to expect an intelligent political reaction’ from untutored eighteen-year-
olds.51 Many would have sympathised with Wilson when he reportedly
dismissed one long-haired heckler during the campaign by stating that:
‘You’re too young to know anything’.52 At the very least, these attitudes
did not help Labour attract youngsters on a significant scale – and
during the 1970s its youth wing would once again fall victim to a small
band of far-left zealots, this time those organised by Militant Tendency.
Participation
While the decline in the proportion of those voting in June might be
read as a sign of increasing alienation from the political system, by 1970
most contemporaries believed the problem of ‘participation’ had
receded. Certainly, in Scotland and Wales the nationalist challenge had
evaporated. In 1969 Labour held on to Glasgow Gorbals in a by-election
fielding ch 9.P65 10/10/03, 12:37228
Conclusion 229
against what was feared would be an insuperable challenge from the
Scottish National Party; and the investiture of Prince Charles as Prince
of Wales in the same year helped mobilise unionist opinion against
Plaid Cymru. Apparently confirming voters’ real feelings about in-
dependence from Westminster, the 1970 election saw the nationalist
parties win only 11 per cent of votes cast in their respective countries.
More widely, however, Benn, whose speeches during 1968 had done
much to highlight the need to reconnect the people to established
politics, thought one cause of Labour’s defeat had been its failure to
address the concerns of those ‘new citizens’ who demanded more self-
government.53 His was not quite a lone voice. In 1969 an editorial in
Socialist Commentary, reflecting the views of revisionists like Mackintosh,
stated that student radicals had exposed real problems with repre-
sentative democracy, in particular the remoteness of decision-making.
Despite this, all the political parties, and Labour in particular, were
‘geared to the traditional political process stemming from another era;
their members seem to spend endless hours debating resolutions calling
on the Government to do this or that, or condemning it for not doing
the other – most of which is a futile exercise, altering nothing’. There
was, it suggested, a pressing need to reconsider how the party related
to society in light of its failure to make links with those ‘practical
idealists’ among the young. However, the only concrete measure Socialist
Commentary proposed was Benn’s earlier (and by then frustrated) Citizens
for Labour initiative.54
The loss of hitherto impregnable council majorities across the country
during 1967 and 1968 had also forced some activists to rethink their
relationship with the communities they hoped to serve. In 1967 Labour
lost control of Salford City Council for the first time since 1945, and
then failed to win it back the following year. This initially galvanised
activists to criticise how they conducted politics locally. While many
blamed government policy for the swing in Salford, it was nonetheless
appreciated that their own organisation needed to be ‘drastically over-
hauled’ if it was ever to regain a majority. This sentiment led to the
promise to create a ‘new form of meeting’ in wards, by cutting out routine
and stressing political debate and the discussion of local issues.55 Wards
became more active than they had been for many years – running recruit-
ment campaigns, distributing leaflets, organising petitions and holding
public meetings – for they could openly oppose the shortcomings of
what was now Conservative Council policy and exploit popular dis-
content over issues such as rehousing and traffic congestion. The party
also became more involved with tenants’ associations, bodies that in the
past some had seen in threatening terms.56
The response to defeat in neighbouring Manchester was more muted.
Nonetheless, even there the chair of Newton Heath ward considered
fielding ch 9.P65 10/10/03, 12:37229
230 Fielding
the Labour Group of councillors should produce a ‘Policy that the people
want and not what they want them to have’.57 Defeat also meant Ardwick
ward revived its advice centre and ran it weekly – if only because the
newly elected Conservative councillors did the same.58 As the City of
Cardiff Labour Party declared, the route back to power meant activists
‘must start again with leaflets and knocking on doors and [holding]
public meetings’. Labour ‘must become a Movement and not just a
collection of administrators’, while wards should become more involved
in their own communities by tackling problems themselves rather than
simply reporting them to the relevant authority.59
The extent to which this meant reviving old – rather than creating
new – ways of doing politics should be clear. Even so, Labour’s 1970
manifesto highlighted to an unprecedented extent the party’s desire to
increase more direct participation in decision-making. Although partici-
pation was still considered a marginal issue by many, it had nonetheless
started to shuffle in from the wings. The creation of the Crowther-Hunt
Commission meant constitutional change remained alive and if the
motives of Cabinet ministers like Callaghan for establishing this body
can be questioned, there were, it should be recalled, others who hoped
it would lead to a federal Britain.
Conclusion
This work has been underpinned by the assumption that Labour’s
generally unimpressive post-war electoral performances were not the
inevitable result of cultural change. In line with much of what has been
described as the ‘new political history’, the relationship between party
and society has been interpreted as being determined by a combination
of the peculiar circumstances in which Labour existed and the party’s
own understanding of and response to that context.60 It was, therefore,
at least possible that the party could have done better, had members
more accurately identified the nature and meaning of change and
responded in the appropriate manner. Some elements in the party did
react much more positively than has usually been supposed but, overall,
Labour hindered rather than helped itself. However, the dominant
response to that failure, or at least Wilson’s loss of office – the ‘return to
class’ – was probably even more disastrous for the party’s longer-term
fortunes. But that is another story.
The book’s main focus has been on what was said and done (and not
done) within the Labour Party. This is not because, on its own, the
party’s internal culture explained its electoral fortunes. After all, Labour
won one of its most famous victories, in 1966, despite a crumbling
organisation; and the party lost in 1959 and 1970 for reasons more
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compelling than, for example, many members’ hostility to the young.
Instead, the work has concentrated on Labour’s internal culture to pro-
mote a broader understanding of the post-war party, to demonstrate its
possibilities and limitations at this particular moment in its history. One
motive was quite basic. Little is known about this culture, which has led
historians to make sweeping – and often inaccurate – generalisations
about its character. If nothing else, therefore, this work should encour-
age a more empathetic appreciation of the party’s plight: so far as
Labour is concerned, it is time we understood a little more and con-
demned a little less. Moreover, ultimately, even if political scientists and
historians cannot precisely measure its impact at any particular general
election, Labour’s internal culture played a significant part in what, at
one point in the 1980s, looked like its terminal decline.
If Labour’s inability to exploit change should no longer be seen as
exclusively dictated by structural factors, this failure was, however, always
likely. No party is able to interpret contemporary developments in a
purely ‘pragmatic’ manner. As society is in constant flux – and in the
1960s that was especially the case – no one can hope to acquire a totally
accurate knowledge of those capricious forces that shape this dynamic.
Moreover, any picture of society a party may assemble can be viewed
only through the inevitably distorting lens of its established ideological
tradition, or ‘discourse’ if you will. Thus, readers should have been
struck by how far Labour members – self-conscious reformers like Tony
Benn as much as more conservative figures such as James Callaghan –
looked on events via a framework constructed well before Clement Attlee
became Prime Minister. This could be an optimistic outlook, being
underpinned by the MacDonaldite confidence that most contemporary
developments could be integrated within the party’s wider purpose. It
was, however, ultimately disabling, insofar as most assumed the party
was under no obligation to change its nature to accommodate such
developments better.
This reluctance to change the party in even some fairly modest ways
was not informed just by political considerations, although some
believed ‘socialism’ had achieved its least worst expression in the shape
of the Labour Party. It was partly because members of any political party
are unavoidably subject to society’s prevailing cultural norms. These
notions of how people should think and behave are, in fact, often more
insidious in shaping perceptions than formal ideology, and can
structure understandings of how a particular belief system may be made
manifest at any one point in time. It is likely some readers were struck,
for example, by contemporary claims that one could oppose black
immigration and be a socialist. At the start of the twenty-first century
this seems contradictory. Given a proper appreciation of the nature of
British society during the 1960s, it should be understandable why to
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many – but not all – loyal Labour members it was an unremarkable
proposition.
During the ‘Golden Age’ many established norms were attacked,
albeit by a minority (although an articulate and loud one). This assault
challenged not so much the ends of Labour politics as much as its means.
With regard to the latter, party members believed socialism (however it
was conceived) would come gradually as a result of conventional electoral
work that focused on winning power at Westminster. While one object
was to reconcile differences, the party would achieve this by largely
basing itself on the support of a white, patriarchal working class, although
remaining open to the help and guidance of enlightened members of
the bourgeoisie. It was not exactly clear at the time how far those who
criticised this strategy were harbingers of History or eccentrics soon to
find a place in Posterity’s dustbin. The Britain of 1970 was, after all,
structurally very similar to that of 1960; if some keenly felt the impact
of radical change, for others change was imperceptible. Therefore, party
members’ often sceptical response to criticism was at least understand-
able: if Labour’s tradition generally pointed in the wrong direction at
the time, the right road, to be fair, was never particularly clear.
When it came to arguments over cultural norms, Labour members
broadly found themselves on one side of the argument, the one that
favoured continuity – or at least incremental reform – over radical trans-
formation. That so many were of the generation that remembered the
1930s and 1940s played a significant part here: theirs was a socialism
of unemployment and austerity rather than affluence and freedom of
expression. It was only in the years immediately following 1970 that
party membership underwent a generational shift, when many of those
who criticised the party in the 1960s tried to convert it to their way of
doing politics.61 The impact of these younger radicals and militant
feminists on the party’s electoral fortunes – one hesitates to lay all the
blame for 1983 on their shoulders – suggests they hardly enjoyed a
privileged insight into cultural change either.
In outlining Labour members’ reaction to their party’s defeat in 1970
it is, finally, striking how little their understanding of society had
changed since the 1950s, perceptions that themselves harked back to
the party’s earliest days and before. The ‘return to class’ confirmed by
the 1970 party conference was not an about-turn resulting from minds
having been changed by experience. It was instead a question of the
left, whose views had hitherto been sidelined, being able to assert them-
selves, thanks to unprecedented union support, over a parliamentary
leadership still attached to an essentially (but apparently discredited)
revisionist strategy. Those who, well before the 1959 general election,
believed Labour’s purpose was largely defined by representing the inter-
ests of mainly male-orientated unions could now exert an influence,
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along with the newly arrived younger radicals, over policy-making pre-
viously denied them. This they did with alacrity.62
In a similar vein, party officials noted that the 1970 campaign had
exposed well known organisational deficiencies, principally a lack of
money, of young and motivated activists as well as of experienced
agents.63 As of old, some considered these flaws could be overcome if
the right evangelical spirit was allied to hard work in the constituencies.
The former minister Arthur Skeffington was due to chair Labour’s 1970
conference but, stricken by terminal illness, he was unable to preside.
Skeffington had, however, written his chair’s address, which Sir Harry
Nicholas, the party’s ineffectual General Secretary, read out to delegates
as its mute author sat on the platform. Noting an apparent upsurge in
enthusiasm for Labour immediately after the election, Skeffington, via
Nicholas, appealed as follows:
This time, comrades, we must tap that source of support. Every ward
must have a membership drive. Try and get one or two collectors
from among your new members. Organisation doesn’t win elections
but it helps! We need more members and more money, so that we
can take full advantage of our next electoral opportunity.64
Skeffington was a dying man and his attachment to past methods was
emotionally understandable; even so, both for him and for those who
sat listening and agreeing with his words, time might as well have been
standing still.
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